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

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Napoleon

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MEMOIRS

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

BY M. DE BOURRIENNE,

HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY.

TO WHICH ARE NOW FIRST ADDED,

AN ACCOUNT OF THE IMPORTANT EVENTS OF THE HUNDRED DAYS, OF NAPOLEON'S SURRENDER TO THE ENGLISH, AND OF HIS RESIDENCE AND DEATH AT ST. HELENA.

WITH

ANECDOTES AND ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES

FROM ALL THE MOST AUTHENTIC SOURCES.

"Ah! Bourrienne, you also will be immortal!" said Napoleon.—"How, Sire?"—"Are you not my Secretary?"

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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CARLO BUONAPARTE, FATHER OF NAPOLEON.

LETITIA RAMOLINO, MOTHER OF NAPOLEON. PORTRAIT HANGING IN ROOM OF HIS BIRTH IN HOUSE AT AJACCIO.

PREFACE

BY THE EDITOR OF THE PRESENT EDITION.

In introducing the present new edition of Monsieur de Bourrienne's Memoirs to the public, we are bound, as editors, to say a few words on the subject. Agreeing, however, with Horace Walpole, that it is an impertinent thing for an editor to dwell for any length of time on the merits of his author, we shall touch but lightly on this part of the matter. We are the more ready to abstain, since the great success in England of the former editions of these Memoirs, and the high reputation they have acquired on the European continent, and in every part of the civilized world where the fame of Bonaparte has ever reached, sufficiently establish the merits of M. de Bourrienne as a biographer. These merits seem to us to consist chiefly in an anxious desire to be impartial, to tell the bad as well as the good of a most wonderful man; and in a peculiarly graphic power of relating facts and anecdotes. With this happy faculty Bourrienne would have made the life of almost any active individual interesting; but the subject of which the most favourable circumstances permitted him to treat, was brimful of events and of the most extraordinary facts. The hero of his history was such a being as the world has produced only on the rarest

occasions, and the complete counterpart to whom has, probably, never existed; for there are broad shades of difference between Napoleon and Alexander, Cæsar, and Charlemagne; neither will modern history furnish more exact parallels, since Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, Cromwell, Washington, or Bolivar, bears but a small resemblance to Bonaparte either in character, fortune or extent of enterprise. For fourteen years, to say nothing of his projects in the East, the history of Bonaparte was the history of all Europe!

With the copious materials he possessed, M. de Bourrienne has produced a work, which, for deep interest, excitement and amusement, can scarcely be paralleled by any of the numerous and excellent memoirs for which the literature of France is so justly celebrated.

M. de Bourrienne shows us the hero of Marengo and Austerlitz in his nightgown and slippers—with a *trait-de-plume* he, in a hundred instances, places the real man before us, with all his personal habits and peculiarities of manner, temper, and conversation.

The friendship between Bonaparte and Bourrienne began in boyhood, at the school of Brienne, and their unreserved intimacy continued during all the most brilliant part of Napoleon's career. We have said enough:—the motives for his writing this work, and his competency for the task, will be best explained in M. de Bourrienne's own words, which the reader will find in the Introductory Chapter.

In the preceding English edition of this Work, considerable care was bestowed to increase its usefulness, by means of notes and extracts from the memorialists of St. Helena, and from other French and English writers, civil as well as military, who have treated of the career, or of any part of the career, of the Man of his Age. In the present edition these notes have been considerably increased by facts and anecdotes collected from some of the best writers of Germany, Italy, and Spain, and by information obtained from private sources—that is to say, from honourable individuals who have been actors in, or spectators of some of the remarkable occurrences of the first

twenty years of the nineteeth century, but who have not hitherto published their remarks in any way. Since the completion of the last edition several good works have appeared, both in England and on the continent, that bear on this important subject. These books also have been consulted. The text and the translation have been moreover carefully revised, and many errors and misinterpretations of words and phrases that existed in the last issue of the Work, have been removed.

M. de Bourrienne says little of Napoleon after his first abdication and retirement to Elba in 1814: we have endeavoured to fill up the chasm thus left by following his hero through the remaining seven years of his life, to the "last scenes of all" that ended his "strange, eventful history,"—to his deathbed and alien grave at Saint Helena. A completeness will thus be given to the Work which it did not before possess, and which we hope will, with the other additions and improvements already alluded to, tend to give it a place in every well-selected library, as one of the most satisfactory of all the lives of Napoleon.

In what we have done ourselves, we have been guided by a spirit of impartiality. In common with Bourrienne, we have in many instances ventured to differ from the *ex-parte* statements of Savary (the notorious Duke of Rovigo), the Count Las Cases, and some others of Napoleon's adherents; but, we trust, that we have never been led away by prejudice, and in no single instance have stated controverted facts except on the highest authorities. Englishmen as we are, we are quite ready to allow that during the prosecution of the last tremendous war, *all* the fault did not rest with Bonaparte. Carlo Botta, the great historian of modern Italy, justly observes, that republicans and royalists, emperors, kings, the pope, the ministers in the different cabinets of Europe, and the different generals in the field, all erred, and were often not merely politically and strategetically, but *morally* wrong.

To increase the value of the present edition, which, altogether, ought rather to be looked upon as a new book than as

After the death of Bonaparte, at St. Helena, reasons of a different nature retarded the execution of my plan. The tranquillity of a secluded retreat was indispensable, for preparing and putting in order the abundant materials in my possession. I found it also necessary to read a great number of works, in order to rectify important errors, to which the want of authentic documents had induced the authors to give credit. This much desired retreat was found. I had the good fortune to be introduced, through a friend, to the Duchess de Brancas, and that lady invited me to pass some time on one of her estates in Hainault. Received with the most amiable hospitality, I have there enjoyed that tranquillity which could alone have rendered the publication of these volumes practicable.

INTRODUCTION.

The desire of speculating on an illustrious name can alone have given birth to the multitude of publications under the titles of historical memoirs, secret memoirs, and other rhapsodies which have appeared respecting Napoleon. On looking into them it is difficult to determine whether the impudence of the writers, or the simplicity of certain readers, is most astonishing. Yet these rude and ill-digested compilations, filled with absurd anecdotes, fabricated speeches, fictitious crimes or virtues, and disfigured by numerous anachronisms, instead of being consigned to just contempt and speedy oblivion, have been pushed into notice by speculators, and have found zealous partisans and enthusiastic apologists.

The spirit of party has availed itself of every thing in the writings published on Napoleon, capable of supporting, according to the events, its different opinions and pretensions. These writings are either invectives or hymns of glory, in which censure or admiration are lavished without measure; they are full of errors, and are, in fact, a kind of mystification, under the disguise of history.

Posterity certainly will not judge Napoleon as his contemporaries have judged him, in two different ways. In future ages the present vivid and natural recollection of his wonderful triumphs will be much weakened; but, at the same time, the misfortunes which his sixty victories have inflicted on European families, will be forgotten. His wars and his conquests will be estimated solely by their results; his policy, by the utility and duration of his institutions, and by their harmony with the age in which he lived. It will be asked, whether he could not have impressed on the field of history, a less difficult, but deeper path than that of his exploits, and whether he did not prefer the renown which belongs to a great military glory, to the less brilliant, but more durable, reputation of having powerfully contributed to the happiness of mankind.

For a time, I entertained the idea of noticing, one by one, the numerous errors which have been written respecting Napoleon; but I have renounced a task, which would have been too labo-

rious to myself, and very tedious to the reader. I shall, therefore, only correct those which come within the plan of my work, and which are connected with facts, to a more accurate knowledge of which than any other person can possess, I may lay claim. There are men who imagine that nothing done by Napoleon will ever be forgotten; but must not the slow but inevitable influence of time be expected to operate with respect to him? The effect of that influence is, that the most important event of an epoch soon sinks, almost imperceptibly, and almost disregarded, into the immense mass of historical facts. Time, in its progress, diminishes the probability as well as the interest of such an event, as it gradually wears away the most durable monuments.

The greater Napoleon was in the age in which he lived, the more reasonable it is that he should not be estimated lightly. To write his life justly and usefully, information ought to be obtained from all persons who were well acquainted with him in the different stages of his career: we should pause, too, until the passions have passed in review before the judgment. All his deeds, be they, according to the opinion of mankind, good or bad, mean or great, were performed by him with a view to posterity: that was his favourite idol. His irresistible passion for transmitting his name to future ages powerfully animated him, and gave energy to his physical faculties. That transmission was with him the immortality of his soul.

Posterity, for which Napoleon did every thing, has commenced for himself. He, doubtless, will one day have an historian worthy of retracing his actions. Far from aspiring to the immense honour of being his Tacitus, I do not even pretend to write a journal of his life, or to elevate myself to the rank of a biographer.

I shall state, respecting this extraordinary man, whose name alone was a power with which any other can with difficulty be compared, all that I know, have seen and heard, and of which I have preserved numerous notes. With confidence I call him an extraordinary man; for he who was indebted for every thing to himself—who won so many victories—subjugated so many states—obtained absolute power over a great and enlightened nation—scattered crowns among his family—made and unmade kings—who lived to be almost the oldest sovereign in Europe—and who was, without dispute, the most distinguished of his age—certainly was not an ordinary man. But I do not concur in the opinion of that writer who states that all his reign was extraordinary, and, in support of his assertion, cites the battle of Trafalgar. Those who wish to eulogize should not be absurd.

We must not be guilty of self-delusion. Great men, however great they be, have their weaknesses, and are liable to errors and faults. Every one must pay the tribute due to humanity. What can exempt from it? The audience of the world requires,

that he who aspires to act the part of a great man, shall never for a moment forget his character. But so many little things enter into the composition of man, that it is impossible he can be great from morning to night.

I attach only a relative importance to what I am about to lay before the public. I shall give authentic documents. If all persons who have approached Napoleon, at any time and in any place, would candidly record what they saw and heard without passion, the future historian would be rich in materials. It is my wish that he who may undertake the difficult task of writing the history of Napoleon, shall find in my notes information useful to the perfection of his work. There he will at least find truth. I have not the ambition to wish that what I state should be taken as absolute authority; but I hope that it will always be consulted.

I have never before published any thing respecting Napoleon. That malevolence which fastens itself upon men who have the misfortune to be somewhat separated from the crowd has, because there is always more profit in saying ill than good, attributed to me several works on Bonaparte; among others, "Les Mémoires Secrets d'un Homme qui ne l'a pas quitté, par M. B——," and "Mémoires Secrets sur Napoleon Bonaparte," par M. de B——," and "Le Précis Historique sur Napoleon." The initial of my name has served to propagate this error. The incredible ignorance which runs through those memoirs, the absurdities and inconceivable silliness with which they abound, do not permit a man of honour and common sense to allow such wretched rhapsodies to be imputed to him. I declared in 1815, and at later periods, in the French and foreign journals, that I had no hand in those publications, and I here formally repeat this declaration.

But it may be said to me, why should we place more confidence in you, than in those who have written before you?

My reply shall be plain. I enter the lists one of the last. I have read all that my predecessors have published. I am confident that all I state is true. I have no interest in deceiving, no disgrace to fear, no reward to expect. I neither wish to obscure nor embellish his glory. However great Napoleon may have been, was he not also liable to pay his tribute to the weakness of human nature? I speak of Napoleon such as I have seen him, known him, frequently admired, and sometimes blamed him. I state what I saw, heard, wrote, and thought at the time, under each circumstance that occurred. I have not allowed myself to be carried away by the illusions of the imagination, nor to be influenced by friendship or hatred. I shall not insert a single reflection which did not occur to me at the very moment of the event which gave it birth. How many transactions and documents were there over which I could but lament! —how many measures, contrary to my views, to my principles,

with facts; and such only is that which might be entitled, "The History of Napoleon, written by himself."

I have said thus much, because it is my wish that the principles which have guided me in the composition of these Memoirs, may be understood. I am aware that they will not please every reader; that is a success to which I cannot pretend. Some merit, however, may be allowed me, on account of the labour I have undergone. It has neither been of a slight nor an agreeable kind. I made it a rule to read every thing that has been written respecting Napoleon, and I have had to decipher many of his autograph documents, though no longer so familiar with his scrawl as formerly. I say decipher, because a real cipher might often be much more readily understood than the handwriting of Napoleon. My own notes, too, which were often very hastily made, in the hand I wrote in my youth, have sometimes much embarrassed me.

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CALENDAR OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

This calendar was established by a decree of the National Convention, dated October 5, 1793, and began to be used on the 24th of November of the same year, or 4th Frimaire, year II. Each month, which consisted of thirty days, was divided into three parts, and every tenth day called *decadi*, was a holiday. This made for twelve months only 360 days, to which five complementary days were added to complete the period of an ordinary year; of course every fourth, or leap year, required the introduction of a sixth complementary day. The year commenced with the day reckoning from the preceding midnight, on which the autumnal equinox fell at Paris. That day, which corresponded with the 22d of September, was called the 1st Vendémiaire. The era was made to commence from the 22d of September, 1792, which was the epoch of the foundation of the republic. This calendar continued in use until the 10th Nivose, year XIV. or December 31st, 1805, when Bonaparte abolished it, and restored the Gregorian calendar.

NAMES OF THE MONTHS.

		Commencing
AUTUMNAL QUARTER.		
Vendémiaire, or	Vintage month	22d of September,
Brumaire	Fog month	23d of October,
Frimaire	Sleet month	22d of November.
WINTER QUARTER.		
Nivose	Snow month	23d of December,
Pluviose	Rain month	21st of January,
Ventose	Wind month	20th of February.
SPRING QUARTER.		
Germinal	Blossom month	23d of March,
Floréal	Flower month	21st of March,
Prairial	Meadow month	21st of May.
SUMMER QUARTER.		
Messidor	Harvest month	20th of June,
Thermidor	Hot month	20th of July,
Fructidor	Fruit month	19th of August.

In reducing dates from this calendar to the Gregorian, allowance must be made for the intercalary day of leap years.

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

RAWN BY ERIC PAPE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH MADE FOR THE CENTURY MAGA

THE BONAPARTE HOUSE AT AJACCIO, WHERE NAPOLEON WAS BORN.



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH MADE FOR THE CENTURY MAGAZINE.

RECEPTION-ROOM IN THE BONAPARTE HOUSE AT AJACCIO.



DRAWN BY J. GRIGNY.

ROOM IN WHICH NAPOLEON WAS BORN.

ENGRAVED BY GEORGE P. BARTLE.

THE INFANT NAPOLEON IN THE ROOM OF HIS BIRTH.

NAPOLEON, EMPEROR.

From an engraving by Benoist Je, after J. Goubaud.

Paris (no date).

MEMOIRS

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

CHAPTER I.

1769—1783.

Authentic date of Bonaparte's birth—His family ruined by the Jesuits—His taste for military amusements—Sham siege at the college of Brienne—The porter's wife and Napoleon—My intimacy with Bonaparte at college—His love for the mathematics, and his dislike of Latin—He defends Paoli and blames his father—He is ridiculed by his comrades—Ignorance of the Monks—Distribution of prizes at Brienne—Madame de Montesson and the Duke of Orleans—Report of M. Keralio on Bonaparte—He leaves Brienne.

Napoleon Bonaparte was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th of August, 1769; the old orthography of his name was Buonaparte, but he suppressed the *u* during the first campaign in Italy. His motives for so doing were merely to render the spelling conformable with the pronunciation, and to abridge his signature. He signed Buonaparte even after the famous 13th Vendémiaire.

It has been affirmed that he was born in 1768, and that he represented himself to be a year younger than he really was. But this is untrue. When we were both at the Military College of Brienne, he always told me the 9th of August was his birthday, and as I was born on the 9th of July, 1769, our proximity of age served to strengthen our union and friendship.

The false and absurd charge of Bonaparte having misrepresented his age, is decidedly refuted by a note in the register of M. Berton, sub-principal of the college of Brienne, in which it is stated that M. Napoleon de Buonaparte, Ecuyer, born in the city of Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th of August, 1769, left the Royal Military College of Brienne on the 17th October, 1784.

The stories about his low extraction are alike devoid of foundation. His family was poor, and he was educated at the

public expense, an advantage of which many honourable families availed themselves. A memorial addressed by his father, Charles Buonaparte, to the war minister, states that his fortune had been reduced by the failure of some enterprise in which he had engaged, and by the injustice of the Jesuits, by whom he had been deprived of an inheritance. The object of this memorial was to solicit a sub-lieutenant's commission for Napoleon, who was then fourteen years of age, and to get Lucien entered a pupil of the Military College. The minister wrote on the back of the memorial "Give the usual answer, if there be a vacancy;" and on the margin are these words—"This gentleman has been informed that his request is inadmissible as long as his second son remains at the school of Brienne. Two brothers cannot be placed at the same time in the Military Schools." When Napoleon was fifteen, he was sent to Paris until he should attain the requisite age for entering the army. Lucien was not received into the college of Brienne, at least not until his brother had quitted the military school of Paris.

Bonaparte was undoubtedly a man of good family. I have seen an authentic account of his genealogy, which he obtained from Tuscany. A great deal has been said about the civil dissensions which forced his family to quit Italy and take refuge in Corsica. On this subject I have nothing to state.

Many and various accounts have been given of Bonaparte's youth.* He has been described in terms of enthusiastic praise and exaggerated condemnation. It is ever thus with individuals who by talent or favourable circumstances are raised above their

* The following interesting trait of Napoleon's childhood is derived from the Memoirs of the Duchess D'Abrantes:—"He was one day accused by one of his sisters of having eaten a basket full of grapes, figs, and citrons, which had come from the garden of *his uncle the canon*. None but those who were acquainted with the Bonaparte family can form any idea of the enormity of this offence. To eat fruit belonging to the *uncle—the canon*—was infinitely more criminal than to eat grapes and figs which might be claimed by any body else. An inquiry took place. Napoleon denied the fact, and was whipped. He was told that if he would beg pardon he should be forgiven. He protested that he was innocent, but he was not believed. If I recollect rightly, his mother was at the time on a visit to M. de Marbeuf, or some other friend. The result of Napoleon's obstinacy was, that he was kept three whole days upon bread and cheese, and that cheese was not *broccio*. However, he would not cry: he was dull, but not sulky. At length, on the fourth day of his punishment, a little friend of Marianne Bonaparte returned from the country, and, on hearing of Napoleon's disgrace, she confessed that she and Marianne had eaten the fruit. It was now Marianne's turn to be punished. When Napoleon was asked why he had not accused his sister, he replied, that though he suspected that she was guilty, yet out of consideration to her little friend, who had no share in the falsehood, he had said nothing. He was then only seven years of age.

"This fact, which would have been nothing extraordinary in any other child, appeared to me worthy of a place among recollections which are connected with the whole life of Napoleon. It is somewhat characteristic of *the man*. I ought to add that the affair was never forgotten by Napoleon. Of this I observed a proof in 1801, at a fête given by Madame Bacciochi (formerly Marianne Bonaparte) at Neuilly, where she resided with Lucien."—*Editor*.



BONAPARTE ATTACKING SNOW FORTS AT THE SCHOOL OF BRIENNE.

THE REDOUBT AT BRIENNE.

fellow-creatures. Bonaparte himself laughed at all the stories which were got up for the purpose of embellishing or blackening his character in early life. An anonymous publication, entitled the "History of Napoleon Bonaparte, from his Birth to his last Abdication," contains perhaps the greatest collection of false and ridiculous details about his boyhood. Among other things, it is stated that he fortified a garden against the attacks of his comrades, who, a few lines lower down, are described as treating him with *esteem* and *respect*. I remember the circumstances which, probably, gave rise to the fabrication inserted in the work just mentioned; they were as follows:

During the winter of 1783-84, so memorable for heavy falls of snow, Napoleon was greatly at a loss for those retired walks and out-door recreations in which he used to take much delight. He had no alternative but to mingle with his comrades, and for exercise, to walk with them up and down a spacious hall. Napoleon, weary of this monotonous promenade, told his comrades that he thought they might amuse themselves much better with the snow, in the great courtyard, if they would get shovels and make hornworks, dig trenches, raise parapets, cavaliers, &c. "This being done," said he, "we may divide ourselves into platoons, form a siege, and I will undertake to direct the attacks." The proposal, which was received with enthusiasm, was immediately put into execution. This little sham war was carried on for the space of a fortnight, and did not cease until a quantity of gravel and small stones having got mixed with the snow of which we made our bullets, many of the combatants, besiegers as well as besieged, were seriously wounded. I well remember that I was a considerable sufferer from this sort of grapeshot fire.

It is almost unnecessary to contradict the story about the ascent in the balloon. It is now very well known that the hero of that headlong adventure was not young Bonaparte, as has been alleged, but one of his comrades, Dupont de Chambon, who was somewhat mad. Of this his subsequent conduct afforded sufficient proofs.

Bonaparte's mind was directed to objects of a totally different kind. He turned his attention to political science. During some of his vacations he enjoyed the society of the Abbé Raynal, who used to converse with him on government, legislation, commercial relations, &c.

On festival days, when the inhabitants of Brienne were admitted to our amusements, posts were established for the maintenence of order. Nobody was permitted to enter the interior of the building without a card signed by the Principal or Vice-Principal. The rank of officers or sub-officers was conferred according to merit; and Bonaparte one day had the command of a post, when the following little adventure occurred, which affords an instance of his decision of character.

The wife of the porter of the school, who was very well known, because she used to sell milk, fruit, &c., to the pupils, presented herself one Saint Louis day for admittance to the representation of the Death of Cæsar, *corrected*, in which I was to perform the part of Brutus. As the woman had no ticket, and insisted on being admitted without one, some disturbance arose. The serjeant of the post reported the matter to the officer, Napoleon Bonaparte, who in an imperious tone of voice exclaimed: "Send away that woman, who comes here with her camp impudence." This was in 1782.

Bonaparte and I were nine years of age when our friendship commenced. It speedily became very intimate, for there was a certain sympathy of heart between us. I enjoyed this friendship and intimacy until 1784, when he was transferred from the Military College of Brienne to that of Paris. I was one among those of his youthful comrades who could best accommodate themselves to his stern character. His natural reserve, his disposition to meditate on the conquest of Corsica, and the impressions he had received in childhood respecting the misfortunes of his country and his family, led him to seek retirement, and rendered his general demeanour, though in appearance only, somewhat unpleasing. Our equality of age brought us together in the classes of the mathematics and polite literature. His ardent wish to acquire knowledge was remarkable from the very commencement of his studies. When he first came to the college, he spoke only the Corsican dialect, and the Sieur Dupuis, who was Vice-Principal before Father Berton, gave him instructions in the French language. In this he made such rapid progress, that in a short time he commenced the first rudiments of Latin. But in this study he evinced such a repugnance, that at the age of fifteen he was not out of the fourth class. There I left him very speedily; but I could never get before him in the mathematical class, in which he was undoubtedly the cleverest lad at the college. I used sometimes to help him with his Latin themes and versions, in return for the aid he afforded me in the solution of problems, at which he evinced a degree of readiness and facility which perfectly astonished me.

When at Brienne, Bonaparte was remarkable for the dark colour of his complexion (which, subsequently, the climate of France somewhat changed), for his piercing and scrutinizing glance,* and for the style of his conversation both with his

* The Duchess D'Abrantes, speaking of the personal characteristics of Bonaparte in youth and manhood, says, "Saveria told me that Napoleon was never a pretty boy, as Joseph was for example: his head always appeared too large for his body—a defect common to the Bonaparte family. When Napoleon grew up, the peculiar charm of his countenance lay in his eye, especially in the mild expression it assumed in his moments of kindness. His anger, to be sure, was frightful, and though I am no coward, I never could look at him in his fits of rage without



RIC PAPE.

BONAPARTE AND PAOLI AT ROSTINO, SEPTEMBER 9, 1790.



BONAPARTE, AT BRIENNE, INSULTS A PORTRAIT OF CHOISEUL.

masters and comrades. His conversation almost always bore the appearance of ill-humour, and he was certainly not very amiable. This I attribute to the misfortunes his family had sustained, and the impressions made on his mind by the conquest of his country.

The pupils were invited by turns to dine with Father Berton, the head of the school. One day, it being Bonaparte's turn to enjoy this indulgence, some of the professors, who were at table, designedly made some remarks disrespectful of Paoli, of whom they knew the young Corsican was an enthusiastic admirer. "Paoli," observed Bonaparte, "was a great man; he loved his country; and I will never forgive my father, who was his adjutant, for having concurred in the union of Corsica with France. He ought to have followed Paoli's fortune, and have fallen with him."*

Generally speaking, Bonaparte was not much liked by his comrades at Brienne. He was not social with them, and rarely took part in their amusements. I, however, was almost his constant companion. During play-hours, he used to withdraw to the library, where he read with deep interest works of history, particularly Polybius and Plutarch. He was also fond of Arrianus, but did not care much for Quintus Curtius. I often went off to play with my comrades, and left him by himself in the library.

The temper of the young Corsican was not improved by the irritation he frequently experienced from his comrades, who were fond of ridiculing him about his Christian name, Napoleon, and his country. He often said to me, "I will do these French all the mischief I can:" and when I tried to pacify him, he would say, "But you do not ridicule me, you like me."

Father Patrauld, our mathematical professor, was much attached to Bonaparte. He was justly proud of him as a pupil. The other professors, in whose classes he was not distinguished, took little notice of him. He had no taste for the study of languages, polite literature, or the arts. As there were no indications of his ever becoming a scholar, the pedants of the establishment were inclined to think him stupid. His superior intelligence was, however, sufficiently perceptible, even through

shuddering. Though his smile was captivating, yet the expression of his mouth, when disdainful or angry, could scarcely be seen without terror. But that forehead which seemed formed to bear the crowns of a whole world;—those hands, of which the most coquetish women might have been vain, and whose white skin covered muscles of iron;—in short, of all that personal beauty which distinguished Napoleon as a young man, no traces were discernible in the boy. Saveria spoke truly when she said, that of all the children of Signora Letitia, the Emperor was the one from whom future greatness was least to be prognosticated.—*Editor.*

* Joseph Bonaparte in his "Notes on Bourrienne," asserts that their father remained faithful to Paoli to the last.—*Editor.*

the reserve under which it was veiled. If the monks, to whom the superintendence of the establishment was confided, had understood the organization of his mind—if they had engaged more able mathematical professors—or if we had had any excitement to the study of chemistry, natural philosophy, astronomy, &c., I am convinced that Bonaparte would have pursued those sciences with all the genius and spirit of investigation which he displayed in a career, more brilliant it is true, but far less useful to mankind. Unfortunately, the monks did not perceive this, and were too poor to pay for good masters. However, after Bonaparte left the college, they found it necessary to engage two professors from Paris, otherwise the college would have fallen to nothing. These two new professors, MM. Durforts, and Despont, finished my education; and I regretted that they did not come sooner. The often repeated assertion, of Bonaparte having received a *careful education* at Brienne, is, therefore, untrue. The monks were incapable of giving it him; and, for my own part, I must confess that the extended information of the present day is, to me, a painful contrast with the limited course of education I received at the Military College. It is only surprising that the establishment should have produced a single able man.

Though Bonaparte had no reason to be satisfied with the treatment he received from his comrades, yet he was above complaining of it; and when he had the supervision of any duty which they infringed, he would rather go to prison than denounce the criminals.

I was one day his accomplice in omitting to enforce a duty which we were appointed to supervise. He prevailed on me to accompany him to prison, where we remained three days. We suffered this sort of punishment several times, but with less severity.

In 1783, the Duke of Orleans and Madame de Montesson visited Brienne; and, for upwards of a month, the magnificent chateau of the Count de Brienne was a Versailles in miniature. The series of brilliant entertainments which were given to the august travellers, made them almost forget the royal magnificence they had left behind them.

The Prince and Madame de Montesson expressed a wish to preside at the distribution of the prizes of our college. Bonaparte and I won the prizes in the class of mathematics, which, as I have already observed, was the branch of study to which he confined his attention, and in which he excelled. When I was called up for the seventh time, Madame de Montesson said to my mother, who had come from Sens, to be present at the distribution, "Pray, Madame, crown your son this time; my hands are weary."

There was an inspector of the military schools, whose business it was to make an annual report on each pupil, whether

BY ERIC PAPE.

THE CHÂTEAU COLOMBIER, NEAR VALENCE.

ENGRAVED BY HENRY WOLF.

FROM A PAINTING BY REALIER-DUMAS.

BONAPARTE, THE NOVICE, AT THE SCHOOL OF BRIENNE.



FACSIMILE OF THE LAST PAGE OF BONAPARTE'S EXERCISE-BOOK AT SCHOOL.

ORIGINAL IN THE LAURENTIAN LIBRARY AT FLORENCE. THE LAST SENTENCE IS, "ST. HELENA, LITTLE ISLE."

FOR AN ACCOUNT OF THIS DOCUMENT, SEE "OPEN LETTERS."

educated at the public expense, or paid for by his family. I copied from the report of 1784, a note which was probably obtained surreptitiously from the War Office. I wanted to purchase the manuscript; but Louis Bonaparte bought it. I did not make a copy of the note which related to myself, because I should naturally have felt diffident in making any use of it. It would, however, have served to show how time and circumstances frequently reversed the distinctions which arise at school or college. Judging from the reports of the inspector of military schools, young Bonaparte was not, of all the pupils at Brienne in 1784, the one most calculated to excite prognostics of future greatness and glory.

The note to which I have just alluded, and which was written by M. Keralio, then inspector of the military schools, describes Bonaparte as being remarkable for his application to the mathematics, passable in history and geography, but rather backward in Latin. The inspector concludes by saying, "He will make an excellent seaman, and deserves to be passed to the Military College of Paris."*

Father Berton, however, opposed Bonaparte's removal to Paris, because he had not passed through the fourth Latin class, and the regulations required that he should be in the third. I was informed by the Vice-Principal, that a report relative to Napoleon was sent from the College of Brienne to that of Paris, in which he was described as being *domineering*, *imperious*, and *obstinate*.

I knew Bonaparte well; and I think M. Keralio's report

* Napoleon remained upwards of five years at Brienne, from March, 1779, till the latter end of 1784. In 1783 Field-Marshal the Chevalier Keralio, inspector of the military schools, selected him to pass the year following to the military school at Paris, to which three of the best scholars were annually sent from each of the twelve provincial schools of France. It is curious as well as satisfactory to know the opinion at this time entertained of him by those who were the best qualified to judge. The manuscript collection which belonged to Marshal Segur, then minister at war, contains the following remarks, under the article headed SCHOOL OF BRIENNE: "State of the king's scholars eligible from their age to enter into the service or to pass to the school at Paris; to wit, M. de Buonaparte (Napoleon), born the 15th of August, 1769, in height 4 feet, 10 inches, 10 lines (5 feet $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches English); has finished his fourth season; of a good constitution, health excellent; character mild, honest, and grateful; conduct exemplary; has always distinguished himself by his application to the mathematics; understands history and geography tolerably well; is indifferently skilled in merely ornamental studies, or in Latin, in which he has only finished his fourth course; would make an excellent sailor, deserves to be passed on to the school at Paris." His old master, Leguille, professor of history at Paris, boasted, that in a list of the different scholars, he had predicted his pupil's subsequent career. In fact, to the name of Bonaparte the following note is added: "*A Corsican by birth and character—he will do something great, if circumstances favour him.*" Monge was his instructor in geometry, who also entertained a high opinion of him. M. Bauer, his German master, was the only one who saw nothing in him, and was surprised at being told he was undergoing his examination for the artillery.—*Hazlitt.*

of him was exceedingly just, except, perhaps, that he might have said, he was *very well,* as to his progress in history and geography, and *very backward* in Latin ; but certainly nothing indicated the probability of his being an *excellent seaman.* He himself had no thought of the navy.

In consequence of M. Keralio's report, Bonaparte was transferred to the Military College of Paris, along with MM. Montarby de Dampierre, de Castres, de Comminges, and de Laugier de Bellecourt, who were all, like him, educated at the public expense, and all, at least, as favourably reported.

What could have induced Sir Walter Scott to say that Bonaparte was the pride of the college, that our mathematical master was exceedingly fond of him, and that the other professors in the different sciences had equal reason to be satisfied with him? What I have above stated, together with the report of M. Keralio, bear evidence of his backwardness in almost every branch of education, except mathematics. Neither was it, as Sir Walter affirms, his precocious progress in mathematics that occasioned him to be removed to Paris. He had attained the proper age, and the report of him was favourable, therefore he was very naturally included among the number of the five who were chosen in 1784.

In a biographical account of Bonaparte, I have read the following anecdote: When he was fourteen years of age, he happened to be at a party where some one pronounced a high eulogium on Vicomte de Turenne, and a lady in company observed that he certainly was a great man; but that she should like him better if he had not burned the palatinate. "What signifies that," replied Bonaparte, "if it was necessary to the object he had in view?"

This is a mere fabrication. Bonaparte was fourteen in the year 1783. He was then at Brienne, where certainly he did not go into company, and least of all, the company of ladies.

ENGRAVED BY ROBERT

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE IN 1785, AGED SIXTEEN.



DRAWN BY MAURICE BOUTET DE MONVEL.

AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL, PRYTANÉE DE LA FLÈCHE, UNDER THE FIRST EMPIRE.



ENGRAVED BY M. HAI

BONAPARTE AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL, PARIS, 1784.

CHAPTER II.

1784—1794.*

Bonaparte enters the Military College of Paris—He urges me to embrace the military profession—His report on the state of the Military School of Paris—He obtains a commission—I set off for Vienna—Return to Paris, where I again meet Bonaparte—His singular plans for raising money—Louis XVI. with the red cap on his head—The 10th of August—My departure for Stuttgard—Bonaparte goes to Corsica—My name inscribed on the list of emigrants—Bonaparte at the siege of Toulon—Le Souper de Beaucaire—Napoleon's mission to Genoa—His arrest—His autographical justification—Duroc's first connection with Bonaparte.

Bonaparte was fifteen years and two months old when he went to the Military College of Paris.† I accompanied him to Nogent sur Seine, whence the coach was to start. We parted with regret, and we did not meet again till the year 1792. Dur-

* *The reader will find at the end of the present volume, an account of the memorable campaigns in Italy, derived from Bonaparte's own statements, and from the narratives of those who were actors in the events.*

† Madame Junot relates some interesting particulars connected with Napoleon's first residence in Paris. "My mother's first care," says she, "on arriving in Paris, was to inquire after Napoleon Bonaparte. He was at that time in the military school at Paris, having quitted Brienne in the September of the preceding year. My uncle Demetrius had met him just after he alighted from the coach which brought him to town; 'And truly,' said my uncle, 'he had the appearance of a fresh importation. I met him in the Palais Royal, where he was gaping and staring with wonder at every thing he saw. He would have been an excellent subject for sharpers, if, indeed, he had had any thing worth taking!' My uncle invited him to dine at his house; for though my uncle was a bachelor, he did not choose to dine at a *traiteur;* the name *restaurateur* was not then introduced. He told my mother that Napoleon was very morose. 'I fear,' added he, 'that that young man has more self-conceit than is suitable to his condition. When he dined with me he began to declaim violently against the luxury of the young men of the military school. After a little he turned the conversation on Mania, and the present education of the young Maniotes, drawing a comparison between it and the ancient Spartan system of education. His observations on this head he told me he intended to imbody in a memorial, to be presented to the minister of war. All this, depend upon it, will bring him under the displeasure of his comrades, and it will be lucky if he escape being run through.'

"A few days afterwards my mother saw Napoleon, and then his irritability was at its height. He would scarcely bear any observations, even if made in his favour, and I am convinced that it is to this uncontrollable irritability that he owed the reputation of having been ill-tempered in his boyhood, and splenetic in his youth.

"My father, who was acquainted with almost all the heads of the military school, obtained leave for him sometimes to come out for recreation. On account

ing these eight years, we maintained an active correspondence: but so little did I anticipate the high destiny which, after his elevation, it was affirmed the wonderful qualities of his boyhood plainly denoted, that I did not preserve one of the letters he wrote to me at that period.

I remember, that in a letter which I received from him about a year after his arrival in Paris, he urged me to keep my promise of entering the army with him. Like him, I had passed through the studies necessary for the artillery service; and in 1787, I went for three months to Metz, in order to join practice with theory. A strange ordinance, which I believe was issued in 1778 by M. de Segur, required that a man should possess four quaterings of nobility, before he could be qualified to serve his king and country as a military officer. My mother went to Paris, taking with her the letters patent of her husband, who died six weeks after my birth. She proved that, in the year 1640, Louis XIII. had, by letters patent, restored the titles of Fauvelet de Villemont, who, in 1586, had kept several provinces of Burgundy subject to the king's authority, at the peril of his life, and the loss of his property; and that his family had occupied the first places in the magistracy since the fourteenth century. All was correct, but it was observed that the letters of nobility had not been registered by the parliament, and to repair this little omission, the sum of twelve thousand francs was demanded. This my mother refused to pay, and there the matter rested.

On his arrival at the military school of Paris, Bonaparte found the establishment on so brilliant and expensive a footing, that he immediately addressed a memorial on the subject to the Vice-Principal of Brienne. He showed that the plan of education was really pernicious, and far from being calculated to fulfil the object which every wise government must have in view. The result of the system, he said, was to inspire the pupils, who were all the sons of poor gentlemen, with a love of ostentation, or rather, with sentiments of vanity and self-

of an accident (a sprain, if I recollect rightly) Napoleon once spent a whole week at our house. To this day, whenever I pass the *quai Conti*, I cannot help looking up at a *mansarde* at the left angle of the house, on the third floor. That was Napoleon's chamber when he paid us a visit, and a neat little room it was. My brother used to occupy the one next to it.

"The two young men were nearly of the same age: my brother perhaps had the advantage of a year or fifteen months. My mother had recommended him to cultivate the friendship of young Bonaparte; but my brother complained how unpleasant it was to find only cold politeness where he expected affection. This repulsiveness on the part of Napoleon was almost offensive, and must have been sensibly felt by my brother, who was not only remarkable for the mildness of his temper and the amenity and grace of his manner, but whose society was courted in the most distinguished circles of Paris on account of his talents. He perceived in Bonaparte a kind of acerbity and bitter irony, of which he long endeavoured to discover the cause. 'I believe,' said Albert one day to my mother, 'that the poor young man feels keenly his dependent situation.'"—*Editor.*



ENGRAVED BY R. G. TIETZE.

PASCAL PAOLI. FROM THE PAINTING BY DRELLING, MADE IN PARIS, 1791.



INTED BY E. BOUTIGNY. EXHIBITED IN THE SALON OF 1894. PUBLICATIO

SCENE DURING THE INSURRECTION IN VENDÉE. 1792–94.

sufficiency: so that, instead of returning happy to the bosom of their families, they were likely to be ashamed of their parents, and to despise their humble homes. Instead of the numerous attendants by whom they were surrounded, their dinners of two courses, and their horses and grooms, he suggested that they should perform little necessary services for themselves, such as brushing their clothes, and cleaning their boots and shoes; that they should eat the coarse bread made for soldiers, &c. Temperance and activity, he added, would render them robust, enable them to bear the severity of different seasons and climates, to brave the fatigues of war, and to inspire the respect and obedience of the soldiers under their command. Thus reasoned Napoleon at the age of sixteen, and time showed that he never deviated from these principles. Of this the establishment of the military school at Fontainbleau is a decided proof.

As Napoleon was an active observer of every thing passing around him, and pronounced his opinion openly and decidedly, he did not remain long at the military school of Paris. His superiors, who were anxious to get rid of him, hurried the period of his examination, and he obtained the first vacant sub-lieutenancy in a regiment of artillery.

I left Brienne in 1787, and as I could not enter the artillery, I proceeded the following year to Vienna, with a letter of recommendation to M. de Montmorin, soliciting employment in the French embassy, then at the court of Austria.

I remained two months at Vienna, where I had the honour of twice seeing the Emperor Joseph. The impression made upon me by his kind reception, his dignified and elegant manners, and graceful conversation, will never be obliterated from my recollection. After M. de Noailles had initiated me in the first steps of diplomacy, he advised me to go to one of the German universities to study the law of nations and foreign languages. I accordingly repaired to Leipsic

I had scarcely got there when the French revolution broke out. Alas! The reasonable ameliorations which the age demanded, and which right-thinking men desired, were widely different from that total overthrow and destruction of the state, the condemnation of the best of kings, and the long series of crimes which sully the pages of French history.

I spent some time at Leipsic, where I applied myself to the study of the law of nations, and the German and English languages. I afterwards travelled through Prussia and Poland, and passed a part of the winter of 1791 and 1792 at Warsaw, where I was most graciously received by Princess Tysziewicz, niece of Stanislaus Augustus, the last King of Poland, and the sister of Prince Poniatowski. The Princess was very well informed, and was a great admirer of French literature. At her invitation, I passed several evenings in company with the

king, in a circle small enough to approach to something like intimacy. I remember that his Majesty frequently asked me to read the Moniteur; the speeches to which he listened with the greatest pleasure were those of the Girondists. Princess Tyszkiewicz wished to print at Warsaw, at her own expense, a translation I had executed of Kotzebue's "Menschenhass und Reue," to which I gave the title of "L'Inconnu."*

I arrived at Vienna on the 26th of March, 1792, when I was informed of the serious illness of the emperor, Leopold II., who died on the following day. In private companies, and at public places, I heard vague suspicions expressed of his having been poisoned; but the public, who were admitted to the palace to see the body lie in state, were soon convinced of the falsehood of these reports. I went twice to see the mournful spectacle, and I never heard a word which was calculated to confirm the odious suspicion, though the spacious hall in which the remains of the emperor were exposed was constantly thronged with people.

In the month of April, 1792, I returned to Paris, where I again met Bonaparte, and our college intimacy was renewed. I was not very well off, and adversity was hanging heavily on him; his resources frequently failed him. We passed our time like two young fellows of twenty-three, who have little money, and less occupation. Bonaparte was always poorer than I. Every day we conceived some new project or other. We were on the look out for some profitable speculation. At one time he wanted me to join him in renting several houses, then building in the Rue Montholon, to underlet them afterwards. We found the demands of the landlords extravagant—every thing failed. At the same time he was soliciting employment at the war-office, and I at the office of foreign affairs. I was for the moment the luckier of the two.

While we were spending our time in a somewhat vagabond way, the 20th of June arrived. We met by appointment at a restaurateur's in the Rue St. Honoré, near the Palais Royal, to take one of our daily rambles. On going out we saw approaching, in the direction of the market, a mob, which Bonaparte calculated at five or six thousand men. They were all in rags, armed with weapons of every description, and were proceeding hastily towards the Tuileries, vociferating all kinds of gross abuse. It was a collection of all that was most vile and abject in the purlieus of Paris. "Let us follow this mob," said Bonaparte. We got the start of them, and took up our station on the terrace of the banks of the river. It was there that he witnessed the scandalous scenes which took place; and it would be difficult to describe the surprise and

* This is the play known on the English stage under the title of "The Stranger."—*Editor.*



APE.

ENGRAVED BY A. E. ANDERSO

BONAPARTE AT A SIX-CENT RESTAURANT IN PARIS.

PAINTED BY LECOMTE-DU-NOUY.

EXHIBITED IN THE SALON OF 1894. PUBLICATION AUTHORIZED.

"THE SUPPER OF BEAUCAIRE."

to be either an accomplice or a victim in the disastrous scenes which were passing at home. My disobedience of the law placed my name on the list of emigrants.

It has been said of me, in a biographical publication, that "it was as remarkable as it was fortunate for Bourrienne that, *on his return*, he got his name erased from the list of emigrants, on which it had been inscribed during his first journey to Germany. This circumstance has been interpreted in several different ways, which are not all equally favourable to M. de Bourrienne."

I do not understand what favourable interpretations can be put upon a statement entirely false. General Bonaparte repeatedly applied for the erasure of my name, from the month of April, 1797, when I rejoined him at Leoben, to the period of the signature of the treaty of Campo-Formio; but without success. He desired his brother Louis, Berthier, Bernadotte, and others, when he sent them to the directory, to urge my erasure; but in vain. He complained of this inattention to his wishes to Bottot, when he came to Passeriano, after the 18th Fructidor. Bottot, who was secretary to Barras, was astonished that I was not erased, and he made fine promises of what he would do. On his return to France, he wrote to Bonaparte: "Bourrienne is erased." But this was untrue. I was not erased until November, 1797, on the reiterated solicitations of General Bonaparte.

It was during my absence from France that Bonaparte, in the rank of *chef de bataillon*, performed his first campaign, and contributed so powerfully to the retaking of Toulon. Of this period of his life I have no personal knowledge, and, therefore, I shall not speak of it as an eyewitness.* I shall merely relate some facts which fill up the interval between 1793 and 1795, and which I have collected from papers which he himself delivered to me. Among these papers is a little production, entitled "Le Souper de Beaucaire," the copies of which he bought up, at a dear rate, and destroyed, on his attaining the consulate. This little pamphlet contains principles very opposite to those he wished to see established in 1800, a period when extravagant ideas of liberty were no longer the fashion, and when Bonaparte entered upon a system totally the reverse of those republican principles professed in the "Souper de Beaucaire."† It may be remarked, that in all that has come to us from St. Helena, not a word is said of this youthful production. Its character sufficiently explains this silence. In all Bonaparte's writings, posterity

* The reader will find this deficiency supplied by an account of the siege of Toulon, extracted from the "Memoirs of Napoleon," dictated by himself at St. Helena.—See the end of the present chapter.—*Editor.*

† This is not, as Sir Walter says, a dialogue between Marat and a Federalist, but a conversation between a military officer, a native of Nismes, a native of Marseilles, and a manufacturer from Montpellier. The latter, though he takes a share in the conversation, does not say much.



D BY H. E. F. PHILIPPOTEAUX. (VERSAILLES MUSEUM.) ENGRAVED BY T. JOH

BONAPARTE, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF THE FIRST BATTALION OF CORSICA.



BONAPARTE ADDRESSING A JACOBIN CLUB IN CORSICA.

will probably trace the profound politician, rather than the enthusiastic revolutionist.

Some documents relative to Bonaparte's suspension and arrest, by order of the representatives Albitte and Salicetti, serve to place in their true light circumstances which have hitherto been misrepresented. I shall enter into some details of this event, because I have seen it stated that this circumstance of Bonaparte's life has been perverted and misrepresented by every person who has hitherto written about him; and the writer who makes this remark, himself describes the affair incorrectly and vaguely. Others have attributed Bonaparte's misfortune to a military discussion on war, and his connexion with Robespierre the younger.*

It has moreover been said, that Albitte and Salicetti explained to the Committee of Public Safety, the impossibility of their resuming the military operations, unaided by the talents of General Bonaparte. This is mere flattery. The facts are these:

On the 13th of July, 1794 (25th Messidor, year II.), the representatives of the people with the army of Italy, ordered that General Bonaparte should proceed to Genoa, there, conjointly with the French *chargé d'affaires*, to confer on certain subjects with the Genoese government. This mission, together with a list of secret instructions, directing him to examine the fortresses of Genoa and the neighbouring country, show the confidence which Bonaparte, who was then only twenty-five, inspired in men who were deeply interested in making a prudent choice of their agents.

Bonaparte set off for Genoa, and fulfilled his mission. The 9th Thermidor arrived, and the deputies, called Terrorists, were superseded by Albitte and Salicetti. In the disorder which then prevailed, they were either ignorant of the orders given to General Bonaparte, or persons envious of the rising glory of the young general of artillery inspired Albitte and Salicetti with suspicions prejudicial to him. Be this as it may, the two representatives drew up a resolution, ordering that General Bonaparte should be arrested, suspended from his rank, and arraigned before the Committee of Public Safety; and, extraordinary as it may appear, this resolution was founded on that very journey to Genoa which Bonaparte executed by the direction of the representatives of the people.†

* It will presently be seen that all this is erroneous, and that Sir Walter commits another mistake when he says that Bonaparte's connexion with Robespierre was attended with fatal consequences to him, and that his justification consisted in acknowledging that his friends were very different from what he had supposed them to be.

† Madame Junot throws some light on this persecution of Bonaparte by Salicetti. "One motive (I do not mean to say the only one)," remarks this lady, "of the animosity shown by Salicetti to Bonaparte, in the affair of Loano,

Bonaparte said at St. Helena, that he was a short time imprisoned by order of the representative Laporte; but the order for his arrest was signed by Albitte, Salicetti, and Laporte. Laporte was not probably the most influential of the three, for Bonaparte did not address his remonstrance to him. He was a fortnight under arrest.

Had the circumstance occurred three weeks earlier, and had Bonaparte been arraigned before the Committee of Public Safety, previous to the 9th Thermidor, there is every probability that his career would have been at an end; and we should have seen perish on the scaffold, at the age of twenty-five, the man who, during the twenty-five succeeding years, was destined to astonish the world by his vast conceptions, his gigantic projects, his great military genius, his extraordinary good fortune, his faults, reverses, and final misfortunes.

It is worth while to remark, that in the post-Thermidorian resolution just alluded to, no mention is made of Bonaparte's association with Robespierre, the younger. The severity with which he was treated is the more astonishing, since his mission

was, that they were at one time suitors to the same lady. I am not sure whether it was in Corsica or in Paris, but I know for a fact that Bonaparte, in spite of his youth, or perhaps I should rather say on account of his youth, was the favoured lover.

"It was the opinion of my brother, who was secretary to Salicetti, that Bonaparte owed his life to a circumstance which is not very well known. The fact is, that Salicetti received a letter from Bonaparte, the contents of which appeared to make a deep impression on him. Bonaparte's papers had been delivered into Salicetti's hands, who, after an attentive perusal of them, laid them aside, with evident dissatisfaction. He then took them up again, and read them a second time. Salicetti declined my brother's assistance in the examination of the papers, and after a second examination, which was probably as unsatisfactory as the first, he seated himself with a very abstracted air. It would appear that he had seen among the papers some document which concerned himself. Another curious fact is, that the man who had the care of the papers after they were sealed up, was an inferior clerk, entirely under the control of Salicetti; and my brother, whose business it was to have charge of the papers, was directed not to touch them. He has often spoken to me of this circumstance, and I mention it here as one of importance to the history of the time. Nothing that relates to a man like Napoleon can be considered useless or trivial.

"What after all was the result of this strange business which might have cost Bonaparte his head?—for had he been taken to Paris and tried by the Committee of Public Safety, there is little doubt that the friend of Robespierre, the younger, would have been condemned by Billaud-Varennes and Collot d'Herbois. The result was the acquittal of the accused. This result is the more extraordinary, since it would appear that at that time Salicetti stood in fear of the young general. A compliment is even paid to Bonaparte in the decree, by which he was provisionally restored to liberty. That liberation was said to be granted on the consideration that General Bonaparte might be useful to the republic. This was foresight; but subsequently, when measures were taken which rendered Bonaparte no longer an object of fear, his name was erased from the list of general officers, and it is a curious fact that Cambacérès, who was destined to be his colleague in the consulate, was one of the persons who signed the act of erasure.—*Editor.*

BY ERIC PAPE.

BONAPARTE UNDER ARREST, AUGUST, 1794.

to Genoa was the alleged cause of it. Was there any other charge against him, or had calumny triumphed over the services he had rendered to his country? I have frequently conversed with him on the subject of this adventure, and he invariably assured me, that he had nothing to reproach himself with, and that his defence, which I shall subjoin, contained the pure expression of his sentiments, and the exact truth.

In the following note, which he addressed to Albitte and Salicetti, he makes no mention of Laporte. The copy which I possess is in the handwriting of Junot, with corrections in the general's hand. It exhibits all the characteristics of Napoleon's writing: his short sentences, his abrupt, rather than concise, style, sometimes his elevated ideas, and always his plain, good sense.

TO THE REPRESENTATIVES, ALBITTE AND SALICETTI.

You have suspended me from my rank, put me under arrest, and declared me to be suspected.

Thus I am disgraced before being judged, or judged before being heard.

In a revolutionized state there are two classes, the suspected and the patriots.

When the first are accused, general measures are adopted towards them for the sake of security.

The oppression of the second class is a shock to public liberty. The magistrate cannot condemn, until after the fullest evidence, and a succession of facts, those who leave nothing to arbitrary decision.

To declare a patriot suspected is to deprive him of all that he most highly values, confidence and esteem.

In what class am I placed?

Since the commencement of the revolution, have I not always been attached to its principles?

Have I not always been contending either with domestic enemies or foreign foes?

I sacrificed my home, abandoned my property, and lost every thing for the republic.

I have since served with some distinction at Toulon, and earned a part of the laurels of the army of Italy at the taking of Saorgio, Oneglia, and Tanaro.

On the discovery of Robespierre's conspiracy, my conduct was that of a man accustomed to look only to principles.

My claim to the title of patriot, therefore, cannot be disputed.

Why, then, am I declared suspected without being heard, and arrested eight days after I heard the news of the tyrant's death?

I am declared suspected, and my papers are sealed.

The reverse of this course ought to have been adopted. My papers should first have been sealed; then I should have been called on for my explanation; and, lastly, declared suspected, if there was reason for coming to such a decision.

It is wished that I should go to Paris with a decree which declares

me suspected. It will naturally be presumed that the representatives did not draw up this decree without accurate information, and I shall be judged with the bias which a man of that class merits.

Though a patriot and an innocent and calumniated man, yet whatever measures may be adopted by the committee, I cannot complain.

If three men declare that I have committed a crime, I cannot complain of the jury who condemns me.

Salicetti, you know me; and I ask whether you have observed any thing in my conduct for the last five years which can afford ground of suspicion?

Albitte, you do not know me; but you have received proof of no fact against me; you have not heard me, and you know how artfully the tongue of calumny sometimes works.

Must I then be confounded with the enemies of my country; and ought the patriots inconsiderately to sacrifice a general who has not been useless to the republic? Ought the representatives to reduce the government to the necessity of being unjust and impolitic?

Hear me; destroy the oppression that overwhelms me, and restore me to the esteem of the patriots.

An hour after, if my enemies wish for my life, let them take it. I have often given proofs how little I value it. Nothing but the thought that I may yet be useful to my country, makes me bear the burden of existence with courage.

It appears that this defence, which is remarkable for its energetic simplicity, produced an effect on Albitte and Salicetti. Inquiries more accurate, and probably more favourable to the general, were instituted; and on the 3d Fructidor (August 20th, 1794), the representatives of the people drew up a decree, stating that, after a careful examination of General Bonaparte's papers, and of the orders he had received relative to his mission to Genoa, they saw nothing to justify any suspicion of his conduct; and that moreover, taking into consideration the advantage that might accrue to the republic from the military talents of the said General Bonaparte, it was resolved that he should be provisionally set at liberty.

Salicetti became the friend and confident of young Bonaparte; but their intimacy did not continue after his elevation.

What is to be thought of the motives for Bonaparte's arrest and provisional liberation, when his innocence and the error that had been committed were acknowledged? The importance of the general's military talents, though no mention is made about the impossibility of dispensing with them, is a pretence for restoring him to that liberty of which he had been unjustly deprived.

It was not at Toulon, as has been stated, that Bonaparte took Duroc into the artillery, and made him his aide-de-camp. The acquaintance was formed at a subsequent period, in Italy. Duroc's cold character, and unexcursive mind, suited Napoleon, whose confidence he enjoyed until his death, and who intrusted him with missions perhaps above his abilities. At



PAINTING BY JEAN-BAPTISTE GREUZE, IN THE COLLECTION OF M. C. MARQUIS DE LAS CASAS. ENGRAVED BY T. JOHNSON.

BONAPARTE, LIEUTENANT OF ARTILLERY.



NAPOLEON PLANNING A BATTLE.

St. Helena, Bonaparte often declared that he was much attached to Duroc. I believe this to be true; but I know that the attachment was not returned. The ingratitude of princes is proverbial. May it not happen that courtiers are sometimes ungrateful?

SIEGE OF TOULON.*

Napoleon, on his arrival, found the head-quarters at Beausset. They were busy making preparations to burn the allied squadrons in the road of Toulon; and the next day the Commandant of the artillery went with the General-in-chief to visit the batteries. What was his surprise to find a battery of six twenty-four pounders planted a quarter of a league from the passes of Ollioules, at three gun-shots from the English vessels, and two from the shore; and all the volunteers of the Côte d'Or and the soldiers of the regiment of Burgundy occupied with heating the balls at all the *bastides!* (country-houses). He did not conceal his astonishment.

The first care of the Commandant of the artillery was to get together a great number of officers in that department, whom the circumstances of the Revolution had removed. At the end of six weeks, he was enabled to assemble, organize, and supply a park of two hundred pieces of artillery. Colonel Gassendi was placed at the head of the arsenal of constructions at Marseilles. The batteries were advanced, and placed on the most advantageous points of the shore; and their effect was such, that some large vessels were dismasted, several smaller ones sunk, and the enemy were forced to abandon that part of the road.

During the time that the preparations for the siege were completing, the army was considerably increased. The Committee of Public Safety sent plans and instructions relative to the conduct of the siege. They had been drawn up in the Committee of Fortifications, by General d'Arçon, of the engineers, an officer of great merit. The chief of battalion, Marescot, and many brigades of engineer officers, arrived. All appeared to be in readiness to commence. A council was called, of which Gasparin, a representative, was president: he was a sensible and well-informed man, who had himself been in the service. The instructions from Paris were read: they detailed at great length the operations necessary to recover Toulon by a regular siege.

The Commandant of artillery, who for the space of a month had been carefully reconnoitring the ground, and had made himself perfectly acquainted with all its localities, proposed the plan of attack which occasioned the reduction of Toulon. He regarded all the propositions of the Committee of Fortifications as totally useless, under the circumstances of the case; and it was his opinion, that a regular siege was not at all necessary. In fact, supposing a position could be gained, which, with from fifteen to twenty mortars, thirty or forty pieces of cannon, and furnaces for red-hot balls, would keep up a fire upon every point of the great and lesser roads, it was evident that the

* From the Memoirs of Napoleon, dictated at St. Helena.

combined squadron would be obliged to abandon them; and the garrison would then be placed in a state of blockade, not being able to communicate with the squadron, which would be forced to stand out to sea. On this hypothesis the Commandant of artillery had laid it down as a principle, that the combined forces would prefer drawing off the garrison, and burning the French vessels and magazines, rather than leave 15 or 20,000 men in the fortress, who sooner or later would be obliged to surrender, without having any thing in their power to destroy, so as to ensure terms of capitulation for themselves.

In a word, he declared that it was not necessary to march against the place at all, but only to occupy the position proposed, and which was to be found at the extreme point of the promontory of Balagnier and l'Eguillette; that he had discovered this position a month before, and had pointed it out to the General-in-chief, assuring him that if he would occupy it with three battalions, he would take Toulon in four days; that the English had become, since he first observed it, so sensible of its importance, that they had disembarked 4000 men there, had cut down all the wood that covered the promontory of Cair, which commanded the whole position, and had employed all the resources of Toulon, even the galley-slaves, in order to intrench themselves there; making it, as they expressed themselves, "a little Gibraltar." But that the point, which a month ago might have been seized and occupied without opposition, now required a serious attack; that it would not be advisable to risk an assault, but to form batteries, mounted with twenty-four pounders and mortars, in order to destroy the epaulments, which were constructed of wood, to break down the palisades, and throw a shower of shells into the interior of the fort; and that then, after a vigorous fire for eight-and-forty hours, the work should be stormed by picked troops. Two days after this fort should be taken, he gave it as his opinion, that Toulon would belong to the Republic. This plan of attack was much discussed; and the engineer officers who were present at the council were of opinion, that the project of the Commandant of artillery was a necessary preliminary to regular sieges, the first principle of all sieges being the establishment of a strict blockade.

From this time there was unanimity of opinion: the enemy constructed two redoubts under the two headlands, one of which immediately commands l'Eguillette and the other Balagnier. These redoubts flanked Little Gibraltar, and played on the two sides of the promontory.

In conformity to the plan adopted, the French raised five or six batteries against Little Gibraltar, and constructed platforms for fifteen mortars. A battery had also been raised of eight twenty-four pounders and four mortars against Fort Malbosquet, the construction of which was a profound secret to the enemy, as the men who were employed on the work were entirely concealed from observation by a plantation of olives. It was intended that this battery should not be unmasked till the moment of marching against Little Gibraltar; but on the 20th of November the Representatives of the People went to inspect it, when they were informed by the cannoneers that it had been completed eight days, and that no use had yet been made of it,



THE RUE PEROLLERIE, VALENCE.
On the left the "Three Pigeons" tavern where Napoleon took his meals

C. W. CHADWICK. FROM A PAINTING BY REALIER-DUMAS. PUB

NAPOLEON, DURING HIS LATER SERVICE IN VALENCE.

THE YOUNG LIEUTENANT HAS JUST TRACED OUT A FORTIFICATION WITH HIS WALKING-ST

STREET IN WHICH BONAPARTE LODGED IN VALENCE.

Mlle. Bou's was the lower of the two houses on the left.

though it was supposed the effect produced by it would be very important. Without further explanation, the Representatives ordered them to open a fire, and accordingly the cannoneers with great joy immediately opened an alternate fire from the battery.

General O'Hara, who commanded the allied army at Toulon, was greatly surprised at the erection of so considerable a battery close to a fort of such importance as Malbosquet, and gave orders that a sortie should be made at break of day. The battery was situated in the centre of the left of the army: the troops in that part consisted of about 6000 men; occupying the line from Fort Rouge to Malbosquet, and so disposed as to prevent all individual communication, though too much scattered to make an effectual resistance in any given point.

An hour before day, General O'Hara sallied out of the garrison with 6000 men; and, meeting with no obstacle, his skirmishers only being engaged, spiked the guns of the battery.

In the mean while, the drums beat the *generale* at head-quarters, and Dugommier with all haste rallied his troops: the Commandant of artillery posted himself on a little headland behind the battery, on which he had previously established a depôt of arms. A communication from this point to the battery had been effected, by means of a boyau which was substituted for the trench. Perceiving from this point that the enemy had formed to the right and left of the battery, he conceived the idea of leading a battalion which was stationed near him through the boyau. By this plan he succeeded in coming out unperceived among the brambles close to the battery, and immediately commenced a brisk fire upon the English, whose surprise was such, that they imagined it was their own troops on the right, who through some mistake were firing on those on the left. General O'Hara hastened towards the French to rectify the supposed mistake, when he was wounded in the hand by a musket-ball, and a sergeant seized and dragged him prisoner into the boyau; the disappearance of the English general was so sudden, that his own troops did not know what had become of him.

In the mean time, Dugommier, with the troops he had rallied, placed himself between the town and the battery: this movement disconcerted the enemy, who forthwith commenced their retreat. They were hotly pursued as far as the gates of the fortress, which they entered in the greatest disorder and without being able to ascertain the fate of their general. Dugommier was slightly wounded in this affair. A battalion of volunteers from the Isere distinguished itself during the day.

General Cartaux had conducted the siege at its commencement; but the Committee of Public Safety had found it necessary to deprive him of the command. This man, originally a painter, had become an adjutant in the Parisian corps; he was afterwards employed in the army; and, having been successful against the Marseillese, the deputies of the Mountains had in the same day obtained him the appointments of Brigadier-general and General of division. He was extremely ignorant, and had nothing military about him; otherwise he was not ill disposed, and committed no excesses at Marseilles on the taking of that city.

General Doppet succeeded Cartaux: he was a Savovard, a physi-

cian, and an unprincipled man : he was entirely governed by interested motives. He was a decided enemy to all who possessed talent. He had no idea of war, and was any thing but brave. This Doppet, nevertheless, by a singular chance, in forty-eight hours after his arrival had very nearly taken Toulon. A battalion of the Côte d'Or and a battalion of the regiment of Burgundy, being on duty in the trenches before Little Gibraltar, had one of their men taken by a Spanish company on guard at the redoubt : they saw their companion ill-treated and beaten, and at the same time the Spaniards offered them every insult by shouts and indecent gestures. The French, enraged, ran to their arms, commenced a brisk fire, and marched against the redoubt.

The Commandant of the artillery immediately hastened to the General-in-chief, who was ignorant of what was going on. They galloped to the scene of action, and there perceiving how the matter stood, Napoleon persuaded the General to support the attack, with the assurance that it would not be productive of greater loss to advance than to retire. The General, therefore, ordered the different corps of reserve to be put in motion : all were quickly on the alert, and Napoleon marched at their head. Unfortunately, an aide-de-camp was killed by the side of the General-in-chief. Doppet was panic-struck ; and ordering the drums in all directions to beat a retreat, recalled his soldiers at the very moment when the grenadiers, having repulsed the skirmishers of the enemy, had reached the gorge of the redoubt, and were about to take it. The troops were highly indignant, and complained that * * * * * and physicians were sent to command them. The Committee of Public Safety recalled Doppet, and at length perceived the necessity of employing a real military man : they accordingly sent Dugommier, an officer who had seen fifty years of service, who was covered with scars, and who was as dauntless as the weapon he wore.

The enemy were every day receiving reinforcements : the public watched with anxiety the direction of the operation of the siege. They could not conceive why every effort should be directed against Little Gibraltar, quite in an opposite direction to the town. " There has not been any thing done yet," it was said all over the country, " but laying siege to a fort which has nothing to do with the permanent fortifications of the place. They will afterwards have to take Malbosquet, and open trenches against the town." All the popular societies made denunciation after denunciation on this subject. Provence complained of the long duration of the siege. A scarcity began to prevail, and increased to such a degree that Freron and Barras, having lost all hopes of the prompt reduction of Toulon, wrote in great alarm from Marseilles to the Convention, to persuade them to take into consideration whether it would not be better that the army should raise the siege and repass the Durance—a manœuvre which had been planned by Francis the First at the time of the invasion of Charles the Fifth. He retired behind the Durance, while the enemy laid Provence waste ; and when famine compelled them to retreat, he then attacked them with fresh vigour. The Representatives urged, that, if our troops should evacuate Provence, the English would be obliged to find provisions for its support, and that, after the harvest, offensive operations might b renewed with considerable advantage by

FROM THE LITHOGRAPH BY RAFFET, IN THE COLLECTION OF E. B. HOLDEN.

THE TAKING OF FORT MULGRAVE ("LITTLE GIBRALTAR"), TOULON.

NAPOLEON,

ON HIS WAY TO CORSICA WITH HIS SISTER ÉLISE, IS MET AT VALENCE BY HIS FORMER LANDLADY, WHO BRINGS HIM A PRESENT OF FRUIT.

an army complete in itself and invigorated by rest. This measure was, they said, absolutely necessary; for as yet, after four months' operations, Toulon had not even been attacked; and as the enemy were perpetually receiving reinforcements, it was to be apprehended that we should in the end be obliged to do precipitately and in confusion, what at the present moment might be effected with regularity and order. However, in a few days after the letter had been received by the Convention, Toulon was taken. The letter was now disowned by the Representatives as a forgery. This was ill-judged; for it was genuine, and gave a just idea of the opinion that existed at the time of its being written, respecting the issue of the siege, and of the difficulties that prevailed in Provence.

Dugommier determined that a decisive attack should be made upon Little Gibraltar: the Commandant of the artillery accordingly threw seven or 8000 shells into the fort, while 30 twenty-four pounders battered the works.

On the 18th of December, at four in the afternoon, the troops left their camps, and marched towards the village of Seine: the plan was to attack at midnight, in order to avoid the fire of the fort and the intermediate redoubts. At the instant when every thing was ready, the Representatives of the People held a council to deliberate whether the attack should be put in execution or not: it is probable they either feared the issue of it, and were desirous to throw all the responsibility of the affair upon General Dugommier, or they were influenced by the opinion entertained by many officers, who conceived success impossible, chiefly on account of the dreadful weather; the rain was falling in torrents.

Dugommier and the Commandant of artillery ridiculed these fears: two columns were formed, and marched against the enemy.

The allied troops, to avoid the effect of the shells and balls, which showered upon the fort, were accustomed to occupy a station at a small distance in the rear of it. The French had great hopes of reaching the works before them; but the enemy had placed a line of skirmishers in front of the fort, and as the musketry commenced firing at the very foot of the hill, the allied troops hastened to the defence of the fort, whence a very brisk fire was immediately opened. Case-shot showered all around. At length, after a most furious attack, Dugommier, who according to his usual custom headed the leading column, was obliged to give way; and in the utmost despair he cried out, "I am a lost man." Success was indeed every way important in those days, for the want of it usually conducted the unfortunate general to the scaffold.

The fire of the cannonading and musketry continued. Captain Muiron of the artillery, a young man full of bravery and resources, and who was the adjoint of the Commandant of artillery, was detached with a battalion of light infantry, and supported by the second column, which followed them at the distance of a musket-shot. He was perfectly acquainted with the position; and he availed himself so well of the windings of the ascent, that he conducted his troops up the mountain without sustaining any loss. He debouched at the foot of the fort: he rushed through an embrasure: his soldiers followed him—and the fort was taken. The English and Spanish cannoneers

were all killed at their guns, and Muiron himself was dangerously wounded by a thrust from the pike of an English soldier.

As soon as they were masters of the fort, the French immediately turned the cannon against the enemy.

By the time that Dugommier had been three hours in the redoubt, the Representatives of the People came with their drawn swords in their hands to load the troops which occupied it with eulogiums. [This positively contradicts the accounts of that time, which incorrectly state that the Representatives marched at the head of the columns.]

At break of day the French marched on Balagnier and l'Eguillette: the enemy had already evacuated those positions. The twenty-four pounders and the mortars were brought to mount these batteries, whence they hoped to cannonade the combined fleets before noon; but the Commandant of the artillery deemed it impossible to fix them there. They were of stone, and the engineers who had constructed them had committed an error in placing a large tower of masonry just at their entrance, so near the platforms that whatever balls might have struck them would have rebounded on the gunners, besides the splinters and rubbish. They therefore planted pieces of cannon on the heights behind the batteries. They could not open their fire until the next day; but no sooner did Lord Hood, the English admiral, see that the French had possessed themselves of these positions, than he made signal to weigh anchor and get out of the roads.

He then went to Toulon, to make it known that there was not a moment to be lost in getting out to sea directly. The weather was dark and cloudy, and every thing announced the approach of the Libeccio (or south-west) wind, so terrible at this season. The council of the combined forces immediately met; and, after mature deliberation, they unanimously agreed that Toulon was no longer tenable. They accordingly proceeded to take measures as well for the embarkation of the troops, as for burning and sinking such French vessels as they could not carry away with them, and setting fire to the marine establishments: they likewise gave notice to all the inhabitants, that those who wished to leave the place might embark on board the English and Spanish fleets.

When these disastrous tidings were spread abroad, a scene of confusion took place which it would be difficult to describe; any more than the disorder and astonishment of the garrison, and of the unfortunate inhabitants, who, only a few hours before, calculating on the great distance of the besiegers from the place, the slow progress of the siege during four months, and the expected arrival of reinforcements, not only hoped to effect the raising of the siege, but even to become masters of Provence.

In the night, Fort Poné was blown up by the English, and an hour afterwards, a part of the French squadron was set on fire. Nine seventy-four gun ships and four frigates or corvettes became a prey to the flames.

The fire and smoke from the arsenal resembled the eruption of a volcano, and the thirteen vessels which were burning in the road were like so many magnificent displays of fireworks. The masts and forms of the vessels were distinctly marked by the blaze, which lasted many



LIGNE. ENGRAVED BY M. HAID

THE COUNCIL OF WAR AT TOULON. 1793.

ENGRAVED BY E. W. CHADWICK.

FROM THE PAINTING BY GASTON ROUILLET. EXHIBITED IN THE SALON OF 1901. PUBLICATION AUTHORIZED.

THE HARBOR OF TOULON, FROM THE HEIGHTS OF SIX-FOURS.

hours, and formed an unparalleled spectacle. It was a heart-rending sight to the French to see such grand resources, and so much wealth, consumed within so short a period. They feared, at first, that the English would blow up Fort La Malgue, but it appeared that they had not time to do so.

The Commandant of artillery then went to Malbosquet. The fort was already evacuated. He ordered the fieldpieces to sweep the ramparts of the town, and heighten the confusion by throwing shells from the howitzers into the port, until the mortars, which were upon the road with their carriages, could be planted in the batteries, and shells thrown from them in the same direction.

General Lapoype took possession of Fort Pharaon, which was evacuated by the enemy. During all this time the batteries of l'Eguillette and Balagnier kept up an incessant fire on the vessels in the road. Many of the English ships were much damaged, and a great number of transports with troops on board were sunk. The batteries continued their fire all the night, and at break of day the English fleet was seen out at sea. By nine o'clock in the morning a high Libeccio wind got up, and the English ships were forced to put into the Hyeres.

Many thousands of the families of Toulon had followed the English; so that the revolutionary tribunals found but few of the guilty in the place: all the parties most deeply implicated had left it. Nevertheless, above a hundred unfortunate wretches were shot within the first fortnight.

Orders afterwards arrived from the Convention for demolishing the houses of Toulon: the absurdity of this measure did not impede the execution of it, and many houses were pulled down, which were obliged subsequently to be built up again.

During the siege of Toulon, the army of Italy had been attacked on the Var. The Piedmontese had attempted to invade Provence, and got nearly as far as Entrevaux; but being defeated at Gillette, they retreated, and retired within their lines.

The news of the taking of Toulon caused a sensation in Provence and throughout France, the more lively as such success was unexpected and almost unhoped-for. From this event Napoleon's reputation commenced: he was made Brigadier-general of artillery in consequence, and appointed to the command of that department in the Army of Italy. General Dugommier was appointed Commander-in chief of the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees.

CHAPTER III.

1794—1795.

Proposal to send Bonaparte to La Vendée—He is struck off the list of general officers—Salicetti—Joseph's marriage with Mademoiselle Clary—Bonaparte's wish to go to Turkey—Note explaining the plan of his proposed expedition—Madame Bourrienne's character of Bonaparte, and account of her husband's arrest—Constitution of the year III.—The 13th Vendémiaire—Bonaparte appointed second in command of the army of the interior—Eulogium of Bonaparte by Barras, and its consequences—St. Helena manuscript.

General Bonaparte returned to Paris, where I also arrived from Germany shortly after him. Our intimacy was resumed, and he gave me an account of all that had passed in the campaign of the south. He frequently alluded to the persecutions he had suffered, and he delivered to me the packet of papers, noticed in the last chapter, desiring me to communicate their contents to my friends. He was very anxious, he said, to do away with the supposition that he was capable of betraying his country, and, under the pretence of a mission to Genoa, becoming a spy on the interests of France. He loved to talk over his military achievements at Toulon and in Italy. He spoke of his first successes with that feeling of pleasure and gratification which they were naturally calculated to excite in him.

The government wished to send him to La Vendée with the rank of brigadier-general of infantry. Bonaparte rejected this proposition, on two grounds. He thought the scene of action unworthy of his talents, and he regarded his projected removal from the artillery to the infantry as a sort of insult. This last was his most powerful objection, and was the only one he urged officially. In consequence of his refusal to accept the appointment offered him, the Committee of Public Safety decreed that he should be struck off the list of general officers.

Deeply mortified at this unexpected stroke, Bonaparte retired into private life, and found himself doomed to an inactivity very uncongenial with his ardent character. He lodged in the Rue de Mail, near the Place de Victoires, and we recommenced the sort of life we had led in 1792, before his departure for Corsica. It was not without a struggle that he determined to await

ENGRAVED BY F. E. FILLEBROWN. FROM A PAINTING BY AN UNKNOWN ARTIST IN THE HÔTEL DE VILLE, AJACCIO.

JOSEPH BONAPARTE. BORN 1768. KING OF NAPLES, 1806 KING OF SPAIN, 1808. COMTE DE SURVILLIERS, 1815. UNDER THE LATTER TITLE, RESIDENT OF BORDENTOWN, N. J. DIED IN FLORENCE, 1844.

FROM A PAINTING BY AN UNKNOWN ARTIST IN THE HÔTEL DE VILLE, AJACCIO.

JULIE CLARY, WIFE OF JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

patiently the removal of the prejudices which were cherished against him by men in power; and he hoped that, in the perpetual changes which were taking place, those men might be superseded by others more favourable to him. He frequently dined and spent the evening with me and my elder brother; and his pleasant conversation and manners made the hours pass away very agreeably. I called on him almost every morning, and I met at his lodgings several persons who were distinguished at the time; among others, Salicetti, with whom he used to maintain very animated conversations, and who would often solicit a private interview with him. On one occasion, Salicetti paid him three thousand francs, in assignats, as the price of his carriage, which his straightened circumstances obliged him to dispose of.* I could easily perceive that our young friend either was, or wished to be, initiated in some political intrigue; and I moreover suspected, that Salicetti had bound him by an oath not to disclose the plans that were hatching. He became pensive, melancholy, and anxious; and he always looked with impatience for Salicetti's daily visit.† Sometimes, withdrawing his mind from political affairs, he would envy the happiness of his brother Joseph, who had just then married Mademoiselle Clary, the daughter of a rich and respectable merchant of Marseilles. He would often say, "That Joseph is a lucky rogue."

Meanwhile time passed away, and none of his projects succeeded—none of his applications were listened to. He was vexed by the injustice with which he was treated, and tormented by the desire of entering upon some active pursuit. He could not endure the thought of remaining buried in the crowd. He determined to quit France; and the favourite idea, which he never afterwards relinquished, that the east is a fine field for glory, inspired him with the wish to proceed to

* Of Napoleon's poverty at this time, Madame Junot says, "On Bonaparte's return to Paris, after the misfortunes of which he accused Salicetti of being the cause, he was in very destitute circumstances. His family, who were banished from Corsica, found an asylum at Marseilles; and they could not now do for him what they would have done had they been in the country whence they derived their pecuniary resources. From time to time he received remittances of money, and I suspect they came from his excellent brother Joseph, who had then recently married Mademoiselle Clary; but with all his economy, these supplies were insufficient. Bonaparte was therefore in absolute distress. Junot often used to speak of the six months they passed together in Paris at this time. When they took an evening stroll on the Boulevard, which used to be the resort of young men, mounted on fine horses, and displaying all the luxury which they were permitted to show at that time. Bonaparte would declaim against fate, and express his contempt for the dandies with their whiskers and their *oreilles de chien*, who as they rode past were eulogizing in ecstasy, the manner in which Madame Scio sang *paole pafumée, paole panachée.* "And it is on such beings as these," he would say, "that Fortune confers her favours: Grand Dieu! how contemptible is human nature!"—*Editor.*

† Salicetti was implicated in the insurrection of the 20th May, 1795, 1st Prairial, year III., and was obliged to fly to Venice.

Constantinople, and to enter the service of the Grand Signior. What romantic plans, what stupendous projects he conceived! He asked me whether I would go with him? I replied in the negative. I looked upon him as a half-crazy young fellow, who was driven to extravagant enterprises and desperate resolutions by his restless activity of mind, joined to the irritating treatment he had experienced, and, perhaps, it may be added, his want of money. He did not blame me for my refusal to accompany him; and he told me that Junot, Marmont, and some other young officers whom he had known at Toulon, would be willing to follow his fortunes.

He drew up a note, which commenced with the words *Note for . . . .* It was addressed to no one, and was merely a plan. Some days after, he wrote out another, which, however, did not differ very materially from the first, and which he addressed to Aubert and Coni. I made him a fair copy of it, and it was regularly forwarded. It was as follows:

NOTE.

Aubert, Coni } 2500 artillerymen.

At a moment when the Empress of Russia has strengthened her union with the Emperor of Austria, it is the interest of France to do every thing in her power to increase the military power of Turkey.

That power possesses a numerous and brave militia, but is very backward in the scientific part of the art of war.

The organization and the service of the artillery, which, in our modern tactics, so powerfully facilitate the gaining of battles, and on which, almost exclusively, depend the attack and defence of fortresses, are especially the points in which France excels, and in which the Turks are most deficient.

They have several times applied to us for artillery officers, and we have sent them some; but the officers thus sent have not been sufficiently powerful, either in numbers or talent, to produce any important result.

General Bonaparte, who, from his youth, has served in the artillery, of which he was intrusted with the command at the siege of Toulon, and in the two campaigns of Italy, offers his services to proceed to Turkey, with a mission from the French government.

He proposes to take along with him six or seven officers, of different kinds, and who may be, altogether, perfect masters of the military art.

He will have the satisfaction of being useful to his country in this new career, if he succeed in rendering the Turkish power more formidable, by completing the defence of their principal fortresses, and constructing new ones.

This note shows the error of the often-repeated assertion, that he proposed entering the service of the Turks against Austria.

DRAWN BY ERIC PAPE.

BONAPARTE ON THE ROAD FROM PARIS TO NICE.

It was said that at almost every change of horses Bonaparte wrote a letter to Josephine.

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BONAPARTE AT NICE IN 1793.

EXPLAINING TO TURREAU AND VOLNEY THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN IN ITALY WHICH HE EXECUTED AS GENERAL IN CHIEF, THREE YEARS LATER.

He makes no mention of such a thing; and the two countries were not at war.*

No answer was returned to this note. Turkey remained unaided, and Bonaparte unoccupied. I must confess, that for the failure of this project, at least, I was not sorry. I should have regretted to see a young man, of great promise, and one for whom I cherished a sincere friendship, devote himself to so uncertain a fate. If, however, a clerk of the War Office had but written on the note "*granted*," that little word would probably have changed the fate of Europe.

Bonaparte remained in Paris, forming schemes for the gratification of his ambition, and his desire of making a figure in the world; but obstacles opposed all he attempted.

Women are better judges of character than men. Madame de Bourrienne, knowing the intimacy which subsisted between my young friend and me, observed him very closely. She preserved some notes which she made upon Bonaparte, and the circumstances which struck her as most remarkable, during our early connexion with him. My wife did not entertain so favourable an opinion of him as I did; the warm friendship I cherished for him, probably, blinded me to his faults. I subjoin Madame de Bourrienne's notes, word for word.

On the day after our second return from Germany, which was in May 1795, we met Bonaparte in the Palais Royal, near a shop kept by a man named Girardin. Bonaparte embraced Bourrienne as a friend whom he loved, and was glad to see. We went that evening to the Théâtre Français. The performance consisted of a tragedy, and "Le Sourd, ou l'Auberge pleine." During the latter piece the audience were convulsed with laughter. The part of Dasnières was represented by Batiste the younger, and it was never played better. The bursts of laughter were so loud and frequent, that the actor was several times obliged to stop in the midst of his part. Bonaparte alone (and it struck me as being very extraordinary) was silent, and coldly insensible to the humour which was so irresistibly diverting to every one else. I remarked at this period that his character was reserved, and frequently gloomy. His smile was hypocritical, and often misplaced; and I recollect that a few days after our return, he gave us one of those specimens of savage hilarity which I greatly disliked, and which prepossessed me against him. He was telling us, that being before Toulon, where he commanded the artillery, one of his officers was visited by his wife, to whom he had been but a short time married, and whom he tenderly loved. A few days after, orders were given for another attack upon the town, in which this officer was to be engaged. His wife came to General Bonaparte, and with tears entreated him to dispense with her husband's services that day. The

* The Scottish biographer makes Bonaparte say that it would be strange if a little Corsican should become King of Jerusalem. I never heard any thing drop from him which supports the probability of such a remark, and certainly there is nothing in his note to warrant the inference of his having made

general was inexorable, as he himself told us, with a sort of savage exultation. The moment of the attack arrived, and the officer, though a very brave man, as Bonaparte himself assured us, felt a presentiment of his approaching death. He turned pale and trembled. He was stationed beside the general, and during an interval when the firing from the town was very strong, Bonaparte called out to him, "Take care, there is a bomb-shell coming!" The officer, instead of moving to one side, stooped down, and was literally severed in two. Bonaparte laughed loudly while he described the event with horrible minuteness.

At this time we saw him almost every day. He frequently came to dine with us. As there was a scarcity of bread, and sometimes only two ounces per head daily were distributed in the section, it was customary to request one's guests to bring their own bread, as it could not be procured for money. Bonaparte, and his brother Louis (a mild, agreeable young man, who was the general's aide-de-camp) used to bring with them their ration bread, which was black, and mixed with bran. I was sorry to observe that all this bad bread fell to the share of the poor aide-de-camp, for we provided the general with a finer kind, which was made clandestinely by a pastrycook, from flour which we contrived to smuggle from Sens, where my husband had some farms. Had we been denounced, the affair might have cost us our heads.

We spent six weeks in Paris, and we went frequently with Bonaparte to the theatres, and to the fine concerts given by Garat, in the Rue St. Marc. These were the first brilliant entertainmeuts that took place after the death of Robespierre. There was always something eccentric in Bonaparte's behaviour, for he often slipped away from us without saying a word; and when we were supposing he had left the theatre, we would suddenly discover him in the second or third tier, sitting alone in a box, and looking rather sulky.

Before our departure for Sens, where my husband's family reside, and which was fixed upon for the place of my first accouchement, we looked out for more agreeable apartments than we had in the Rue Grenier, Saint Lazare, which were on a ground floor. Bonaparte used to accompany us and assist us in our researches. At last we took the first floor of a handsome new house, No. 19, Rue de Marais. Bonaparte, who wished to stop in Paris, went to look at a house opposite to ours. He had thoughts of taking it, for himself, his uncle Fesch, now Cardinal Fesch, and a gentleman named Patrauld, formerly one of the masters of the Military School. One day he said, "With that house over there, my friends in it, and a cabriolet, I shall be the happiest fellow in the world."

We soon after left town for Sens. The house was not taken, for other and great affairs were preparing. During the interval between our departure and the fatal day of Vendémiaire, several letters passed between him and his school companion. These letters were of the most amiable and affectionate description. [They have been stolen.] On our return, in November of the same year, every thing was changed. The college friend was now a great personage. He had got the command of Paris in return for the business of Vendémiaire. Instead of a small house in the Rue de Marais, he occupied a splendid

DRAWN BY ERIC PAPE. ENGRAVED BY M. F

BONAPARTE TELLING FORTUNES IN THE SALON OF MME. TALLIEN.

hotel in the Rue des Capucines; the modest cabriolet was converted into a superb equipage, and the man himself was no longer the same. But the friends of his youth were still received when they made their morning calls. They were invited to grand déjeûners, which were sometimes attended by ladies; and, among others, by the beautiful Madame Tallien and her friend, the amiable Madame Beauharnais, to whom Bonaparte had begun to pay attention. He cared little for his friends, and ceased to address them in the style of familiar equality. I shall mention only one instance, that of M. Rey, whose father lost his life in the siege of Lyons, and who, being there himself, was saved as by a miracle. He was a gentle, amiable youth, and devoted to the royal cause. We used to see him daily. He waited on his college comrade; but being unable to bring himself to speak in the tone of distant respect, Bonaparte soon turned his back upon him, and on seeing him again did not speak a word to him. The only thing he did for him was to appoint him to the wretched place of an inspector of provisions, which Rey could not accept. Three years after, he died of a pulmonary affection, regretted by all his friends.

After the thirteenth of Vendémiaire, M. de Bourrienne saw Bonaparte only at distant periods. In the month of February, 1796, my husband was arrested, at seven in the morning, by a party of men, armed with muskets, on the charge of being a returned emigrant. He was torn from his wife and his child, only six months old, being barely allowed time to dress himself. I followed him. They conveyed him to the guard-house of the section, and thence I know not whither. In every place he was treated in a most infamous manner: and, finally, in the evening, they placed him in the lock-up-house of the prefecture of police, which, I believe, is now called the central bureau. There he passed two nights and a day, among men of the lowest description, some of whom were even malefactors. His wife and his friends ran about every where, trying to find somebody to protect him, and, among the rest, Bonaparte was applied to. It was with great difficulty he could be seen. Madame de Bourrienne, accompanied by one of her husband's friends, waited for the Commandant of Paris until midnight, but he *did not come home*. Next morning she returned at an early hour, and found him. She stated what had happened to her husband, whose head was then at stake. He appeared to feel very little for the situation of his friend. However, he determined to write to Merlin, the minister of justice. Madame de Bourrienne carried the letter according to its address. She met the minister as he was coming down stairs, on his way to the Directory. Being in grand costume, he wore a Henri IV. hat, surmounted with a multitude of plumes, a dress which formed a singular contrast with his person. He opened the letter; and whether it was that he cared as little for the general as the cause of M. de Bourrienne's arrest, he replied, that the business was no longer in his hands, and that it was now under the cognizance of the public administrators of the laws. The minister then stepped into his carriage, and the lady was conducted to several offices in his hotel. She passed through them with a broken heart, for she met with none but harsh men, who told her that the prisoner deserved death. From them she learned that on the following day he would be brought before the judge of the peace for

his section, who would decide whether there was ground for putting him on his trial. In fact, this proceeding took place next day. He was conveyed to the house of the judge of the peace for the section of Bondy, Rue Grange-aux-Belles, whose name was Lemaire. His countenance was mild; and though his manner was cold, he had none of the harshness and ferocity common to the government agents of that time. His examination of the charge was long, and he several times shook his head. The moment of decision had arrived, and every thing seemed to indicate that the termination would be to place the prisoner under accusation. At seven o'clock he desired his wife to be called; she hastened to him, and beheld a most heart-rending scene. He was suffering under a hæmorrhage, which had continued since two o'clock, and had interrupted the examination. The judge of the peace, who looked sad, sat with his head resting on his hand. She threw herself at his feet, and implored his clemency. The wife and the two daughters of the judge visited this scene of sorrow, and assisted Madame de Bourrienne in softening him. He was a worthy and feeling man, a good husband and parent. It was evident that he struggled between compassion and duty. He kept looking over the laws on the subject, and, after long researches, said to me, "To-morrow is Décadi, and no proceedings can take place on that day. Find, Madame, two responsible persons, who will answer for the appearance of your husband, and I will permit him to go home with you, accompanied by the two guardians." Next day two friends were found, one of whom was M. Desmaisons, counsellor of the court, who became bail for M. de Bourrienne. He continued under these guardians six months, until a law compelled the persons who were inscribed on the fatal list to remove to the distance of ten leagues from Paris. One of the guardians was a man of straw; the other was a knight of St. Louis. The former was left in the anti-chamber; the latter made, every evening, one of our party at cards. The family of M. de Bourrienne have always felt the warmest gratitude to the judge of the peace and his family. That worthy man saved the life of M. de Bourrienne, who, when he returned from Egypt, and had it in his power to do him some service, hastened to his house; but the good judge was no more!

The letters mentioned in the narrative were at this time stolen from me by the police officers.

Every one was now eager to pay court to a man who had risen from the crowd in consequence of the part he had acted at an extraordinary crisis, and who was spoken of as the future general of the army of Italy. It was expected that he would be gratified, as he really was, by the restoration of some letters which contained the expression of his former very modest wishes, called to recollection his unpleasant situation, his limited ambition, his pretended aversion for public employment, and finally exhibited his intimate relations with those who were, without hestitation, characterized as Emigrants, to be afterwards made the victims of confiscation and death.

The 13th of Vendémiaire (October 5, 1795) was approaching.

The National Convention had been painfully delivered of a new constitution, called, from the epoch of its birth, "the Constitution of Year III." It was adopted on the 22d of August, 1795. The provident legislators did not forget themselves. They stipulated that two-thirds of their body should form part of the new legislature. The party opposed to the Convention hoped, on the contrary, that, by a general election, a majority would be obtained for its opinion. That opinion was against the continuation of power in the hands of men who had already so greatly abused it. The same opinion was also entertained by a great part of the most influential sections of Paris, both as to the possession of property and talent. These sections declared that, in accepting the new constitution, they rejected the decree of the 30th of August, which required the re-election of two-thirds. The Convention, therefore, found itself menaced in what it held most dear—its power, and, accordingly, resorted to measures of defence. A declaration was put forth, stating that the Convention, if attacked, would remove to Chalons-sur-Marne; and the commanders of the armed force were called upon to defend that body.

The 5th of October, the day on which the sections of Paris attacked the Convention, is certainly one which ought to be marked in the wonderful destiny of Bonaparte. With the events of that day were linked, as cause and effect, many great political convulsions of Europe. The blood which flowed ripened the seeds of the youthful general's ambition. It must be admitted that the history of past ages presents few periods full of such extraordinary events as the years included between 1795 and 1815. The man whose name serves, in some measure, as a recapitulation of all these great events, was entitled to believe himself immortal.

Living retired at Sens since the month of July, I only learned what had occasioned the insurrection of the sections from public report and the journals. I cannot, therefore, say what part Bonaparte may have taken in the intrigues which preceded that day. He was officially characterized only as secondary actor in the scene. The account of the affair which was published announces that Barras was, on that very day, commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior, and Bonaparte second in command. Bonaparte drew up that account. The whole of the manuscript was in his handwriting, and it exhibits all the peculiarity of his style and orthography. He sent me a copy.

Those who read the bulletin of the 13th Vendémiaire, cannot fail to observe the care which Bonaparte took to cast the reproach of shedding the first blood on the men he calls rebels. He made a great point of representing his adversaries as the aggressors. It is certain he long regretted that day. He often told me that he would give years of his life to blot it out from

the page of his history. He was convinced that the people of Paris were dreadfully irritated against him, and he would have been glad if Barras had never made that speech in the Convention, with the part of which, complimentary to himself, he was at the time so well pleased. Barras said, "It is to his able and prompt dispositions that we are indebted for the defence of this assembly, around which he had posted the troops with the greatest skill." This is perfectly true, but it is not always agreeable that every truth should be told. Being out of Paris, and a total stranger to this affair, I know not how far he was indebted for his success to chance, or to his own exertions, in the part assigned to him by the miserable government which then oppressed France. He represented himself only as secondary actor in this sanguinary scene in which Barras made him his associate. He sent to me, as already mentioned, an account of the transaction, written entirely in his own hand, and distinguished by all the peculiarities of his style and orthography.*

"On the 13th," says Bonaparte, "at five o'clock in the morning, the representative of the people, Barras, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior, and General Bonaparte was nominated second in command.

"The artillery for service was still at the camp of Sablons, guarded solely by one hundred and fifty men; the remainder was at Marly with two hundred men. The depot of Meudon was left unprotected. There were at Feuillans, only a few four-pounders without artillery-men, and but 80,000 cartridges. The victualling depots were dispersed throughout Paris. In many sections, the drums beat to arms; the section of the Théâtre Français had advanced posts even as far as the Pont Neuf, which it had barricaded.

"General Barras ordered the artillery to be transported immediately from the camp of Sablons to the Tuileries, and selected the artillery-men from the battalions of the 89th regiment, and from the *gendarmerie*, and placed them at the palace; sent to Meudon 200 men of the police legion whom he brought from Versailles, 50 cavalry, and two companies of veterans; he ordered the property which was at Marly to be conveyed to Meudon; caused cartridges to be brought there, and established a workshop at that place for the manufacture of more. He secured means for the subsistence of the army and of the Convention for many days, independently of the depots which were in the sections.

"General Verdier, who commanded at the Palais National, exhibited great coolness; he was required not to suffer a shot

* Joseph Bonaparte, in a note on this passage, insinuates that the account of the 13th Vendémiaire was never sent to Sens, but was abstracted by Bourrienne, with other documents, from Napoleon's cabinet.—*Editor.*

DRAWN BY F. DE MYRBACH.

THE THIRTEENTH VENDÉMIAIRE.

OCTOBER 5, 1795. BONAPARTE QUELLING THE INSURRECTION OF THE SECTIONS.

to be fired till the last extremity. In the mean time, reports reached him from all quarters acquainting him that the sections were assembled in arms, and had formed their columns. He, accordingly, arrayed his troops so as to defend the Convention, and his artillery was in readiness to repulse the rebels. His cannon was planted at Feuillans' to fire down the Rue St. Honoré. Eight-pounders were pointed at every opening, and in the event of any mishap, General Verdier had cannon in reserve to fire in flank upon the column which should have forced a passage. He left in the Carrousel three howitzers (eight-pounders) to batter down the houses, from which the Convention might be fired upon. At four o'clock, the rebel columns marched out from every street to unite their forces. It was necessary to take advantage of this critical moment to attack the insurgents, even had they been regular troops. But the blood about to flow was French; it was therefore for these misguided people, already guilty of rebellion, to imbrue their hands in the blood of their countrymen by striking the first blow.

"At a quarter before five o'clock, the insurgents had formed. The attack was commenced by them on all sides. They were every where routed. French blood was spilled: the crime, as well as the disgrace, fell this day upon the sections.

"Among the dead were every where to be recognised emigrants, landowners, and nobles; the prisoners consisted for the most part of the *chouans* of Charette.

"Nevertheless, the sections did not consider themselves beaten: they took refuge in the church of St. Roch, in the theatre of the republic, and in the Palais Egalité; and every where they were heard furiously exciting the inhabitants to arms. To spare the blood which would have been shed the next day, it was necessary that no time should be given them to rally, but to follow them with vigour, though without incurring fresh hazards. The general ordered Montchoisy, who commanded a reserve at the Place de la Révolution, to form a column with two twelve-pounders, to march by the Boulevard in order to turn the Place Vendôme, to form a junction with the picket stationed at head-quarters, and to return in the same order of column.

"General Brune, with two howitzers, deployed in the streets of St. Nicaise, and St. Honoré. General Cartaux sent two hundred men and a four-pounder of his division, by the Rue St. Thomas-du-Louvre, to deploy in the square of the Palais Egalité. General Bonaparte, who had his horse killed under him, repaired to Feuillans'.

"The columns began to move. St. Roch, and the theatre of the republic, were taken by assault, when the rebels abandoned them, and retreated to the upper part of the Rue de la Loi, and barricaded themselves on all sides. Patrols were sent thither, and several cannon-shots were fired during the night, in order

to destroy their defences, which object was effectually accomplished.

"At daybreak, the general having learned that some students from the St. Geneviève side of the river were marching with two pieces of cannon to succour the rebels, sent a detachment of dragoons in pursuit of them, who seized the cannon and conducted them to the Tuileries. The enfeebled sections, however, still showed a front. They had barricaded the section of Grenelle, and placed their cannon in the principal streets. At nine o'clock, General Beruyer hastened to form his division in battle array in the Place Vendôme, marched with two eight-pounders to the Rue des Vieux-Augustins, and pointed them in the direction of the Section Le Pelletier. General Vachet, with a corps of *tirailleurs*, marched on his right, ready to advance to the Place Victoire. General Brune marched to the Perron, and planted two howitzers at the upper end of the Rue Vivienne. General Duvigier, with his column of six hundred men, and two twelve-pounders, advanced to the streets of St. Roch and Montmartre; but the sections lost courage with the apprehension of seeing their retreat cut off. They evacuated the post, and, at the sight of our soldiers, forgot the honour of the French name which they had to support. The section of Brutus still caused some uneasiness. The wife of a representative had been arrested there. General Duvigier was ordered to proceed along the Boulevard as far as the Rue Poissonnière. Beruyer took up a position at the Place Victoire, and General Bonaparte occupied the Pont-au-Change.

"The Section of Brutus was surrounded, and the troops advanced upon the Place de Grève, where the crowd poured in from the Isle St. Louis, from the Théâtre Français, and from the Palace. Every where the patriots had regained their courage, while the poniards of the emigrants, armed against us, had disappeared. The people universally admitted their error.

"The next day the two sections of Le Pelletier and the Théâtre Français were disarmed."*

* The following history of the famous 13th Vendémiaire, will, no doubt, be interesting to the reader, and will supply M. de Bourrienne's deficiency in this respect.—"The expectations founded on the armies of Europe, on the progress of internal discord, and on the attempt of the Emigrants having failed, recourse was next had to the discontented Sections. It was hoped to bring about the counter-revolution by means of the new Directorial Constitution. This constitution was nevertheless the work of the moderate republican party; but inasmuch as it gave the ascendant to the middle classes, the royalist intriguers indulged confident expectations of entering by their means into the Legislature and the Government. The Convention having suppressed the Jacobins and the Faux-bourgs in order to put an end to anarchy and violence, the *Jeunesse Dorée* thought this a proper time to insult their fellow-citizens as Republicans, and the Sections rose against the Convention to annul its authority now that it was mildly and beneficially exercised, and to restore despotism and the ancient *régime:* upon what principle it is impossible to guess, except that mentioned by Luther, that 'human reason is like a drunken man on horseback—set it up on one side,

ATTAQUE DE SAINT-LUC

RIOT OF ST. ROCHE.

On the 4th of October, 1795, at six o'clock A. M., Napoleon visited every post, and placed his troops of the line. They were few in number, and might easily be decoyed by the populace. Arms were confided to 500 individuals, called *Les Patriotes de quatre-vingt neuf.* Three battalions were confided to General Berruyer; and General Cartaux commanded 400 men and four pieces of cannon, and was stationed on *Pont Neuf.*

Whilst every thing portended a sanguinary affair, the danger becoming every instant more pressing, the Convention discussed the appearance of things without coming to any decision. Suddenly a column of some battalions of the section *Lepelletier,* headed by Lafond, an emigrant, appeared on Pont Neuf, and obliged Cartaux to fall back under the posterns. At three o'clock, Dancian, general of the sections, required the Convention to remove the troops which menaced the people. At about a quarter after four, some rockets were fired from the *Hotel de Noailles.* This was the signal for the attack. Lafond's column wheeled round, and marched on the *Pont Royal,* along the *Quai Voltaire.* This column was routed by the artillery of the Louvre and *Pont Royal,* after rallying three times under the fire. St. Roche was taken, the *Rue St. Honoré, la Rue St. Florentin,* and every other post occupied by the sectionaries, were cleared. At six o'clock, the affray was over; and if a few common shots were heard during the night, they were discharged to destroy and repress the formation of barricades, which some of the inhabitants still wished to maintain.

The result of this petty civil war brought Bonaparte forward; but the party he defeated at that period never pardoned him for the past, and that which he supported dreaded him in the future. Five years after, he will be found reviving the principles which he combated on the 5th of October, 1795. On being appointed, on the motion of Barras, Lieutenant-general of the Army of the Interior, he established his head-quarters in the Rue Neuve des Capucines. The statement in the "Manuscrit de Sainte Hélène," that after the 13th Brumaire he remained unemployed at Paris, is, therefore, obviously erroneous.

To avoid returning to this "Manuscrit de St. Hélène," which at the period of its appearance attracted more attention than it deserved, and which was very generally attributed to Bonaparte, I shall here say a few words respecting it. I shall briefly repeat what I said in a note when my opinion was asked, under high authority, by a minister of Louis XVIII.

and it is sure to fall over on the other.' Or rather, passion is only satisfied with mischievous extremes—moderation and wisdom appear to be its bane—and reason is the dupe of sophistry and passion.

"The Convention notwithstanding held an even course and was determined to keep it. To avoid the error of the first Constituent Assembly, which had involved France in endless troubles, by the prudery of excluding its members from the subsequent assembly, the Convention decreed the re-election of two-thirds of its members. This prompt and seasonable step, which had for its object to save the country from the return of anarchy or a counter-revolution, excited the greatest possible ferment; the Royalist Committee came to an understanding with the journalists and shopkeepers of Paris; the Fauxbourg St. Germain, hitherto deserted, was filled from day to day with emigrants in the Chouan uniform, who made no secret of their design of restoring absolute power, while the section Lepelletier (or Filles St. Thomas) under the guidance of La Harpe, Lacretelle, and other literary drivellers, at once the accomplices and dupes of the surviving party, declared loudly (in order to arrive by a diversion at the same end) that all power resided in the assembled people. The struggle became more and more furious; the majority of the sections of Paris sided with the section Lepelletier in rejecting the decree of the Convention, who however, on the 1st of Vendémiaire, pronounced both that and the Constitution to have been acceded to by the majority of the primary assemblies throughout France. The Sections had now nothing to do but submit; but as they had farther objects in view, or were led on by those who had, they were by no means disposed to do so. They proceeded to nominate the electors, who were to choose the new members after their own fashion, and to organize an armed force to defend their meetings.

"The Convention, apprized of the coming storm and not inclined tamely to yield to it, collected the troops from the camp of Sablons, delegated its powers to a Committee of five persons, Colombel, Barras, Daunou, Letourneur, and Merlin of Douai, who were charged with the care of the public safety; enrolled a *Battalion of the Patriots of Eighty-nine* (amounting to fifteen or eighteen hundred old revolutionists, who had been objects of persecution to the *réactionnaires* in the southern departments), and on the 11th, at night, sent to dissolve the assembly of electors by force, but they had already adjourned. During the night of the 11th, the decree which dissolved the college of electors and armed the Battalion of Patriots of Eighty-nine, produced the greatest consternation and was represented as a return to the system of terror. The Section Lepelletier did every thing in its power to incite the other Sections to revolt. The Convention, no less alarmed, resolved to give the first blow and bring the affair to a conclusion by disarming the refractory Sections.

No reader intimately acquainted with public affairs can be deceived by the pretended authenticity of this pamphlet. What does it contain? Facts perverted and heaped together without method, and related in an obscure, affected, and ridiculously sententious style. Besides what appears in it, but which is badly placed there, it is impossible not to remark the omission of what should necessarily be there, were Napoleon the author. Some truths are mixed up with an inconceivable mass of falsehoods. Some forms of expression used by Bonaparte are occasionally met with, but they are awkwardly introduced, and often with bad taste.

It has been reported that the pamphlet was written by M. Bertrand, formerly an officer of the army of the Vistula, and a relation of the Count de Simeon, peer of France.

"On the 12th of Vendémiaire at seven or eight o'clock in the evening, General Menou, accompanied by the Representatives of the People, who always attended on such occasions as Commissioners of the Army of the Interior, proceeded with a numerous escort to the place of rendezvous of the Section Lepelletier to put the decree of the Convention in execution. The infantry, cavalry, and artillery were all crowded together in the Rue Vivienne, at the extremity of which stood the Convent of the *Filles St. Thomas*. The Sectionaries occupied the windows of the houses in this street. Several of their battalions drew up in line in the court-yard of the convent, and the military force which General Menou led found itself placed in an embarrassing predicament. The Committee of the Section having designated themselves as a deputation of the Sovereign People in the exercise of their original functions, which the convention had usurped, they refused to obey its orders; and after an hour spent in useless conferences, General Menou and the Commissioners withdrew by a sort of capitulation, without having dissolved or disarmed the meeting. The Section thus victorious declared themselves in permanence; sent deputations to the other Sections, boasting of its success and urgently recommending the measures best calculated to ensure the common triumph. In this manner it prepared for the contest of the 13th of Vendémiaire."—*Hazlitt.*

FROM THE PAINTING BY P. OUTIN.

EXHIBITED IN THE SALON OF 1889.

PUBLICATION AUTHORIZED.

THE BATTLE OF QUIBERON.

In July, 1795, six thousand French "émigrés" were landed at Quiberon, in Brittany, under the protection of an English fleet. Hoche, at the head of the republican forces, attacked them fiercely, and only about 1800 of them escaped to the English vessels.

ENGRAVED BY J. W. EVANS.

FROM THE PAINTING BY FRANÇOIS FLAMENG.

PUBLICATION AUTHORIZED.

THE CONQUEST OF HOLLAND.

The French, under Pichegru, taking advantage of the ice-bridges formed by the severe cold in the early part of 1795, overran Holland.

ERIC PAPE.

THE CIVIL MARRIAGE OF NAPOLEON AND JOSEPHINE.

CHAPTER IV.

1795—1797.

On my return to Paris I meet Bonaparte—His interview with Josephine—My return to Sens—Bonaparte's marriage, and departure from Paris ten days after—Portrait and character of Josephine—Bonaparte's dislike of national property—Letter of General Colli, and Bonaparte's reply—Bonaparte refuses to serve with Kellerman—Marmont's letters—Bonaparte's order to me to join the army—My departure from Sens for Italy—Insurrection of the Venetian States.

After the 13th Vendémiaire, I visited Paris. During the short time I stopped there, I saw Bonaparte less frequently than formerly. I had, however, no reason to attribute this to any thing but the pressure of public business with which he was now occupied. When I did meet him, it was most commonly at breakfast or dinner. One day he called my attention to a young lady who sat opposite to him, and asked what I thought of her. The way in which I answered his question appeared to give him much pleasure. I readily gathered from his conversation, that his union with this young widow would probably assist him in gaining the objects of his ambition. His constantly increasing influence with her had already brought him into contact with the most influential persons of that epoch. He remained in Paris only ten days after his marriage, which took place on the 9th of March 1796.*

* Bonaparte's first interview with Josephine, and the circumstance which gave rise to it, are thus described in the "Memoires de Constant."

"Eugene was not more than fourteen or fifteen years of age when he ventured to introduce himself to General Bonaparte, for the purpose of soliciting his father's sword, of which he understood the general had become possessed. The countenance, air, and frank manner of Eugene, pleased Bonaparte, and he immediately granted him the boon he sought. As soon as the sword was placed in the boy's hands, he burst into tears, and kissed it. This feeling of affection for his father's memory, and the natural manner in which it was evinced, increased the interest of Bonaparte for his young visiter. Madame de Beauharnais, on learning the kind reception which the general had given her son, thought it her duty to call and thank him. Bonaparte was much pleased with Josephine on this first interview, and he returned her visit. The acquaintance thus commenced, speedily led to their marriage."

This anecdote is related in nearly the same terms, in "A Voice from St. Helena."—*Editor.*

Madame Bonaparte possessed personal graces and many good qualities. I am convinced that all who were acquainted with her must have felt bound to speak well of her; to few, indeed, did she ever give cause for complaint. Benevolence was natural to her, but she was not always prudent in its exercise. Hence her protection was often extended to persons who did not deserve it. Her taste for splendour and expense was excessive. This proneness to luxury became a habit which seemed constantly indulged without any motive. What scenes have I not witnessed when the moment for paying the tradesmen's bills arrived! She always kept back one half of their claims, and the discovery of this exposed her to new reproaches, How many tears did she shed which might have been easily spared!

When fortune placed a crown on her head, she told me that the event, extraordinary as it was, had been predicted. It is certain that she put faith in fortune-tellers. I often expressed to her my astonishment, that she should cherish such a belief, and she readily laughed at her own credulity; but notwithstanding, never abandoned it. The event had given importance to the prophecy; but the foresight of the prophetess, said to be an old negress, was not the less a matter of doubt.

Not long before the 13th of Vendémiaire, that day which opened for Bonaparte his immense career, he addressed a letter to me at Sens, in which, after some of his usually friendly expressions, he said, "Look out a small piece of land in your beautiful valley of the Yonne. I will purchase something of the sort, as soon as I can scrape together the money. I wish to retire there: but recollect that I will have nothing to do with national property."

Bonaparte left Paris on the 21st of March, 1796, while I was still with my guardians. He no sooner joined the army than General Colli transmitted to him the following letter, which, with its answer, I think sufficiently interesting to deserve preservation.

General,

I suppose that you are ignorant of the arrest of one of my officers, named Moulin, the bearer of a flag of truce, who has been detained for some days past at Murseco, contrary to the laws of war, and notwithstanding an immediate demand for his liberation being made by General Count Vidal. His being a French emigrant cannot take from him the rights of a flag of truce, and I again claim him in that character. The courtesy and generosity which I have always experienced from the generals of your nation, induces me to hope that I shall not make this application in vain; and it is with regret that I mention that your chief of brigade, Barthelemy, who ordered the unjust arrest of my flag of truce, having yesterday by the chance of war fallen into my hands, that officer will be dealt with according to the treatment which M. Moulin may receive.

L'Impératrice Joséphine

I most sincerely wish that nothing may occur to change the noble and humane conduct which the two nations have hitherto been accustomed to observe towards each other.

(Signed) COLLI.

Ceva, April 17th, 1796.

Bonaparte replied as follows:

GENERAL,

An emigrant is a parricide whom no character can render sacred. The feelings of honour, and the respect due to the French people, were forgotten when M. Moulin was sent as a flag of truce. You know the laws of war: and I therefore do not give credit to the reprisals with which you threaten the chief of brigade, Barthelemy. If, contrary to the laws of war, you authorize such an act of barbarism, all the prisoners taken from you shall be immediately made responsible for it with the most deplorable vengeance, for I entertain for the officers of your nation that esteem which is due to brave warriors.

The Executive Directory, to whom these letters were transmitted, approved the arrest of M. Moulin; but ordered that he should be securely guarded, and not brought to trial in consequence of the character with which he was invested.

About the middle of the year 1796, the Directory proposed to appoint General Kellerman, who commanded the army of the Alps, second in command of the army of Italy.

On the 24th of May, 1796, Bonaparte wrote to Carnot respecting this plan, which was far from being agreeable to him. He said, "Whether I shall be employed here or any where else is indifferent to me: to serve the country, and to merit from posterity a page in our history, is all my ambition. If you join Kellerman and me in command in Italy, you will undo every thing. General Kellerman has more experience than I, and knows how to make war better than I do; but both together, we shall make it badly. I will not willingly serve with a man who considers himself the first general in Europe."

Numbers of letters from Bonaparte to his wife have been published. I cannot deny their authenticity, nor is it my wish to do so. I will, however, subjoin one which appears to me to differ a little from the rest. It is less remarkable for exaggerated expressions of love, and a singularly ambitious and affected style, than most of the correspondence here alluded to. Bonaparte is announcing the victory of Arcola to Josephine.

Verona, the 29th, noon.*

At length, my adored Josephine, I live again. Death is no longer before me, and glory and honour are still in my breast. The enemy is beaten at Arcola. To-morrow we will repair the blunder of Vaubois, who abandoned Rivoli. In a week Mantua will be ours, and then thy husband will fold thee in his arms, and give thee a thousand proofs of his ardent affection. I shall proceed to Milan as soon as I can: I am

* There is no other date; but the name of Arcola is sufficient.

a little fatigued. I have received letters from Eugene and Hortense. I am delighted with the children. I will send you their letters as soon as I am joined by my household which is now somewhat dispersed.

We have made five thousand prisoners, and killed at least six thousand of the enemy. Adieu, my adorable Josephine. Think of me often. When you cease to love your Achilles, when your heart grows cool towards him, you will be very cruel, very unjust. But I am sure you will always continue my faithful mistress, as I shall ever remain your fond lover. Death alone can break the union which sympathy, love, and sentiment have formed. Let me have news of your health. A thousand and a thousand kisses.

It is impossible for me to avoid occasionally placing myself in the foreground in the course of these Memoirs. I owe it to myself to answer, though indirectly, to certain charges which, on various occasions, have been made against me. Some of the documents which I am about to insert belong, perhaps, less to the history of the general-in-chief of the army of Italy, than to that of his secretary; but I must confess, I wish to show that I was not an intruder, nor yet pursuing, as an obscure intriguer, the path of fortune. I was influenced much more by friendship than by ambition when I took a part on the theatre where the rising glory of the future emperor already shed a lustre on all who were attached to his destiny. It will be seen by the following letters with what confidence I was then honoured; but these letters, dictated by friendship, and not written for history, speak also of our military achievements; and whatever brings to recollection the events of that heroic period, must still be interesting to many.

Head-quarters, at Milan, 29 Prairial, year IV.
(June 8, 1796.)

The general-in-chief has ordered me, my dear Bourrienne, to make known to you the pleasure he experienced on hearing of you, and his ardent desire that you should join us. Take your departure, then, my dear Bourrienne, and arrive quickly. You may be certain of obtaining the testimonies of affection, which are your due, from all who know you; and we much regret that you are not with us, to have a share in our success. The campaign which we have just concluded will be celebrated in the records of history. With less than 30,000 men, in a state of almost complete destitution, it is a fine thing to have, in the course of less than two months, beaten, eight different times, an army of from 65 to 70,000 men, obliged the King of Sardinia to make a humiliating peace, and driven the Austrians from Italy. The last victory, of which you have doubtless had an account, the passage of the Mincio, has closed our labours. There now remain for us the siege of Mantua and the castle of Milan; but these obstacles will not detain us long. Adieu, my dear Bourrienne: I repeat General Bonaparte's request that you should repair hither, and the testimony of his desire to see you. Receive, &c.

MARMONT,
Chief of Brigade, and Aide-de-camp to the general-in-chief.

FROM THE INDIA-INK SKETCH BY INGRES, IN THE COLLECTION OF M. GERMAIN BAPST.

NAPOLEON WORKING BY LAMPLIGHT.

I was obliged to remain at Sens, soliciting my erasure from the emigrant list, which I did not obtain, however, till 1797, and to put an end to a charge made against me of having fabricated a certificate of residence. Meanwhile, I applied myself to study, and preferred repose to the agitation of camps. For these reasons I did not then accept this friendly invitation, notwithstanding that I was very desirous of seeing my young college friend in the midst of his astonishing triumphs. Ten months after, I received another letter from Marmont, in the following terms:

Head-quarters, Gorizia, 2 Germinal, year V.
(March 22, 1797.)

The general-in-chief, my dear Bourrienne, has ordered me to express to you his wish for your prompt arrival here. We have all along anxiously desired to see you, and look forward with great pleasure to the moment when we shall meet. I join with the general, my dear Bourrienne, in urging you to join the army without loss of time. You will increase a united family, happy to receive you in its bosom. I enclose an order written by the general, which will serve you as a passport. Post it, and arrive immediately. We are on the point of penetrating into Germany. The language is changing already, and in four days we shall hear no more Italian. Prince Charles has been well beaten, and we are pursuing him. If this campaign be fortunate, we may sign a peace, which is so necessary for Europe, in Vienna. Adieu, my dear Bourrienne: reckon for something the zeal of one who is much attached to you,

MARMONT.

Head-quarters, Gorizia, 2 Germinal, year V.

BONAPARTE, GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.

The citizen Bourrienne is to come to me on receipt of the present order.

BONAPARTE.

The odious manner in which I was then harassed, I know not why, on the part of the government, respecting my certificate of residence, rendered my stay in France not very agreeable. I was even threatened with being put on my trial for having produced a certificate of residence which was alleged to be signed by nine false witnesses. This time, therefore, I resolved without hesitation to set out for the army. General Bonaparte's order, which I registered at the municipality of Sens, answered for a passport, which otherwise would probably have been refused me. I have always felt a strong sense of gratitude for his conduct towards me on this occasion.

Notwithstanding the haste I made to leave Sens, the necessary formalities and precautions detained me some days, and at the moment I was about to depart, I received the following letter:

Head-quarters, Judenburgh, 10 Germinal, year V.
(April 8, 1797.)

The general-in-chief again orders me, my dear Bourrienne, to urge you to come to him quickly. We are in the midst of success and triumphs. The German campaign begins even more brilliantly than did the Italian. You may judge, therefore, what a promise it holds out to us. Come, my dear Bourrienne, immediately—yield to our solicitations—share our pains and pleasures, and you will add to our enjoyments.

I have directed the courier to pass through Sens, that he may deliver this letter to you, and bring me back your answer.

MARMONT.

To the above letter this order was subjoined:

The citizen Fauvelet de Bourrienne is ordered to leave Sens, and repair immediately by post to the head-quarters of the army of Italy.

BONAPARTE.

I arrived at the Venetian territory at the moment when the insurrection against the French was on the point of breaking out. Thousands of peasants were instigated to rise under the pretext of appeasing the troubles of Bergamo and Brescia. I passed through Verona on the 16th of April, the eve of the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben, and of the revolt of Verona. Easter Sunday was the day which the ministers of Jesus Christ selected for preaching "that it was lawful, and even meritorious, to kill Jacobins." *Death to Frenchmen!—Death to Jacobins!* were their rallying cries. At the time, I had not the slightest idea of this state of things, for I had left Sens only on the 11th of April. After stopping two hours at Verona, I proceeded on my journey without being aware of the massacre which threatened that city. When about a league from the town, I was, however, stopped by a party of insurgents, on their way thither, consisting, as I estimated, of about two thousand men. They only desired me to cry *El viva Santo Marco,* an order with which I speedily complied, and passed on. What would have become of me had I been in Verona on the Monday? On that day the bells were rung, while the French were butchered in the hospitals. Every one met in the streets was put to death. The priests headed the assassins, and more than four hundred Frenchmen were thus sacrificed. The forts held out against the Venetians, though they attacked them with fury; but repossession of the town was not obtained until after ten days. On the very day of the insurrection of Verona, some Frenchmen were assassinated between that city and Vicenza, through which I passed on the day before without danger; and scarcely had I passed through Padua, when I

PRÉLIMINAIRES DE LA PAIX DE LÉOBEN

NEGOTIATION OF PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE AT LEOBEN.

Some hours after receiving dispatches from the Directory, Napoleon wrote to the Archduke Charles to make overtures of peace to him; the Archduke immediately answered that he would learn the opinion of his Court, having no power to treat alone.

At last, on the 7th of April, 1797, the head-quarters were fixed at Leoben, when Generals Bellegarde and Merfeld presented themselves to demand an armistice of ten days, previous to making a definitive peace. The armistice was signed the same evening, but the French agreed to five days only. The Austrian plenipotentiaries arrived at Leoben on the 13th of April, and the preliminaries were signed on the 18th.

The scene in the picture is in a pavilion of the Bishop's palace in the midst of a garden. The French general seems to be saying to the Austrian envoys: "If we are not agreed upon that point, I continue my march, and behold the road to victory!"

The picture contains some historical portraits; among others, Lavalette, aide-de-camp to Napoleon, who wrote under the dictation of his general; to the left of Lavalette are Louis Buonaparte, and Eugene Beauharnais, leaning his head on the future King of Holland. There are also portraits of Berthier, Massena, Augereau, and Murat, then inseparable associates from Napoleon.

learned that others had been massacred there. Thus the assassinations travelled as rapidly as the post.

I shall say a few words respecting the revolt of the Venetian states, which, in consequence of the difference of political opinions, has been viewed in very contradictory lights.

The last days of Venice were approaching, and a storm had been brewing for more than a year. About the beginning of April the threatening symptoms of a general insurrection appeared. The quarrel commenced when the Austrians entered Peschiera, and some pretext was also afforded by the reception given to *Monsieur*, afterwards Louis XVIII. It was certain that Venice had made military preparations during the siege of Mantua, in 1796. The interests of the aristocracy outweighed the political considerations in our favour. On the 7th of June, 1796, General Bonaparte wrote thus to the Executive Directory:

> The Senate of Venice lately sent two judges of their Council here to ascertain definitively how things stand. I repeated my complaints. I spoke to them about the reception given to *Monsieur*. Should it be your plan to extract five or six millions from Venice, I have *expressly prepared* this sort of rupture for you. If your intentions be *more decided*, I think this ground of quarrel ought to be kept up. Let me know what you mean to do, and wait till the favourable moment, which I shall seize according to circumstances; for we must not have to do with all the world at once.

The Directory answered that the moment was not favourable; that it was first necessary to take Mantua, and give Wurmser a sound beating. However, towards the end of the year 1796 the Directory began to give more credit to the sincerity of the professions of neutrality made on the part of Venice. It was resolved therefore to be content with obtaining money and supplies for the army, and to refrain from violating the neutrality. The Directory had not then in reserve, like Bonaparte, the idea of making the dismemberment of Venice serve as a compensation for such of the Austrian possessions as the French republic might retain.

At the period to which these Memoirs are now brought (April, 1796), the expected favourable moment had arrived. The knell of Venice was rung; and Bonaparte thus wrote to the Directory on the 30th of April: "I am convinced that the only course to be now taken, is to destroy this ferocious and sanguinary government." On the 3d of May, writing from Palma Nuova, he says: "I see nothing that can be done, but to obliterate the Venetian name from the face of the globe."

Twenty days after this determination to humble the Venetian aristocracy, he wrote to the Directory: "The party at Genoa, which is called the patriotic, has managed very ill. Its follies

and inconsistencies have given the advantage to the aristocrats. Had the patriots remained quiet, but for a fortnight, the aristocracy would have been ruined, and would have died of itself."

Two causes powerfully contributed to hasten the downfal of Venice, after an existence of twelve hundred years. The conquests of the French had propagated the principles of the revolution in Italy. The Archduke of Milan had been deposed; why should not the Doge of Venice also cease to rule? The spirit of the revolution was gradually diffused, and discontent rapidly spread along with it. The difference between the new doctrines and the gloomy institutions of Venice, was sufficiently striking to account for the desire to escape from the latter.

On the other hand, great measures were no longer to be expected from the senate of Venice, for the government was worn out. What ought to be done was certainly discussed, but no decision was adopted. The senate was constantly fluctuating between Austria and France; between a conquered and a conquering power. Accustomed to tremble before Austria, Venice always paid more deference to that power than to France. This unfortunate government hoped to derive advantage from the entrance of the French army into Germany, and its position in the defiles of Carinthia;—that opportunity was to be taken to renew the Sicilian Vespers. The fanatical peasants, among whom money was distributed, every where took up arms. Bonaparte on his part had tolerated a revolutionary apostleship, a measure easily justified. He wished to reinforce his army by an Italian army, and thus to guard against the vengeance and perfidy which had destroyed so many ultramontane armies in preceding wars.

Of all the Italians, the people of Venice were the most hostile to us. Bonaparte wrote to M. Lallemant, the minister of the French republic at Venice, "that all the reports drawn up by the Proveditores of Brescia, Bergamo, and Cremona, which attributed the insurrection to the French, were a series of impostures, the object of which was to justify the perfidy of the senate of Venice in the eyes of Europe."

Towards the end of March, 1797, the government of Venice was in a desperate state. Ottolini, the Podesta of Bergamo, an instrument of tyranny in the hands of the state inquisitors, then harassed the people of Bergamo and Brescia, who, after the reduction of Mantua, wished to be separated from Venice. He drew up, to be sent to the senate, a long report respecting the plans of separation, founded on information given him by a Roman advocate, named Marcelin Serpini, who had come to Bergamo on business connected with the property of the Princess Albani, and who pretended to have gleaned the facts he communicated, in conversation with officers of the French army. The plan of the patriotic party was, to unite the Venetian territories on the main land, with Lombardy, and to form of the

ENGRAVED BY M. HAIDER. FROM THE PAINTING BY LEOPOLD KUPELWIESER, IN THE IMPERIAL CHÂTEAU OF LAXENBURG, AUSTRIA.

ARCHDUKE CHARLES.

BY ERIC PAPE. AFTER THE PORTRAIT BY VINAZER, AND A CONTEMPORARY ENGRAVING IN THE COLLECTION OF MR. W. C.

DAGOBERT-SIGMUND, COUNT VON WURMSER.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE IN 1798.

From the drawing by André Dutertre, made on board the *Orient* during the passage to Egypt, 1798
The original is in the Bibliothèque Nationale.

whole one republic. The conduct of Ottolini exasperated the party inimical to Venice, and augmented the prevailing discontent. Having disguised his valet as a peasant, he sent him off to Venice with the report he had drawn up on Serpini's communications, and other information; but this report never reached the inquisitors. The valet was arrested, his despatches taken, and Ottolini fled from Bergamo. This gave a beginning to the general rising of the Venetian States. In fact, the force of circumstances alone brought on the insurrection of those territories against their old insular government. General La Hoz, who commanded the Lombard legion, was the active protector of the revolution, which certainly had its origin more in the progress of the prevailing principles of liberty than in the crooked policy of the senate of Venice. Bonaparte, indeed, in his despatches to the Directory, stated that the senate had instigated the insurrection; but that was not quite correct, and he could not wholly believe his own assertion.

Pending the vacillation of the Venetian senate, Vienna was exciting the population of its states on the continent to rise against the French. The Venetian government had always exhibited an extreme aversion to the French revolution, which had been violently condemned at Venice. Hatred of the French had been constantly excited and encouraged, and religious fanaticism had inflamed many persons of consequence in the country. From the end of 1796 the Venetian senate secretly continued its armaments, and the whole conduct of that government announced intentions, which have been called perfidious, but the only object of which was to defeat intentions still more perfidious. The senate was the irreconcileable enemy of the French republic. Excitement was carried to such a point, that in many places the people complained that they were not permitted to arm against the French. The Austrian generals industriously circulated the most sinister reports respecting the armies of the Sambre-et-Meuse and the Rhine, and the position of the French troops of the Tyrol. These impostures, printed in bulletins, were well calculated to instigate the Italians, and especially the Venetians, to rise in mass to exterminate the French, when the victorious army should penetrate into the hereditary states.

The pursuit of the Archduke Charles into the heart of Austria encouraged the hopes which the Venetian senate had conceived, that it would be easy to annihilate the feeble remnant of the French army, as the troops were scattered through the states of Venice on the main land. Wherever the senate had the ascendancy, insurrection was secretly fomented: wherever the influence of the patriots prevailed, ardent efforts were made to unite the Venetian terra firma to the Lombard republic.

Bonaparte skilfully took advantage of the disturbances, and the massacres consequent on them, to adopt towards the senate

the tone of an offended conqueror. He published a declaration that the Venetian government was the most treacherous imaginable. The weakness and cruel hypocrisy of the senate, facilitated the plan he had conceived of making a peace for France at the expense of the Venetian republic. On returning from Leoben, a conqueror and pacificator, he, without ceremony, took possession of Venice, changed the established government, and, master of all the Venetian territory, found himself, in the negotiations of Campo Formio, able to dispose of it as he pleased, as a compensation for the cessions which had been exacted from Austria. After the 19th of May, he wrote to the Directory that one of the objects of his treaty with Venice was to avoid bringing upon us the odium of violating the preliminaries relative to the Venetian territory, and, at the same time, to afford pretexts and to facilitate their execution.

At Campo Formio the fate of this republic was decided. It disappeared from the number of states without effort or noise The silence of its fall astonished imaginations warmed by historical recollections from the brilliant pages of its maritime glory. Its power, however, which had been silently undermined, existed no longer except in the illusion of those recollections. What resistance could it have opposed to the man destined to change the face of Europe?

CHAPTER V.

1797.

Signature of the preliminaries—Fall of Venice—My arrival and reception at Leoben—Bonaparte wishes to pursue his success—The Directory opposes him—He wishes to advance on Vienna—Movement of the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse—Bonaparte's dissatisfaction—Arrival at Milan—We take up our residence at Montebello—Napoleon's judgment respecting Dandolo and Melzi—Unopened correspondence answered.

I JOINED Bonaparte at Leoben on the 19th of April, the morning of the signature of the preliminaries of peace. These preliminaries resembled in no respect the definitive treaty of Campo Formio. The still incomplete fall of the state of Venice did not, at that time, present an available prey for partition. All was arranged afterwards. Woe to the small states that come in immediate contact with two colossal empires waging war!

Here terminated my connexion with Bonaparte as a comrade and equal, and those relations with him commenced, in which I saw him suddenly great, powerful, and surrounded with homage and glory. I no longer addressed him as I had been accustomed to do. I appreciated too well his personal importance. His position placed too great a social distance between him and me, not to make me feel the necessity of fashioning my demeanour accordingly. I made with pleasure, and without regret, the easy sacrifice of the style of familiar companionship, and other little privileges. He said, in a loud voice, when I entered the saloon where he was surrounded by the officers who formed his brilliant staff, "I am glad to see you, at last;" but as soon as we were alone, he made me understand that he was pleased with my reserve, and thanked me for it. I was immediately placed at the head of his cabinet. I spoke to him the same evening respecting the insurrection of the Venetian territories; of the dangers which menaced the French, and of those which I had escaped, &c. "Care thou* nothing about it," said he; "those rascals shall pay for it. Their republic has had its day, and is done." This republic was, however, still existing, wealthy and powerful. These words brought to my recollection what I had read in a work by one Gabriel Naudé, who wrote during the

* He used to *tuloyer* me in this familiar manner until his return to Milan.

reign of Louis XIII. for Cardinal de Bagin:—"Do you see Constantinople, which flatters itself with being the seat of a double empire; and Venice, which glories in her stability of a thousand years? *Their day will come.*"

In the first conversation which Bonaparte had with me, I thought I could perceive that he was not very well satisfied with the preliminaries. He would have liked to advance with his army to Vienna. He did not conceal this from me. Before he offered peace to Prince Charles, he wrote to the Directory that he intended to pursue his success; but that for this purpose he reckoned on the co-operation of the armies of the Sambre-et-Meuse and the Rhine. The Directory replied, that he must not reckon on a diversion in Germany, and that the armies of the Sambre-et-Meuse and the Rhine were not to pass that river. A resolution so unexpected—a declaration so contrary to what he had constantly solicited, compelled him to terminate his triumphs, and renounce his favourite project of planting the standard of the republic on the ramparts of Vienna, or at least of levying contributions on the suburbs of that capital.

A law of the 23d of August, 1794, forbad the use of any other names than those in the register of births. I wished to conform to this law, which very foolishly interfered with old habits. My eldest brother was living, and I therefore designated myself Fauvelet the younger. This annoyed General Bonaparte. "Such change of name is absolute nonsense," said he. "I have known you for twenty years by the name of Bourrienne. Sign as you still are named, and see what the advocates, with their laws, will do."

On the 20th of April, as Bonaparte was returning to Italy, he was obliged to stop in an island of the Tagliamento, while a torrent passed by, which had been occasioned by a violent storm. A courier appeared on the right bank of the river. He reached the island. Bonaparte read in the despatches of the Directory, that the armies of the Sambre-et-Meuse and the Rhine were in motion; that they were preparing to cross the Rhine, and had commenced hostilities on the very day of the signing of the preliminaries. This information arrived seven days after the Directory had written that "he must not reckon on the co-operation of the armies of Germany." It is impossible to describe the general's emotion on reading these despatches. He had signed the preliminaries only because the government had represented the co-operation of the armies of the Rhine as impracticable at that moment, and shortly afterwards, he was informed that the co-operation was about to take place. The agitation of his mind was so great, that he, for a moment, conceived the idea of passing to the left bank of the Tagliamento, and breaking all engagements, under some pretext or other. He persisted for some time in this resolution, which, however, Berthier and some other generals

ENGRAVED BY A. E. ANDERSON.

AFTER A PAINTING BY GEORGES-(JULES-VICTOR) CLAIRIN, IN THE CHÂTEAU OF LA BAISSIÈRE.

PUBLICATION AUTHORIZED.

THE FRENCH BEFORE THE DUCAL PALACE, VENICE.

(SEE "LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.")

successfully opposed. He exclaimed, "What a difference would there have been in the preliminaries, if, indeed, there had been any!" His chagrin, I might almost say, his despair, increased, when, some days after his entry into the Venetian States, he received a letter from Moreau, dated the 23d of April, in which that general informed him, that having passed the Rhine on the 20th, with brilliant success, and taken four thousand prisoners, it would not be long before he joined him. Who, in fact, can say what would have happened, but for the vacillating and distrustful policy of the Directory, which always encouraged low intrigues, and participated in the jealousy excited by the renown of the young conqueror? Because the Directory dreaded his ambition, they sacrificed the glory of our arms and the honour of the nation; for it cannot be doubted, that had the passage of the Rhine, so urgently demanded by Bonaparte, taken place some days sooner, he would have been able, without incurring any risk, to dictate, imperiously, the conditions of peace on the spot; or, if Austria were obstinate, to have gone on to Vienna, and signed it there. Still occupied with this idea, he wrote to the Directory, on the 8th of May: "Since I have received intelligence of the passage of the Rhine, by Hoche and Moreau, I much regret that it did not take place fifteen days sooner; or, at least, that Moreau did not say that he was in a situation to effect it." (He had been informed to the contrary.) What, after this, becomes of the unjust reproach against Bonaparte, of having, through jealousy of Moreau, deprived France of the advantages which a prolonged campaign would have procured her? Bonaparte was too devoted to the glory of France to sacrifice it to jealousy of the glory of any individual.

In traversing the Venetian States, to return to Milan, he often spoke to me of Venice. He always assured me, that he was originally entirely unconnected with the insurrections which had agitated that country; that common sense would show, as his project was to advance upon the Danube, he had no interest in having his rear disturbed by revolts, and his communications interrupted or cut off. "Such an idea," said he, "would be absurd, and could never enter into the mind of a man, to whom even his enemies cannot deny a certain degree of tact." He acknowledged that he was not vexed that matters had turned out as they had done, because he had already taken advantage of these circumstances (in the preliminaries) and hoped to profit still more from them (in the definitive peace). "When I arrive at Milan," said he, "I will occupy myself with Venice." It is, therefore, quite evident to me, that, in reality, the general-in-chief had nothing to do with the Venetian insurrections; that subsequently he was not displeased with them; and that, later still, he derived great advantage from them.

We arrived at Milan on the 5th of May, by way of Leybach,

Trieste, Palma-Nuova, Padua, Verona, and Mantua. Bonaparte soon took up his residence at Montebello, a very fine castle, three leagues from Milan, with a view over the rich and magnificent plains of Lombardy. At Montebello commenced the negotiations for the definitive peace which were terminated at Passeriano. The Marquis di Gallo, the Austrian plenipotentiary, resided half a league from Montebello.

During his residence at Montebello, the general-in-chief made an excursion to the Lake of Como, and to the Lago Maggiore. He visited the Borromean islands in succession, and occupied himself, on his return, with the organization of the towns of Venice, Genoa, and Milan. He sought for men and found none. "Good God," said he, "how rare men are! There are eighteen millions in Italy, and I have with difficulty found two, Dandolo and Melzi."

He appreciated them properly. Dandolo was one of the men who, in those revolutionary times, reflected the greatest honour upon Italy. After being a member of the great council of the Cisalpine republic, he exercised the functions of proveditore general in Dalmatia. It is only necessary to mention the name of Dandolo to the Dalmatians to learn from the grateful inhabitants how just, noble, and vigorous his administration was.

The services of Melzi are known. He was chancellor and keeper of the seals of the Italian monarchy, and was created Duke of Lodi.

In those who have seen the world, the truth of Napoleon's reproach excites little astonishment. In a country which, according to biographies and newspapers, abounds with extraordinary men, a woman of much talent* said, "What has most surprised me, since the elevation of my husband has afforded me the opportunity of knowing many persons, and particularly those employed in important affairs, is the universal mediocrity which exists. It surpasses all that the imagination can conceive, and it is observable in all ranks, from the clerk to the minister. Without this experience, I never could have believed my species to be so contemptible."

Who does not remember Oxensteirn's remark to his son, who trembled at going so young to the congress of Munster! "Go, my son. You will see by what sort of men the world is governed."

During the time when the preliminaries of Leoben suspended military operations, Napoleon was not so anxious to reply immediately to all letters. He took a fancy to do, not exactly as Cardinal Dubois did, when he threw into the fire all the letters he had received, saying—"There! my correspondents are answered;" but something of the same kind. To satisfy himself that people wrote too much, and lost, in trifling and useless

* Madame Roland.

answers, valuable time, he told me to open only the letters which came by extraordinary couriers, and to leave all the rest for three weeks in the basket. I declare that at the end of that time it was unnecessary to reply to four-fifths of these communications. I will explain how this happened. Some were themselves answers; some were acknowledgments of letters received; others contained requests for favours already granted, but of which intelligence had not been received. Many were filled with complaints respecting provisions, pay, or clothing, and orders had been issued upon all these points before the letters were written. Some generals demanded reinforcements, money, promotion, &c. By not opening their letters, Bonaparte was spared the unpleasing office of refusing. When the general-in-chief compared the very small number of letters which it was necessary to answer with the large number which time alone had answered, he laughed heartily at his whimsical idea. Would not this mode of proceeding be preferable to that of causing letters to be opened by any one who may be employed, and replying to them by a circular to which it is only necessary to attach a date?

During the negotiations which followed the treaty of Leoben, the Directory ordered General Bonaparte to demand the liberty of MM. de la Fayette, Latour-Maubourg, and Bureau de Puzy, detained at Olmutz since 1792, as prisoners of state. The general-in-chief executed this commission with as much pleasure as zeal, but he often met with difficulties which appeared to be insurmountable. It has been very incorrectly stated that these prisoners obtained their liberty by one of the articles of the preliminaries of Leoben. I wrote a great deal on this subject to the dictation of General Bonaparte, and I joined him only on the day after the signature of those preliminaries. It was not till the end of May of the year 1797, that the liberation of these captives was demanded, and they did not obtain their freedom till the end of August. There was no article in the treaty, public or secret, which had reference to them. Neither was it at his own suggestion that Bonaparte demanded the enlargement of the prisoners, but by order of the Directory. To explain why they did not go to France immediately after their liberation from Olmutz, it is necessary to recollect that the events of the 18th Fructidor occurred between the period when the first steps were taken to procure their liberty, and the date of their deliverance. It required all Bonaparte's ascendancy and vigour of character to enable him to succeed in his object at the end of three months. The documents, which will be referred to in the proper place, will show how the prisoners were treated in the fortress of Olmutz; with what noble pride they received their liberty, and how they, to the last, preserved the feeling of independence and dignity which a long and rigid captivity had not been able to subdue.

CHAPTER VI.

1797.

Negotiations with Austria—Bonaparte's dissatisfaction—Letter written to Bonaparte by Sabatier de Castres—Letter of complaint from Bonaparte to the Executive Directory—Note respecting the affairs of Venice and the club of Clichy, written by Bonaparte and circulated in the army—Intercepted letter of the Emperor Francis.

We had arrived at the month of July, and the negotiations were tediously protracted. It was impossible to attribute the embarrassment which was constantly occurring to any thing but the artful policy of Austria. Other affairs occupied Bonaparte. The news from Paris engrossed all his attention. He saw with extreme displeasure the manner in which the influential orators of the councils, and pamphlets written in the same spirit as they spoke, criticised him, his army, his victories, the affairs of Venice, and the national glory. He was quite indignant at the suspicions which it was sought to create respecting his conduct and ulterior views.

Before this period, he received a letter from M. Sabatier de Castres, in which some intrigues against him were revealed. After a long and unimportant preamble, M. Sabatier said:

For yourself alone, general, how is it that after having rescued France from opprobrium, and perhaps preserved her from dissolution, you have still enemies amongst Frenchmen? Glory, as you know, excites envy, as the magnet attracts iron; and envy, you likewise know, hatches intrigues, invents slanders, and excites persecutions. The nation erects statues for you, and the government lays snares.

I have discovered, through a person of my acquaintance who arrived here lately from Basle, that Citizen Delacroix, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has, during these three months past, had a man placed near you, who is instructed to observe you, and to insinuate himself into the confidence of the individuals who surround you, if he cannot succeed in obtaining yours; and that M. Barthelemi, by order of the same minister, sent Baron de Nertia to Milan some weeks back to play a similar part in Madame Bonaparte's circle. I could not obtain any further information respecting the first of these spies, except that he is a man of much talent, knows several languages, and is not a soldier. But my acquaintance, from

DRAWN BY T. DE THULSTRUP.

BONAPARTE LISTENS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GENERAL SÉRURIER AND THE AUSTRIAN ENVOY FOR THE CAPITULATION OF MANTUA. (SEE PAGE 49.)

whom I obtain this intelligence, knows Nertia personally, and has visited him at Basle, and from himself he learned what I have communicated to you; and further, that he has a pension of twenty thousand livres tournois from the foreign department; that he is married, and that his wife lives with one of the secretaries of Citizen Delacroix. I had already heard it stated that this Baron de Nertia, who sometimes represents himself to be an Italian and sometimes a Frenchman, is a very worthless fellow, the author of some badly written, indecent romances. He, however, it is said, displays much talent in conversation. If he be really a clever man, he is only so much the more dangerous.

Being unable to overcome the interest which your talents and virtues inspire, or the admiration which is your due, I would wish for wings to fly to communicate these details to you. To write to you by post would render me suspected by the government which extends its hospitality to me. Who knows, besides, whether my letter would reach you? My situation no longer permitting me to travel, and yet being desirous to inform you of the espionnage of which you and Madame Bonaparte are the objects, I have had the good fortune to prevail upon a worthy man (M. de Raville) to make a journey to Italy for the purpose of conveying this letter to you. He is an honest gentleman, who has turned merchant to support his wife and two daughters, who have emigrated. Such is his esteem for me, and veneration for you, that although he should not be reimbursed for his expenses, he would, he told me, consider himself amply recompensed by the pleasure of seeing a great man, and by the recollection of a step, or rather of a long journey, which had for its object to serve you.

As for myself, I earnestly desire to prove to you my profound esteem and strong attachment by services more important than that of this communication; and I venture to say, if fate ever place me near you, that I believe I shall be found not altogether incapable of contributing to the maintenance, and even to the augmentation, of the glory with which you have covered yourself. Having arrived at an age when the passions pass in review before the judgment—an observer, as it were, by instinct—possessed of ideas not merely ministerial, but political—attentive to some social relations hitherto overlooked—it would not be difficult for me to offer to the activity of your soul and genius fresh means of astonishing the universe, and of tracing in the field of history a path less troublesome, and more lasting, even than that of your exploits. And, positively, I am able to convince you that it is not only possible, but very easy, to give, irresistibly, a new direction to the social mind, as advantageous to nations as to sovereigns, and to stamp, in a single day, on France, and, by reaction, afterwards on almost all the monarchies of Europe, a form of government more tenacious than any hitherto existing; in fact, invariable, and even indestructible, if any thing human can be so. What will appear to you more extraordinary, and even inconceivable, although nothing is more real and true, is, that I have only to make known my system to see it carried into effect; for (and this circumstance alone may lead you to divine what it is) all armies, from the private soldier to the general-in-chief, would assist in its execution—all would find themselves equally interested in it.

If these assertions appear ridiculous to you, you may at least suspend your judgment respecting their truth, if you condescend to reflect, that before the invention of balloons, a man would have been laughed at, even in the Academy of Sciences, who should have affirmed that any person could sketch, breakfast and dine in the air, and cross the channel otherwise than in a vessel.

I do not know whether you receive the journal entitled "The Spectator of the North." It is the best written and most interesting periodical work I know of. In the last number there are two very long letters concerning you. It is certain that Dumouriez and Rivarol have written them between them. I thought you might feel some curiosity to see how such writers speak of you; I have therefore extracted the two letters, and M. de Raville will give them to you, in case you have not yet seen the number in which they appeared.

I have read in a journal that you had demanded your dismissal, and that you proposed to return to France as soon as the matters connected with the peace should be concluded. Many observations occur to me on this subject; but it would not become me to do any thing which might savour of offering advice: that would be to imitate, in some respects, the savage chief who wished to point out to the sun the course that great luminary ought to pursue. I will content myself with requesting you to consider this long letter only as a slight mark of the extreme interest I feel for you.

I remain, with the greatest respect,
Your very humble and obedient servant,
L. Sabatier de Castres.

Leipsig, May 19, 1797.
At M. Fleischer's, Bookseller, Leipsig.

Bonaparte could not endure to have his conduct predicated; and enraged at seeing his campaigns depreciated, his glory and that of his army disparaged, and intrigues formed against him in the Club of Clichy, he wrote to the Directory the following letter:

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

Citizens Directors,

I have just received a copy of the motion of Dumolard (June 23, 1797), which contains the following passage:

"That many of the Council of Ancients have since suggested doubts respecting the causes and the degree of these criminal violations (Venice) of the law of nations, impartial men cannot reproach the legislative body for having extended its belief to declarations so precise, so solemn, and guaranteed with so much earnestness by the executive power."

This motion was printed by order of the assembly. It is evident, then, that the passage is directed against me. I was entitled, after having five times concluded peace, and given a deathblow to the coalition, if not to civic triumphs, at least to live tranquilly under the protection of the first magistrates of the republic. At present I find myself ill-treated, persecuted, and disparaged, by every shameful

means which their policy brings to the aid of persecution. I would have been indifferent to all except that species of opprobrium with which the first magistrates of the republic endeavour to overwhelm me. After having deserved well of my country by my last act, I am not bound to hear myself accused in a manner as absurd as atrocious. I have not expected, that a manifesto, signed by emigrants, paid by England, should obtain more credit with the Council of Five Hundred, than the evidence of eighty thousand men—than mine! What! we were assassinated by traitors—upwards of four hundred men perished; and the first magistrates of the republic make it a crime to have believed the statement for a moment. Upwards of four hundred Frenchmen were dragged through the streets. They were assassinated before the eyes of the governor of the fort. They were pierced with a thousand blows of stilettos, such as I sent you—and the representatives of the French people cause it to be printed, that if they believed this fact for an instant, they were excusable. I know well there are societies where it is said, "Is this blood, then, so pure?"

If only base men, who are dead to the feeling of patriotism and national glory, had spoken of me thus, I would not have complained. I would have disregarded it; but I have a right to complain of the degradation to which the first magistrates of the republic reduce those who have aggrandized, and carried the French name to so high a pitch of glory. Citizens Directors, I reiterate the demand I made for my dismissal; I wish to live in tranquillity, if the poniards of Clichy will allow me to live. You have employed me in negotiations. I am not very fit to conduct them.

About the same time, he drew up the following note respecting the affairs of Venice, which was printed without the author's name, and circulated through the whole army:

NOTE.

Bonaparte, pausing before the gates of Turin, Parma, Rome Naples, and Vienna, offering peace when he was sure of obtaining nothing but fresh triumphs—Bonaparte, whose every operation exhibits respect for religion, morality, and old age; who, instead of heaping, as he might have done, dishonour upon the Venetians, and humbling their republic to the earth, loaded her with acts of kindness, and took such great interest in her glory—is this the same Bonaparte who is accused of destroying the venerable government of Venice, and democratizing Genoa, and even of interfering in the affairs of the prudent and worthy people of the Swiss Cantons? Bonaparte had passed the Tagliamento, and entered Germany, when insurrections broke out in the Venetian States; those insurrections were, therefore, opposed to Bonaparte's project: surely, then, he could not favour them. When he was in the heart of Germany, the Venetians massacred more than four hundred French troops, drove their quarters out of Verona, assassinated the unfortunate Laugier, and presented the spectacle of a fanatical party in arms. He returned to Italy; and on his arrival, as the winds cease their agitation at the presence of Neptune, the whole of Italy, which was in commotion, which was in arms, was restored to order.

However, the deputies from Bonaparte drew up different articles, conformable to the situation of the country, and in order to prevent, not a revolution in the government, for the government was defunct, and had died a natural death, but a crisis, and to save the city from convulsion, anarchy, and pillage. Bonaparte spared a division of his army to save Venice from pillage and massacre. All the battalions were in the streets of Venice, the disturbers were put down, and the pillage discontinued. Property and trade were preserved, when General Baraguey d'Hilliers entered Venice with his division. Bonaparte, as usual, spared blood, and was the protector of Venice. Whilst the French troops remained they conducted themselves peaceably, and only interfered to support the provisional government.

Bonaparte could not say to the deputies of Venice, who came to ask his protection and assistance against the populace, who wished to plunder them, "I cannot meddle with your affairs." He could not say this, for Venice, and all its territories, had really formed the theatre of war; and, being in the rear of the army of Italy, the republic of Venice was really under the jurisdiction of that army. The rights of war confer upon a general the powers of supreme police over the countries which are the seat of war. As the great Frederick said, "There are no neutrals where there is war." Ignorant advocates and babblers have asked, in the Club of Clichy, why we occupy the territory of Venice. These declaimers should learn war, and they would know, that the Adige, the Brenta, and the Tagliamento, where we have been fighting for two years, are within the Venetian States. But, gentlemen of Clichy, we are at no loss to perceive your meaning. You reproach the army of Italy for having surmounted all difficulties—for subduing all Italy—for having twice passed the Alps—for having marched on Vienna, and obliged Austria to acknowledge the republic that you, men of Clichy, would destroy. You accuse Bonaparte, I see clearly, for having brought about peace. But I know you, and I speak in the name of eighty thousand soldiers. The time is gone when base advocates and wretched declaimers could induce soldiers to revolt. If, however, you compel them, the soldiers of the army of Italy will soon appear at the Barrier of Clichy, with their general. But woe to you, if they do!

Bonaparte having arrived at Palma-Nuova, issued a manifesto, on the 2d of May, 1797. Arrived at Mestre, where he posted his troops, the government sent three deputies to him, with a decree of the Great Council, without Bonaparte having solicited it, and without his having thought of making any change in the government of that country. The governor of Venice was an old man, ninety-nine years of age, confined by illness to his apartment. Every one felt the necessity of renovating this government of twelve hundred years existence, and to simplify its machinery, in order to preserve its independence, honour, and glory. It was necessary to deliberate, first, on the manner of renovating the government; secondly, on the means of atoning for the massacre of the French, the iniquity of which every one was sensible of.

Bonaparte, after having received the deputation at Mestre, told them, that in order to obtain satisfaction for the assassination of his brethren in arms, he wished the Great Council to arrest the inquisi-

ED BY PIERRE PRUDHON. OWNED BY M. ROUART. IN THE EXHIBITION OF THE PORTRAITS OF THE CENTURY, BEAUX ARTS, 1883. ENGRAVED BY R. G. TIETZE.

ÉLISE, ELDEST SISTER OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE;

PRINCESS OF PIOMBINO, GRAND DUCHESS OF TUSCANY, COUNTESS OF COMPIGNANO.

FROM THE PAINTING BY HORACE VERNET, IN THE LOUVRE.

ENGRAVED BY PETER ATKEN.

THE BARRIÈRE DE CLICHY, OR THE DEFENSE OF PARIS IN 1814.



DRAWN BY ERIC PAPE.

PROSTRATION OF THE LAST DOGE OF VENICE ON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO AUSTRIA.

ors. He afterwards granted them an armistice, and appointed Milan as the place of conference. The deputies arrived at Milan on the ..... A negotiation commenced to re-establish harmony between the governments. However, anarchy, with all its horrors, afflicted the city of Venice. Ten thousand slaves threatened to pillage the shops. Bonaparte acquiesced in the proposition submitted by the deputies, who promised to verify the loss which had been sustained by pillage.

Bonaparte also addressed a manifesto to the Doge, which appeared in all the public papers. It contained fifteen articles of complaint, and was followed by a decree ordering the French minister to leave Venice, the Venetian agents to leave Lombardy, and the Lion of St. Mark to be pulled down in all the continental territories of Venice.

The general-in-chief now openly manifested his resolution of acting the soldier, and marching on Paris; and this disposition, which was well known in the army, was soon communicated to Vienna. At this period, a letter from the Emperor Francis II. to his brother, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, was intercepted by Bonaparte. I instantly translated this letter, which proved to him that Francis II. was acquainted with his project. He likewise saw with pleasure the assurances which the emperor gave his brother of his love of peace, as well as the wavering of the imperial resolves, and the incertitude respecting the fate of the Italian princes, which the emperor easily perceived to depend on Bonaparte. The emperor's letter was as follows:

My dear Brother,

I punctually received your kind letter, containing a description of your unhappy and delicate situation. You may be assured that I perceive it as clearly as you do yourself; and I pity you the more, because, in truth, I do know not what advice to give you. You are, like me, the victim of the former inactivity of the princes of Italy, who ought, at once, to have acted with all their united forces, while I still possessed Mantua. If Bonaparte's project be, as I learn, to establish republics in Italy, this is likely to end in spreading republicanism over the whole country. I have already commenced negotiations for peace, and the preliminaries are ratified. If the French observe them as strictly as I do, and will do, then your situation will be improved; but already the French are beginning to disregard them. The principal problem which remains to be solved, is, whether the French Directory approve of Bonaparte's proceedings, and whether the latter, as appears by some papers distributed through his army, is not disposed to revolt against his country, which also seems to be probable, from his severe conduct towards Switzerland, notwithstanding the assurances of the Directory, that he had been ordered to leave the country untouched. If this should be the case, new and innumerable difficulties may arise. Under these circumstances, I can, at present, advise nothing; for, as to myself, it is only time and the circumstances of the moment which can point out how I am to act.

As to what you mention respecting Spanocchi, all I can say is, that he is at your service. I can only recommend him to you as what he has always been reported to be, that is, an honest and able man, and such he has proved in all the transactions I have had with him. I cannot inform you how he has conducted himself since he has been amongst the French, because I have no longer any communication with the Milanese. The best way to know him certainly, would be to obtain information, if you can, of his conduct in these times.

There is nothing new here. We are all well: but the heat is extraordinary. Always retain your friendship and love for me. Make my complements to your wife, and believe me ever.

Your best friend and brother,

FRANCIS.

Hetzendorf, July 20, 1797.

BONAPARTE, GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. FROM THE ORIGINAL PEWTER MEDAI IN THE CARNAVALET MUSEUM.

CHAPTER VII.

1797.

M. Dunan—His true name—He writes against the army of Italy—Indignation of Bonaparte—Note dictated by the General—A second note of Bonaparte.

BONAPARTE, who was much vexed at the manner in which the envious and the hostile spoke of his campaigns in Italy, was not displeased at the opportunity which a most severe attack on his conduct and plans by one Dunan afforded for a reply. The proper name of Dunan was Duverne de Presle; and he was afterwards suspected to be the man who, under the name of Thebau, was the accomplice of Brottier, La Ville Heurnois, and the Chevalier Despommelles, my maternal uncle. He was of the royalist party, and had assumed several names. Dunan, the one he at this time bore, belonged to a grocer of the Faubourg Saint Marceau, in whose house he resided. Duverne de Presle (for this, as has been said, was his right name) had been condemned to transportation on September 4, 1797; but he escaped the execution of the sentence.

In publishing this note, dictated by the general-in-chief, I feel confident that it is calculated to give gratification, not only to the soldiers who have survived those glorious campaigns, but to all persons who may wish to compare Bonaparte in 1797, and Napoleon in 1817:

M. Dunan has then discovered that the army of Italy has not done enough. It should have advanced out of the lists in which it fought in Italy. Indeed! It would seem that M. Dunan uses a map on a very small scale. He ought to leave (so M. Dunan speaks of Bonaparte) the castle of Milan besieged; Mantua under blockade—he ought to leave behind him the King of Naples—the Pope—that immense country which he has just conquered—and advance, like the leg of a pair of compasses, into Germany. Good M. Dunan, let us reason the point—let us try to understand one another.

It was wrong, you say, to concentrate the whole army for the purpose of besieging Mantua! The question rests on a matter of fact, of which you have been erroneously informed. Not a single man was employed in the siege of Mantua more than was necessary for its

blockade. It was besieged by the artillery taken in the fortresses belonging to Modena, in the neighbourhood of Mantua. The army of observation took the line best calculated to cover the blockade. Some strong columns were sent to Bologna, Ferrara, and Leghorn. Different powers were thus menaced, and obliged to make peace; and the English were driven from Leghorn, and, by a counterblow, from the Mediterranean.

Returning with that promptitude which characterizes the army of Italy, the French troops arrived upon the Adige in time to receive Wurmser and his grand army. What could you have wished them to have done better? Ought Germany to have been invaded? But then it would be necessary to abandon Italy, and expose that fine country to an insurrection, to a successful sortie from Mantua, to hostile corps from the Frioul. Ought the Tyrol to have been merely traversed in order to return again? Doubtless!

The Tyrol, which, on your map, covers only three or four inches, is an extremely mountainous country, inhabited by a warlike people, and having forty leagues of impracticable defiles, through the midst of which passes the great chain of the Alps, which forms the true boundary of Germany and Italy.

Moreau was still beyond the Rhine, and Jourdan upon the Sieg. But I try in vain to make you understand me. You do not even understand yourself. This article, like the rest of your work, is an assemblage of false and ill-conceived ideas. That is not surprising; for you talk of a business of which you know nothing. The professor of philosophy, who harangued Hannibal, I forget where, pretended also to be a great warrior.

You believe, then, that if Cæsar, Turenne, Montecuculi, and Frederick the Great, were to revisit the earth, they would become your scholars! The perfection or the system, of modern warfare, consists, as you pretend, in throwing one corps to the right, another to the left; leaving the enemy in the centre, and even in placing one's self behind a line of fortified places. Were these principles taught to our youth, the science of war would be thrown back four hundred years: and if any one should act upon them, and have to do with an active enemy, possessing the slightest knowledge of military stratagems, he would beat one of your corps and cut off the retreat of the other.

The retreat of Moreau is not so much admired by connoisseurs exactly on its own account, but because of the defective plan of the campaign.

Whether the people allow to Bonaparte the possession of some courage, and the spirit which belongs to the age of thirty, or whether they call him a braggart, a player at hazard, or a schoolboy, his glory will remain for the judgment of posterity: it consists in the esteem of his brothers in arms, and even of his enemies; in the grand results which he has obtained; and, finally, in the foresight which made him censure, from the first hour, the whole plan of the operations of the Rhine, as well as the expedition to Ireland.

The army of Italy, in this campaign, has overthrown the Sardinian army, inured to arms by forty years of warfare, and the army of Beaulieu, which was so strong that the Court of Vienna had no doubt of

its being able to recover the territory of Nice. The army of Wurmser arrived from the Rhine, with twenty thousand select troops; which circumstance allowed Moreau to repass the Rhine, and Hoche to advance upon the Maine. If Wurmser was reinforced, he was not the stronger for it, and, after a march as daring as it was judicious, which alone would serve to make this brave army immortal, he found himself closely blockaded with his head-quarters in Mantua.

Alvinzi, reinforced by all the divisions of Poland, of Silesia, of Hungary, and also by a detachment from the Rhine, presented himself; but, after several days of manœuvres, he was annihilated at Arcola. Our retreat from the Rhine allowed the enemy to send fresh reinforcements to the Tyrol. The spirit of fanaticism being excited in Hungary and Austria by the noblesse, the priests and their partisans, those countries voluntarily poured forth their recruits, to double the force of our enemies, and thereby increased the laurels of the brave soldiers of the army of Italy, by the battles of Rivoli and La Favorite, and, some days after, by the taking of Mantua, Bergamo, and Treviso.

A few days after, Bonaparte, still exasperated at the Parisian declamations on his conduct, dictated to me a second note in the following terms:

What is there so ridiculous or so improbable which the inhabitants of a great city may not be made to believe? or rather, what interest can men of talent have to endeavour to obscure the national glory?

It has been stated and restated, every where, that the army of Italy was ruined, and that Bonaparte himself would have increased the number of the prisoners of Olmutz, had he not luckily concluded peace. Bonaparte entered Germany on three points at once; by the Tyrol, Carinthia, and Carniola. In thus dividing his forces, he had no fear of being any where too weak, for the enemy's forces were disposed in a similar manner. He was, besides, obliged to make his attack in that way, in order to reserve to himself a retreat, and to make sure of being able to cover his magazines and depots.

But when the enemy, routed in all quarters, had abandoned his magazines, twenty-four thousand prisoners and sixty pieces of cannon;—when Bonaparte was in possession of Trieste, Gorizia, Clagenfurth, and Brixen, he perceived that he might be attacked in his turn; that the enemy, who had fled far behind the mountains, to rally, might conceal his movements, and, falling upon the different divisions of the army of Italy, beat them in detail. The general-in-chief, therefore, took good care not to march his divisions from the Tyrol to Inspruck, but ordered them to come to Carinthia. He also directed on Carinthia the division which had been in Carniola, in place of sending it to Istria, as a less skilful general might have done. Instead of doing that, he caused Clagenfurth to be fortified, and placed his depots there.

By these means, instead of three communications, he had but one; instead of having to keep down the Tyrolese, a people naturally stubborn and restless, he abandoned them, and had no longer any thing to fear from them. Thus, instead of the army of Italy occupying

a line of eighty leagues, he concentrated it upon a single point, which threatened at once Vienna, Hungary, and Bavaria. General Kerpen, who had collected together at Inspruck his division, so often beaten, believing that General Joubert intended to march against him, no sooner learned that this general was proceeding to Carinthia by the Drawe, than he returned into the Tyrol. General Quasdanowich, who had hastened to the defence of Hungary, being informed that the French army was concentrated in Carinthia, marched rapidly on Trieste. Thus, while Bonaparte had collected his whole army on a single point, in the heart of the Austrian hereditary states, having the power to direct his movements wherever he pleased, Prince Charles had the main body of his army divided between Salzburgh and Vienna, and weakened by detachments to the Tyrol and Carniola. It was in these circumstances that the enemy asked an armistice. Some days after, the preliminaries of peace were signed. Those preliminaries saved Vienna, and, perhaps, the existence of the house of Austria.

The revolt of the Venetians was powerless, and repressed before the army returned to Italy. Indeed, General Kilmaine possessed, for the preservation of Italy, numerous garrisons in all the fortified places and castles; two Polish legions, two Lombard legions, and the whole of General Victor's division, which came from Rome. All the castles of Verona, Porto-Legnago, Peschiera, and Palma-Nuova, were in the power of the army of Italy, and in a state of defence. A part of the Venetian States was in revolt. The enemy, it is said, might attack Italy by the Tyrol—as if Peschiera, Mantua, and all Italy, in which there were very considerable forces, could be attacked by detachments. But the enemy might take Trieste. That would have required fresh detachments, and there was so little interest in preserving Trieste, that the general had never kept there more than one hundred cavalry, and had ordered General Friant, with whom he had left a regiment of hussars, and twelve hundred infantry, to retire, in case of attack, upon Gorizia and Palma-Nuova; and from reinforcing the garrison of the latter place, to join him in person at Clagenfurth.

It may be said, that Prince Charles always fell into the snares which were constantly laid for him by General Bonaparte; and that, from the battle of the Tagliamento to the time of General Landon's appearance in the Tyrol, the whole of his movements were a series of errors, being all ill combined, or conformable to the snares laid by his enemy. With an inferior army, the art of war consists in always having more forces than the enemy on the point where the enemy is attacked, or where he attacks. But this art is not to be learned from books, nor even by experience. It is a tact which properly constitutes the genius of war.

CHAPTER VIII.

1797.

Unfounded reports—Carnot—Capitulation of Mantua—General Clarke—The Directory yields to Bonaparte—Berthier—Arrival of Eugene Beauharnais at Milan—Count de Launay d'Entraigues—His interview with Bonaparte—His examination—Seizure of his papers—Copy of one describing a conversation between him and Count de Montgaillard.

While Bonaparte was thus expressing his opinion on his campaigns, and the injustice with which they had been criticised, it was generally believed that Carnot dictated to him from a closet in the Luxembourg all the plans of his operations, and that Berthier was at his right hand, without whom, notwithstanding Carnot's plans, which were often mere romances, he would have been greatly embarrassed. This twofold misrepresentation was very current for some time; and, notwithstanding it was contrary to the evidence of facts, it met with much credence, particularly abroad. There was, however, no foundation for the opinion. Let us render to Cæsar that which is Cæsar's due. Bonaparte was a creator in the art of war, and no imitator. That no man was superior to him in that art, is incontestable. At the commencement of the glorious campaign in Italy, the Directory certainly sent out instructions to him; but he always followed his own plans, and continually wrote back that all would be lost if movements conceived at a distance from the scene of action were to be blindly executed. He also offered to resign. At length the Directory perceived the impossibility of prescribing operations of war according to the view of persons in Paris; and when I became the secretary of the general-in-chief, I saw a despatch of the Directory, dated May, 1796, committing the whole plan of the campaign to his judgment; and assuredly there was not a single operation or movement which did not originate with him. Carnot was obliged to yield to his firmness. When the Directory, towards the end of 1796, felt disposed to treat for peace, General Clarke, appointed to conclude the armistice, was authorized, in case Mantua should not be taken before the negotiation was brought to a close, to propose leaving the blockade in *statu quo*. Had such a condition been adopted, it would doubtless have been stipu-

lated that the Emperor of Austria should be allowed to provision the garrison and inhabitants of the city day by day. Bonaparte, convinced that an armistice without Mantua would by no means conduce to peace, earnestly opposed such a condition. He carried his point; Mantua capitulated, and the result is well known. Yet he was not blind to the hazards of war; while preparing, during the blockade, an assault on Mantua, he wrote thus to the Directory: "A bold stroke of this nature depends absolutely for success on a dog or a goose. It is all a question of surprise."

Bonaparte was exceedingly sensitive to the rumours which reached him respecting Carnot and Berthier. He one day said to me, "What gross stupidity is this? It is very well to say to a general, 'Depart for Italy, gain battles, and sign a peace at Vienna;' but the execution—that is not so easy. I never followed the plans which the Directory sent me. Too many circumstances occur on the spot to modify them. The movement of a single corps of the enemy's army may confound a whole plan arranged by the fireside. Only fools can believe such stuff. As for Berthier, since you have been with me, you see what he is—he is a blockhead. Yet it is he who does all; it is he who gathers a great part of the glory of the army of Italy." I told him that this erroneous opinion could not last long; that each person would be allowed his merit, and that at least posterity would judge rightly. This observation seemed to please him.

Berthier was a man full of honour, courage, and probity, and exceedingly regular in the performance of his duties. Bonaparte's attachment to him arose more from habit than liking. Berthier did not concede with affability, and refused with harshness. His abrupt, egotistic, and unpleasing manners, did not, however, create him many enemies, but, at the same time, did not make him many friends. In consequence of our frequent intercourse, he had contracted the friendly practice of speaking to me in the second person singular; but he never wrote to me in that style. He was perfectly acquainted with the disposition of all the corps, and could name their commanders and their respective forces. In fact, he was an excellent head of the staff of an army; but that is all the praise that can be given, and indeed he wished for no greater. He had such entire confidence in Bonaparte, and looked up to him with so much admiration, that he never could have presumed to oppose his plans, or give any advice. Berthier's talent was very limited, and of a peculiar nature; his character was one of extreme weakness. Bonaparte's friendship for him, and the frequency of his name in the bulletins and official despatches, have unduly elevated his reputation. Bonaparte, giving his opinion to the Directory, respecting the generals employed in his army, said, "Berthier has talents, activity,

DRAWN BY H. A. OGDEN.

BONAPARTE AS LIEUTENANT-COLONEL IN THE NATIONAL GUARD.

courage, character—all in his favour." This was in 1796. He then made an eagle of him; at St. Helena he called him a goose. He should neither have raised him so high, nor sunk him so low. Berthier neither merited the one nor the other.

Bonaparte was a man of habit; he was much attached to all the people about him, and did not like new faces. Berthier loved him. He despatched his orders well, and that enabled him to pass off with his small portion of talent.

It was about this time that young Beauharnais came to Milan. He was seventeen years old. He had lived in Paris with his mother since the departure of Bonaparte. On his arrival, he immediately entered the service, as aide-de-camp to the general-in-chief, who felt for him an affection, which was justified by his good qualities.

Count de Launay d'Entraigues, well known in the French revolution, held a diplomatic post at Venice, when that city was threatened by the French. Aware of his being considered the agent of all the machinations then existing against France, and especially against the army of Italy, he endeavoured to escape; but the town being surrounded, he was seized, together with all his papers. The apparently frank manners of the count pleased Bonaparte, who treated him with indulgence. His papers were restored, with the exception of three relating to political subjects. The count afterwards fled to Switzerland, and ungratefully represented himself as having been oppressed by Bonaparte. His false statements have induced many writers to make of him an heroic victim. He was assassinated in 1802, by his own servant.

I kept a copy of one of his most interesting papers. It has been much spoken of, and Fauche-Borel has, I believe, denied its authenticity and the truth of its contents. The manner in which it fell into the hands of the general-in-chief—the importance attached to it by Entraigues—the differences I have observed between the manuscript I copied, and versions which I have since read, and the knowledge of its authenticity, having myself transcribed it from the handwriting of the count, who, in my presence, vouched for the truth of the facts it details—all these circumstances induce me to insert it here, and compel me to doubt that it was, as Fauche-Borel asserted, a fabrication.

This manuscript is entitled, "My Conversation with Count de Montgaillard, on the 4th of December, 1799, from Six in the Afternoon till Midnight, in the presence of the Abbé Dumontel."

[On my copy are written the words, "Extracts from this conversation, made by me, from the original." I omitted what I thought unimportant, and transcribed only the most interesting passages.]

Montgaillard spoke of the revolutionary government; of what

created it, and caused its duration. After speaking of the Committee of Public Safety, he adds—

" I have only named these four persons of the committee, because they were the only ones concerned with assassination. The others directed their attention to different objects. Carnot, among the rest, was occupied with military affairs.

" He exerted his talent to make Europe tremble; and while Robespierre exercised a tyranny unexampled in the records of the world, Carnot announced to Europe, that the genius of evil reigned on the earth, and that Heaven awarded victory to crime.

" Barrère is a sort of undefinable creature; a sort of coffee-house wit. He used to go every day, after leaving the committee, to visit a woman, with whom Champanetz lived. He would stay with her till midnight, and would frequently say, ' To-morrow we shall get rid of fifteen, twenty, or thirty of them.' When the woman expressed her horror of these murders, he exclaimed, ' *We must oil the wheels of the revolution ;*' and, laughing, departed."

Montgaillard then spoke of his escape, of his flight to England, of his return to France, of his second departure, and finally of his arrival at Bale, in August, 1795. He then said—

" I had previously had a communication with the Danish minister. He asked me what I thought of the coalition ? and when I replied only by general observations, he added, ' *I will tell you frankly : I look upon these coalesced kings as thieves, who pick pockets on their way to the gallows.*'

" The Prince de Condé called me to Mülheim, and knowing the connexions I had had in France, proposed that I should sound General Pichegru, whose head-quarters were at Altkirch, and where he then was, surrounded by four representatives of the Convention.

" I immediately went to Neufchatel, taking with me four or five hundred louis. I cast my eyes on Fauche-Borel, the king's printer at Neufchatel, and also yours and mine, as the instrument by which to make the first overture, and I selected, as his colleague, M. Courant, a native of Neufchatel.

" I persuaded them to undertake the business; I loaded them with instructions and passports. They were foreigners: so I furnished them with all the necessary documents to enable them to travel in France as foreign merchants, and purchasers of national property. I commended them to God, and went to Bale to wait for news from them.

" On the 13th of August, Fauche and Courant set out for the head-quarters at Altkirch.

" They remained there eight days without finding an opportunity to speak to Pichegru, who was surrounded by representatives and generals. Pichegru observed them, and seeing them continually wheresoever he went, he conjectured that they had something to say to him, and he called out in a loud voice, while passing them, ' *I am going to Huningen.*'

" Fauche contrived to throw himself in his way at the end of a corridor. Pichegru observed him, and fixed his eyes upon him, and although it rained in torrents, he said aloud, ' *I am going to dine at the château of Madame Salomon.*' This château was three leagues from Huningen, and Madame Salomon was Pichegru's mistress.

" Fauche set off directly to the château, and begged to speak with General Pichegru. He told the general that, being in the possession of some of J. J. Rousseau's manuscripts, he wished to publish them, and dedicate them to him.

" ' Very good,' said Pichegru ; ' but I should like to read them first; for J. J. Rousseau professed principles of liberty, in which I do not concur, and with which I should not like to have my name connected.'—' But,' said Fauche, ' I have something else to speak to you about.'—' What is it, and on whose behalf ?'—' On behalf of the Prince de Condé.'—' Be silent, then, and follow me.'

" He conducted Fauche alone into a retired cabinet, and said to him, ' Explain yourself; what does Monseigneur the Prince de Condé wish to communicate to me?' Fauche was embarrassed, and stammered out something unintelligible. ' Compose yourself,' said Pichegru ; ' my sentiments are the same as the Prince de Condé's. What does he desire of me ?'—Fauche, encouraged by these words, replied, ' The Prince wishes to join you. He is confident in you, and wishes to connect himself with you.'

" ' These are vague and unmeaning words,' observed Pichegru. ' All this amounts to nothing. Go back, and ask for written instructions, and return in three days to my head-quarters, at Altkirch. You will find me alone precisely at six o'clock in the evening.'

" Fauche immediately departed, arrived at Bale, hastened to me, and joyfully informed me of all that had passed. I spent the night in writing a letter to General Pichegru. The Prince de Condé, who was invested with all the powers of Louis XVIII., except that of granting the cordon-bleu, had, by a note in his own handwriting, deputed to me all his powers, to enable me to maintain a negotiation with General Pichegru.

" I therefore wrote to the general, stating, in the outset, every thing that was calculated to awaken in him that noble sentiment of pride, which is the instinct of great minds ; and after pointing out to him the vast good it was in his power to effect, I spoke of the gratitude of the king, and the benefit he would confer on his country by restoring royalty. I told him that his majesty would make him a marshal of France, and governor of Alsace, as no one could better govern the province than he, who had so valiantly defended it. I added, that he would have the cordon-rouge—the Château de Chambord, with its park, and twelve pieces of cannon taken from the Austrians—a million of ready money—two hundred thousand livres per annum—and a hotel in Paris ;—that the town of Arbois, Pichegru's native place, should bear his name, and be exempt from all taxation for twenty-five years ;—that a pension of two hundred thousand livres would be granted to him, with half reversion to his wife, and fifty thousand livres to his heirs for ever, until the extinction of his family. Such were the offers, made in the name of the king, to General Pichegru. (Then followed the boons to be granted to the officers and soldiers, an amnesty to the people, &c.) I added, that the Prince de Condé desired that he would proclaim the king in the camps, surrender the city of Huningen to him, and join him for the purpose of marching on Paris."

Pichegru, having read the letter with great attention, said to Fauche, " This is all very well; but who is this M. de Mont-

gaillard who talks of being thus authorized? I neither know him nor his signature. Is he the author?"—" Yes," replied Fauche. " But," said Pichegru, " I must, before making any negotiation on my part, be assured that the Prince de Condé, with whose handwriting I am well acquainted, approves of all that has been written in his name by M. de Montgaillard. Return directly to M. de Montgaillard, and tell him to communicate my answer to the prince."

Fauche immediately departed, leaving M. Courant with Pichegru. He arrived at Bale at nine o'clock in the evening. I set off directly for Milheim, the Prince de Condé's head-quarters, and arrived there at half-past twelve. The prince was in bed, but I awoke him. He made me sit down by his bedside, and our conference then commenced.

After having informed the prince of the state of affairs, all that remained was to prevail on him to write to General Pichegru, to confirm the truth of what had been stated in his name. This matter, which appeared so simple, and so little liable to objection, occupied the whole night. The prince, as brave a man as can possibly be, has inherited nothing from the great Condé but his undaunted courage. In other respects, he is the most insignificant of men; without resources of mind, or decision of character; surrounded by men of mediocrity, and even baseness; and though he knows them well, he suffers himself to be governed by them.

It required nine hours of hard exertion to get him to write to General Pichegru a letter of nine lines. 1st. He did not wish it to be in his handwriting.—2d. He objected to dating it.—3d. He was unwilling to call him *General* Pichegru, lest he should recognise the republic by giving that title.—4th. He did not like to address it, or affix his seal to it.

At length he consented to all, and wrote to Pichegru that he might place full confidence in the letters of the Comte de Montgaillard.

When all this was settled, after great difficulty, the prince next hesitated about sending the letter; but at length he yielded. I set off for Bale, and despatched Fauche to Altkirch, to General Pichegru.

The general, after reading a letter of eight lines, and recognising the handwriting and signature, immediately returned it to Fouche, saying, " I have seen the signature: that is enough for me. The word of the prince is a pledge with which every Frenchman ought to be satisfied. Take back his letter." He then inquired what was the prince's wish. Fauche explained that he wished—1st. That Pichegru should proclaim the king to his troops, and hoist the white flag.—2d. That he should deliver up Huningen to the prince. Pichegru objected to this:—" I will never take part in such a plot," said he; " I have no wish to make the third volume of Lafayette and Dumourier. I know my resources; they are as certain as they are vast. Their roots are not only in my army, but in Paris, in the Convention, in the departments, and in the armies of those generals, my colleagues, who think as I do. I wish to do nothing by halves. There must be a complete end of the present state of things. France cannot continue a republic. She must have a king, and that king must be Louis XVIII.

But we must not commence the counter-revolution, until we are certain of effecting it. 'Surely and promptly' is my motto. The prince's plan leads to nothing. He would be driven from Huningen in four days, and in fifteen I should be lost. My army is composed both of good men and bad. We must distinguish between them, and, by a bold stroke, assure the former of the impossibility of drawing back, and that their only safety lies in success. For this purpose, I propose to pass the Rhine, at any place and any time that may be thought necessary. In the advance I will place those officers on whom I can depend, and who are of my way of thinking. I will separate the bad, and place them in situations where they can do no harm, and their position shall be such as to prevent them from uniting. That done, as soon as I shall be on the other side of the Rhine, I will proclaim the king, and hoist the white flag. Condé's corps and the emperor's army will then join us. I will immediately repass the Rhine, and re-enter France. The fortresses will be surrendered, and will be held in the king's name by the imperial troops. Having joined Condé's army, I immediately advance. All my means now develop themselves on every side. We march upon Paris, and in a fortnight will be there. But it is necessary that you should know that you must give the French soldier wine and a crown in his hand, if you would have him cry *vive le roi!* Nothing must be wanting at the first moment. My army must be well paid as far as the fourth or fifth march in the French territory. There, go and tell all this to the prince, show my handwriting, and bring me back his answer."

During these conferences, Pichegru was surrounded by four representatives of the people, at the head of whom was Merlin de Thionville, the most insolent and the most ferocious of inquisitors. These men, having the orders of the committee, pressed Pichegru to pass the Rhine, and go and besiege Manheim, where Merlin had an understanding with the inhabitants. Thus, if on one hand the committee by its orders made Pichegru wish to hasten the execution of his plan, on the other he had not a moment to lose, for, to delay obeying the orders of the four representatives was to render himself suspected. Every consideration, therefore, called upon the prince to decide, and decide promptly. Good sense required him also to do another thing; namely, to examine without passion what sort of man Pichegru was, to consider the nature of the sacrifice he made, and what were his propositions. Europe acknowledged his talents, and he had placed the prince in a condition to judge of his good faith. Besides, his conduct and his plan afforded fresh proofs of his sincerity. By passing the Rhine, and placing himself between the armies of Condé and Wurmser, he rendered desertion impossible; and if success did not attend his attempt, his own acts forced him to become an emigrant. He left in the power of his fierce enemies his wife, his father, his children. Every thing bore testimony to his honesty; the talents he had shown were a pledge for his genius, his genius for his resources; and the sacrifices he would have to make in case of failure, proved that he was confident of success.

What stupid conceit was it for any one to suppose himself better able to command Pichegru's army, than Pichegru himself!—to pretend to be better acquainted with the frontier provinces, than Pichegru, who commanded them, and had placed his friends in them, as

commanders of the towns! This self-conceit, however, ruined the monarchy at this time, as well as at so many others. The Prince de Condé, after reading the plan, rejected it *in toto*. To render it successful, it was necessary to make the Austrians parties to it. This Pichegru exacted, but the Prince of Condé would not hear a word of it, wishing to have confined to himself the glory of effecting the counter-revolution. He replied to Pichegru by a few observations, and concluded his answer by returning to his first plan—that Pichegru should proclaim the king without passing the Rhine, and should give up Huningen—that then the army of Condé, by itself, and without the aid of the Austrians, would join him. In that case, he could promise one hundred thousand crowns in louis, which he had at Bale, and fourteen millions of livres, which he had in good bills, payable at sight.

No argument or entreaty had any effect on the Prince de Condé. The idea of communicating his plan to Wurmser, and sharing his glory with him, rendered him blind and deaf to every consideration. However, it was necessary to report to Pichegru the observations of the Prince de Condé, and Courant was commissioned to do so.

This document appeared so interesting to me, that while Bonaparte was sleeping, I was employed in copying it. Notwithstanding posterior and reiterated denials of its truth, I believe it to be perfectly correct.

We were now in July, and the negotiations were carried on with a tardiness which showed that something was kept in reserve on both sides. Bonaparte at this time was any thing but disposed to sign a peace, which he always hoped to be able to make at Vienna, after a campaign in Germany, seconded by the armies of the Rhine, and the Sambre-et-Meuse. The minority of the Directory recommended peace on the basis of the preliminaries, but the majority wished for more honourable and advantageous terms; while Austria, relying on troubles breaking out in France, was in no haste to conclude a treaty. In these circumstances, Bonaparte drew up a letter to be sent to the Emperor of Austria, in which he set forth the moderation of France; but stated that, in consequence of the many delays, nearly all hope of peace had vanished. He advised the emperor not to rely on difficulties arising in France, and doubted, if war should continue, and the emperor be successful in the next campaign, that he would obtain a more advantageous peace than was now at his option. This letter was never sent to the emperor, but was communicated as the draft of a proposed despatch to the Directory. The Emperor Francis, however, wrote an autograph letter to the general-in-chief of the army of Italy, which will be noticed when I come to the period of its reception. It is certain that Bonaparte at this time wished for war. He was aware that the cabinet of Vienna was playing with him, and that the Austrian ministers expected some political convul-

DESAIX.

From an engraving by Elizabeth G. Herhan after Guérin.

Paris 1798.

sion in Paris, which they hoped would be favourable to the Bourbons. He therefore asked for reinforcements. His army consisted of thirty-five thousand nine hundred men, and he desired it to be raised to sixty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, ready for the field.

General Desaix, profiting by the preliminaries of Leoben, came in the end of July to visit the scene of the army of Italy's triumphs. His conversations with Bonaparte respecting the army of the Rhine were far from giving him confidence in his military situation in Italy, or assurance of support from that army, in the event of hostilities commencing beyond the mountains. At this time that friendship between Bonaparte and Desaix began, which continued until the untimely death of the latter.

All the world knows the part which the general-in-chief of the army of Italy took at the famous crisis of the 18th Fructidor; his proclamation, his addresses to the army, and his celebrated order of the day. Bonaparte went much into detail on this subject at St. Helena; and I shall now proceed to state what I knew at the time respecting that memorable event, which was in preparation in the month of June.

CHAPTER IX.

1797.

The royalists of the interior—Bonaparte's intention of marching on Paris with twenty-five thousand men—His animosity against the emigrants and the Clichy Club—His choice between the two parties of the Directory—Augereau's order of the day against the word *Monsieur*—Bonaparte wishes to be made one of the five Directors—He supports the majority of the Directory—La Vallette, Augereau, and Bernadotte, sent to Paris—Interesting correspondence relative to the 18th Fructidor.

Bonaparte had long observed the struggle which was going on between the partisans of royalty and the republic. He was told that royalism was every where on the increase. All the generals who returned from Paris to the army complained of the spirit of reaction they had noticed. Bonaparte was constantly urged by his private correspondents to take one side or the other, or to act for himself. He was irritated by the audacity of the enemies of the republic, and he saw plainly that the majority of the councils had an evident ill-will towards him. The orators of the Club of Clichy missed no opportunity of wounding his self-love in speeches and pamphlets. They spared no insults, disparaged his success, and bitterly censured his conduct in Italy, particularly with respect to Venice. Thus his services were recompensed by hatred or ingratitude. About this time he received a pamphlet, which referred to the judgments pronounced upon him by the German journals, and more particularly by the "Spectator of the North," which he always made me translate.

He urged the Directory to arrest the emigrants, to destroy the influence of foreigners, to recall the armies, to suppress the journals sold to England, such as the "Quotidienne," the "Mémorial," and the "Thé," which he accused of being more sanguinary than Marat ever was. In case of there being no means of putting a stop to assassinations and the influence of Louis XVIII., he offered to resign.

His resolution of passing the Alps with 25,000 men, and marching by Lyons on Paris, was known in the capital, and discussions arose respecting the consequences of this passage of another Rubicon. On the 17th of August, 1797, Carnot wrote to him—"People attribute to you a thousand absurd projects.

DRAWN BY H. CHARTIER. ENGRAVED BY E. H. DEL'ORME.

CAPTURE OF THE PASS OF TARVIS.

They cannot believe that a man who has performed so many great exploits can be content to live as a private citizen." This observation applied to Bonaparte's reiterated request to be permitted to retire from the service on account of the state of his health, which, he said, disabled him from mounting his horse.

The general-in-chief was justly of opinion that the tardiness of the negotiations, and the difficulties which incessantly arose, were founded on the expectation of an event which would change the government of France, and render the chances of peace more favourable to Austria. He still urgently recommended the arrest of the emigrants, the stopping of the presses of the royalist journals, which he said were sold to England and Austria, and the suppression of the Clichy Club. This club was held at the residence of Gérard Desoddieres, in the Rue de Clichy. Aubry was one of its warmest partisans, and he was the avowed enemy of the revolutionary cause, which Bonaparte advocated at this period. Aubry's conduct at this time, together with the part he had taken in provoking Bonaparte's dismissal in 1795, inspired the general with an implacable hatred of him.

Bonaparte despised the Directory, which he accused of weakness, indecision, pusillanimity, wasteful expenditure, and perseverance in a system degrading to the national glory.* He

* The Directory merited these accusations. The following sketches of two of their official sittings presents a singular contrast:

"At the time that the Directory were first installed in the Luxembourg (October 27, 1795)," says M. Bailleul, "there was hardly a single article of furniture in it. In a small room, round a little broken table, one of the legs of which had given way from age, on which table they had deposited a quire of letter-paper, and a writing-desk *à calamet*, which luckily they had had the precaution to bring with them from the Committee of Public Safety, seated on four rush-bottomed chairs, in front of some logs of wood ill-lighted, the whole borrowed from the porter Dupont; who would believe that it was in this deplorable condition that the members of the new government, after having examined all the difficulties, nay, let me add, all the horrors of their situation, resolved to confront all obstacles, and that they would either deliver France from the abyss in which she was plunged, or perish in the attempt? They drew up on a sheet of letter-paper the act by which they declared themselves constituted, and immediately forwarded it to the Legislative Bodies."

And the Count La Vallette, writing to M. Cuvillier Fleury, says,

"I saw our five kings, dressed in the robes of Francis I., his hat, his pantaloons, and his lace: the face of La Reveillere looked like a cork upon two pins, with the black and greasy hair of Clodion. M. de Talleyrand, in pantaloons of the colour of wine dregs, sat in a folding chair at the feet of the Director Barras, in the Court of the Petit Luxembourg, and gravely presented to his *sovereigns* an ambassador from the Grand Duke of Tuscany, while the French were eating his master's dinner, from the soup to the cheese. At the right hand there were fifty musicians and singers of the Opera, Lainé, Lays, Regnault, and the actresses, now all dead of old age, roaring a patriotic cantata to the music of Méhul. Facing them, on another elevation, there were two hundred young and beautiful women, with their arms and bosoms bare, all in ecstasy at the majesty of our Pentarchy and the happiness of the Republic. They also wore tight flesh-colour pantaloons, with rings on their toes. That was a sight that never will be seen again. A fortnight after this magnificent *fête*, thousands of families

knew that the Clichy party demanded his dismissal and arrest. He was given to understand that Dumolard was one of the most decided against him, and that, finally, the royalist party was on the point of triumphing.

Before deciding for one party or the other, Bonaparte first thought of himself. He did not imagine that he had yet achieved enough to venture on possessing himself of that power which certainly he might easily have obtained. He therefore contented himself with joining the party which was, for the moment, supported by public opinion. I know he was determined to march upon Paris, with 25,000 men, had affairs taken a turn unfavourable to the republic, which he preferred to royalty. He cautiously formed his plan. To defend the Directory was, he conceived, to defend his own future fortune ; that is to say, it was protecting a power which appeared to have no other object than to keep a place for him until his return.

The parties which rose up in Paris produced a reaction in the army. The employment of the word *Monsieur* had occasioned quarrels, and even bloodshed. General Augereau, in whose division these contests had taken place, published an order of the day, setting forth that every individual in his division who should use the word Monsieur, either verbally or in writing, under any pretence whatever, should be deprived of his rank, and declared incapable of serving in the republican armies. This order was read at the head of each company.

Bonaparte viewed the establishment of peace as the close of his military career. Repose and inactivity were to him unbearable. He sought to take part in the civil affairs of the republic, and was desirous of becoming one of the five directors, convinced that, if he obtained that object, he would speedily stand single and alone. The fulfilment of this wish would have prevented the Egyptian expedition, and placed the imperial crown much sooner upon his head. Intrigues were carried on in Paris in his name, with the view of securing to him a legal dispensation on the score of age. He hoped, though he was but eight-and-twenty, to supersede one of the two directors who were to go out of office. His brothers and their friends made great exertions for the success of the project, which, however, was not officially proposed, because it was too adverse to the prevailing notions of the day, and seemed too early a violation of the constitution of the year III., which, nevertheless, was violated in another way a few months after.

The members of the Directory were by no means anxious to have Bonaparte for their colleague. They dissembled, and so

wept over their banished fathers, forty-eight Departments were deprived of their representatives, and forty editors of newspapers were forced to go and drink the waters of the Elbe, the Synamary, or the Ohio ! It would be a curious disquisition to seek to discover what really were at that time the Republic and Liberty."—*Editor.*

did he. Both parties were lavish of their mutual assurances of friendship, while they cordially hated each other. The Directory, however, appealed for the support of Bonaparte, which he granted; but his subsequent conduct clearly proves that the maintenance of the constitution of the year III. was a mere pretext. He indeed defended it meanwhile, because, by aiding the triumph of the opposite party, he could not hope to preserve the influence which he exercised over the Directory. I know well that, in case of the Clichy party gaining the ascendancy, he was determined to cross the Alps, and to assemble all the friends of the republic at Lyons, thence to march upon Paris.

In the Memorial of St. Helena, it is stated, in reference to the 18th Fructidor, "That the triumph of the majority of the councils was his desire and hope, we are inclined to believe from the following fact, viz.—that at the crisis of the contest between the two factions, a secret resolution was drawn up by three of the members of the Directory, asking him for three millions to support the attack on the councils, and that Napoleon, under various pretences, did not send the money, though he might easily have done so."

This is not very comprehensible. There was no *secret resolution* of the members who applied for the three millions. It was Bonaparte who offered the money, which, however, he did not send; it was he who despatched Augereau; and he who wished for the triumph of the directorial majority. His memory failed him sadly at St. Helena, as will be seen from some correspondence which I shall presently submit to the reader. It is very certain that he did offer the money to the Directory; that is to say, to three of its members. Bonaparte had so decidedly formed his resolution, that, on the 17th of July, wishing to make Augereau his confident, he sent to Vicenza for him, by an extraordinary courier.

Bonaparte adds, that when Bottot, the confidential agent of Barras, came to Passeriano, after the 18th Fructidor, he declared to him that as soon as La Vallette should make him acquainted with the real state of things, the money should be transmitted. The inaccuracy of these statements will be seen in the correspondence relative to the event. In thus distorting the truth, Napoleon's only object could have been to proclaim his inclination for the principles he adopted, and energetically supported from the year 1800; but which, previously to that period, he had, with no less energy, opposed.

He decidedly resolved to support the majority of the Directory, and to oppose the royalist faction: the latter, which was beginning to be important, would have been listened to, had it offered power to him. About the end of July, he sent his aide-de-camp, La Vallette, to Paris. La Vallette was a man of good sense and education, pleasing manners, pliant temper, and moderate opinions. He was decidedly devoted to Bonaparte.

With his instructions, he received a private cipher to enable him to correspond with the general-in-chief.*

* The following interesting statement relative to La Vallette's mission, and to the political intrigues of the period, is extracted from the Memoirs of that personage.

"While France and her armies were at last enjoying the repose brought by heroic exertions, Government betrayed, by its internal dissensions, the fatal secret of its weakness and incapacity. The enlightened part of the country had soon become sensible that the Directory would never obtain any but a temporary and stormy existence. Besides the impossibility of preserving perfect harmony between five persons, possessing power in common, while they were swayed by different passions, prejudices, and characters, it was easy to be convinced that even the concentration of power in so few hands, being an homage paid to monarchy, would recall too many recollections, and too much regret for the old form of government, not to tempt its adherents to make efforts in its favour. In the eyes of the Royalists, the Directory was then only a passage to monarchy. They hoped that it would be short; and their wishes, inflamed by the expectation of success, made them bold. For the first time they combined a reasonable plan by addressing themselves to the passions of their foes, and to ambition so ardent in its calculation. The Constitution of the year III. had created two councils — one called the 'Council of Five Hundred,' and the other the 'Council of Ancients.' Among the persons composing them were still many members of the Convention, who could not bear the idea of the return of the Bourbons; but among them also sat some old Constitutionalists, who had united their exertions and wishes for the establishment of a representative monarchy. The greatest part among them were men of merit. All had been persecuted by the Committee of Public Safety. The members of the Directory had been all chosen out of the Convention, and the majority of them had voted for the death of the king. These were no titles to recommend them to the confidence of the people, much less to that of the Constitutionalists. The difference between the conduct and the opinions of Government, and a part of the Chambers, soon created an animosity, which betrayed itself in all their mutual concerns. Perhaps, however, it would not have brought on a catastrophe, if one of our most celebrated generals had not entered the Council of Five Hundred, already resolved to carry into execution a conspiracy in favour of the Bourbons.

"Pichegru it was who conceived that fatal design a long time before. I was told by General Lahorie, who accompanied him to Paris when the Convention summoned the Conqueror of Holland to her aid to crush the Jacobins, that when he left the Metropolis after the affair of the 12th Germinal, Pichegru lost no opportunity of showing his contempt for that assembly—contempt so great, that he grew angry at the thought of the praises and honours that had been lavished on him. Such were his ideas when he took the command of the Rhine army, and soon after began his correspondence with the Prince of Condé. It could not remain long a secret: the Prince wavered, asked advice, and solicited orders of the Count de Lille. This hesitation, these numerous letters, let so many people into the secret, that authentic papers were alone wanted to establish complete evidence of the plot. Those papers were soon found. Count d'Entraigues, a fiery and active-minded emigrant, though not very prudent, was one of the agents of the correspondence. He was attached to the Russian Legation which had been sent to the former government of Venice, and he remained in that city, thinking himself safe in his foreign regimentals. The general-in-chief had him arrested. A great part of the correspondence was seized among his papers, and sent to the Directory.

"A government that felt itself strong enough to be just, would have had the traitor arrested, and the laws would have decided. But the Directory considered that Pichegru was protected by eminent services, by his great reputation, his title of Deputy, and the support of a whole party. The examination of the plot proved, besides, that if General Moreau had not taken a direct part in it, he

DRAWN BY ERIC PAPE. FROM THE PORTRAIT BY FRANÇOIS GÉRARD, IN THE MUSEUM OF VERSAILLES.

LOUIS-MARIE DE LAREVELLIÈRE-LÉPEAUX, MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORY

Augereau went after La Vallette on the 27th of July. Bonaparte wrote to the Directory, that Augereau "had solicited leave to go to Paris on his own private business."

had at least known of it. When he learned that Government was acquainted with it, he hastened to disclose it; but this tardy disclosure, instead of destroying suspicion, confirmed it. Besides that, other respectable names might be exposed. All these considerations made Government fear legal proceedings, the publicity and final result of which might too probably prove fatal to its members; so that it was deemed preferable to involve in one common destruction, by a 'coup d'état,' the private foes of Government and those who had betrayed the republic.

"General Bonaparte followed attentively the progress of these sad dissensions. In the heat of the debates of the Council of Five Hundred, some aspersions had been directed against his lieutenants, and even against himself. He at first proudly repelled them; but on maturer thought, he resolved to send to Paris some one who could obtain exact information on the situation of affairs, and I was chosen for that mission. 'Mix with every body,' he said; 'do not let yourself be led away by party spirit; tell me the truth, and tell it me free from all passion.'

"I arrived in Paris in the month of May. The five members of Government were, at that time, Barras, Rewbell, Carnot, La Reveillere Lépaux, and Barthelemy. The first four had been members of the Convention; and although none of them had been famous during the Reign of Terror for any atrocious act, still the three first had voted the death of the king—a vote which, notwithstanding the fatal though powerful consideration that may be presented in alleviation, placed them amongst the most furious Jacobins, and was prejudicial to the respect with which they ought to have been invested. The people bore impatiently the yoke of men who recalled to their minds such fatal events; and they were especially disliked by the Constitutionalists of 1791, who reproached them at once with the destruction of their edifice, and the persecutions which had so long weighed upon them.

"When I arrived, the contest was violent, and the antagonists of Government made no secret of their wish to overthrow the majority. My first visit was to Barras, who seemed to have preserved favourable sentiments for General Bonaparte, and who expressed to me a wish to maintain the friendship which had so long united them. After him I saw Carnot, who spoke to me with a reserve commanded by the intimate connexion of General Bonaparte with Barras. A difference of systems and views on some points of Government had created between these two Directors an animosity which betrayed itself in invectives and threats, that left no opening for reconciliation. Carnot, however, expressed himself with candour. 'It is impossible,' he said, 'to go on any longer on the revolutionary road. If a lasting system of moderation be not adopted, all is lost. France feels horror for whatever brings to mind the deplorable measures to which the necessity of saving her has carried the country. The public mind is irritated, and unless great care be taken, the effect will be to involve us again in a confusion, out of which we shall be extricated only to bend under the yoke of the Bourbons. The faction against which I am struggling does not blush to charge me with being a royalist; and nevertheless, nobody is more convinced than I am of Pichegru's treason, and the necessity of punishing him; but they want to govern France as they would a club. Narrow views, passionate, factious spirit, the prejudices of ignorance and fear, ever suspicious and blind, preside over all our acts: they prefer the violence that irritates, while moderation and firmness would be sufficient to smooth every thing. My situation is painful; for I am forced to move with a party in which, exclusive of Pichegru, there are men to whom I am obnoxious, who perhaps conspire with him, and who will ruin the Republic, without obtaining the secret aim of their endeavours. I have tried,' he added, 'to reclaim Pichegru; I was not personally acquainted with him; but the conversation I had with him convinced me that he is cleverer than

But the truth is, Augereau was sent expressly to second the revolution which was preparing against the Clichy party, and the minority of the Directory.

Bonaparte made choice of Augereau because he knew his stanch republican principles, his boldness, and his deficiency of political talent. He thought him well calculated to aid a commotion, which his own presence with the army of Italy prevented him from directing in person; and besides, Augereau was not an ambitious rival, who might turn events to his own advantage. Napoleon said, at St. Helena, that he sent the

I thought, and that he has taken his final resolutions. I do not know what are his means of execution, now that he is no longer with the army; but whatever they may be, they will miscarry when opposed by the firm vigilance of Government, and by public opinion, which is strongly declared against the Bourbons.'

"This conversation, of which I have only recorded the most remarkable parts, was the only one I had with Carnot. The house of Barras was open to me, and I went there so often that Carnot could not but look upon me as a man entirely devoted to the party of that Director: it was, however, not so. All his speeches breathed hatred and vengeance. A month before the catastrophe took place, it was secretly resolved to make it terrible, and the victims were marked out. My position and my duty forbade me taking any part in the contest, but I wrote the truth to General Bonaparte. I observed that he would tarnish his glory if he gave any support to acts of violence, which the situation of Government did not justify; that nobody would pardon him if he joined the Directory in their plan to overthrow the constitution and liberty; that proscriptions were about to take place against the national representation, and against citizens whose virtues made them worthy of respect; that punishments would be inflicted without trial, and that the hatred resulting from such measures would extend not only to the Directory, but to the whole system of republican government. Besides, it was not certain that the party they were going to proscribe, really wished the return of the Bourbons; and in any case the legal punishment and banishment of Pichegru would be sufficient to destroy any plans of that sort. These considerations made so much impression on the mind of General Bonaparte, that he soon avoided, in his correspondence with the Directory, all allusion to the interior situation of France, and at last left off writing to them altogether. His long silence appeared strange to Barras, who however easily guessed the cause of it. He continued seeing me; but I perceived by his gravity, and the insidious questions of his favourites, that he suspected me of not being his friend. I never loved equivocal situations, and I hastened to get out of the one I was in by candidly declaring my sentiments to one of his confidents. 'I know enough,' I said, 'of the plans of government to hurt them if I were to acquaint their enemies with what I do know: it would however be an act of treason, of which you know I am incapable. But, as a citizen and an honest man, I cannot dissemble that I do not approve of the *coup d'état* that is meditated. You are going to trample on laws and liberty. Such a system of violence will sooner or later recoil on your own heads. After having toiled and suffered ten years to obtain a representative government, it is distressing to reap nothing but tyranny, or the convulsions of anarchy.' He answered me by some commonplace observations on the necessity of striking a great blow at a faction that wanted to overthrow the Republic. Barras, to whom this conversation was reported, according to my intention, thought it requisite to dissemble: he did not treat me ill, but he had me watched with a vigilance that extended even to my correspondence with General Bonaparte. My letters to him were written in ciphers; and that proof of mystery and mistrust, by augmenting their suspicions, contributed perhaps to hasten the catastrophe, through the fear that Bonaparte might take some resolution that would perplex the Directory." —*Editor.*

addresses of the army of Italy by Augereau, because he was a decided supporter of the opinions of the day. That was the true reason for choosing him.

Bernadotte was subsequently despatched on the same errand. Bonaparte's pretence for sending him was, that he wished to transmit to the Directory four flags, which, out of the twenty-one taken at the battle of Rivoli, had been left, *by mistake*, at Peschiera. Bernadotte, however, did not take any great part in the affair. He was always prudent.

The crisis of the 18th Fructidor, which retarded for three years the extinction of the pentarchy, presents one of the most remarkable events of its short existence. It will be seen how the directors extricated themselves from this difficulty. I subjoin the correspondence relating to this remarkable episode of our revolution, cancelling only such portions of it as are irrelevant to the subject. It exhibits several variations from the accounts given by Napoleon, at St. Helena, to his noble companions in misfortune.

On the 6th Messidor, year V. (24th of June, 1797), the Directory wrote the following confidential letter to Bonaparte:

> We observe, citizen-general, with extreme satisfaction, your continued proofs of attachment to the cause of liberty, and the constitution of the year III. You may rely on the most perfect reciprocity on our part. We accept with pleasure the offers you have made, to come to the aid of the republic. They are an additional pledge of your sincere love of your country. You cannot doubt that we will employ your services only for the tranquillity, happiness, and glory of France.

This letter was in the handwriting of La Reveillère Lepeaux, and was signed by Barras, Rewbell, and La Reveillère. Carnot and Barthelemy knew nothing of it.

On the 30th Messidor, Barras announced the change of ministry to Bonaparte.

On the 4th Thermidor, La Vallette wrote thus:

> I saw Barras this morning.
>
> He appears well satisfied with all that is going on. He did not conceal from me that the division is very decided between the members of the Directory. He will stand firm; and if a decree of accusation be drawn up against us, we will mount our horses and crush them.
>
> Carnot told me that you took a false view of what was passing in France. "There is nothing to fear," said he. "They are merely flies, buzzing about. Assure Bonaparte that he need be under no apprehension. The republic will not perish."
>
> Barras has repeatedly told me that, in the present crisis, money would powerfully assist. I mentioned your proposition, and he accepted it with transport. He intends writing to you on the subject.

The following is part of a letter written by Barras on the 5th Thermidor:

All the enemies of the republic protest against the dismissal of the ministers, which is a proof that the measure was salutary and urgent. I, Rewbell, and La Reveillère are sincerely attached to the republic and the constitution, and will defend them to the end of our lives. Carnot, who has doubtless been misled by perfidious men, has separated from us. We shall at length determine the course of assignats, which for a year have perplexed the republic. On this subject, I have no reason to reproach myself. I did all in my power to prevent it; but the Directory, which was then influenced by a ferocious man, the enemy of French liberty, nullified all my efforts, and all my representations. Hoche is here, and is about to prepare for his expedition to Ireland. We shall turn our attention to the interior. I expect that, without any violent commotion, we shall restore public spirit, and that the good citizens of the legislative body, those who love the republic, and have shown themselves determined to defend it, will rally.

Next day, the 6th Thermidor, Barras made an urgent demand for money.

No delay. Reflect that it is only with the help of money that I can fulfil your honourable and generous intentions.

On the same day, La Vallette wrote as follows:

The proposition has been referred to the consideration of Barras, Rewbell, and Reveillère. All three agreed that without money it would be impossible to extricate themselves from existing difficulties. They hope that you will send them large sums. They thank you in anticipation, and they say you are a man who can do much. The councils have been forced to content themselves with the explanation of the Directory, relative to the proclamations of the army.

Pichegru and Willot have decidedly raised the mask. It would appear there is a wish to oppose them to Bonaparte, in case he joins the Directory.

Carnot is still tranquil. Lacroix has been the victim of the sort of compromise which it was necessary to make to get rid of the ministers.

On the 10th Thermidor he says—

The minority of the Directory still trust to the possibility of an arrangement. The majority will perish, rather than descend one step lower. They see the abyss which is opening beneath them.

But such is the fatal destiny or the weakness of Carnot, that he is becoming one of the supporters of the monarchical party, as he was of the terrorists. He is inclined to temporize.

Again, on the 16th Thermidor, he observes—

All is going on as before. There is a grand plan of attack by the Council of Five Hundred, and vigorous preparations for defence on the part of the Directory.

Barras says to those who listen to him, "I am waiting for the decree of accusation to mount my horse and attack the conspirators of the councils, and their heads will soon roll in the kennel."

I THE PAINTING BY FRANÇOIS GÉRARD IN THE MUSEUM OF VERSAILLES. ENGRAVED BY R. G. T

GÉNIE-BERNARDINE-DESIRÉE CLARY, WIFE OF JEAN-BAPTISTE-JULES BERNADOTT

Most of the persons I meet when I call on Barras are members of the Council of Five Hundred. They condemn the choice you have made of Willot to command the south.

Augereau is expected this evening. Barras, when he told me this news, added, "His presence will make more than one change colour, especially when he receives a new title, which will give greater weight to what he says and does."

At Barras's, this evening, they were contriving a plan for driving away the emigrants, or throwing them into the river. This was discussed very seriously, in the presence of ten persons.

Many zealous patriots are of opinion that the directors have committed serious faults. It is wished that they had drawn up a proclamation with an explanation of its grounds, and that they had not concealed the reason why ten or twelve thousand men are moving round the constitutional circle, for nobody is deceived on that subject. Barras is reproached for his indolence, his love of pleasure, and his indiscreet impetuosity; Rewbell for his prejudices, his obstinacy, and his mediocrity; Reveillère for his timidity, his dilatoriness, and his want of energy; finally, Barras, Rewbell, and Reveillère are all blamed for their insufficiency, their narrow views, and the fatal mania of acting like leaders of factions, instead of like statesmen. It is to be feared that Augereau will irritate them by his violence.

I forgot to tell you a remark made by General Lapoype. We were speaking of peace, and he said, pressing my hand, "My dear fellow, I hope it may not take place, and that Bonaparte will complete his grand work, the republicanizing of Italy."

Another letter of La Vallette, dated the 18th Thermidor, makes no mention of the crisis; but one from him, dated the 21st, commences thus:

Barras appeared to me somewhat uneasy at not having received money. It was observed that perhaps Bonaparte was not sufficiently authorized by the letter transmitted to him. "But," said he, "it could not have more than three signatures,* nor could it be more positive." I spoke to him of the reconciliation; upon which he replied, that no such thing has happened, and that it is impossible. The Directory will save the republic, at least Barras, Carnot, and Reveillère will.

Irritation is increasing. There will be an epoch, which I know is wished for by those who visit Barras.

"The petitions," said Carnot, "made by the army of Italy, are at variance with the constitution. They embarrass us greatly. It is difficult to justify such a violation. All opinions would have been conciliated, if the Directory would have had Merlin, Ramel, Charles Lacroix, and Truguet.† I had the promise of the members of the Five Hundred that they would put a stop to the clamours and enterprises of eight or ten troublesome fellows, who are the declared partisans of Louis XVIII. Nothing of the kind has been done. Public opinion has been braved, and the public mind has been irritated. For

* This was the directorial majority. Carnot and Barthelemy would not have signed.

† Merlin, as minister of justice; Ramel, minister of finance; Charles Lacroix, minister for foreign affairs; and Truguet, minister of the marine.

my part, though I think that moderation can alone save us, I have spoken some very harsh truths to the inspectors of the hall. If violent measures be resorted to, I will give in my resignation."

Augereau has plainly said, "I am sent to *kill the royalists.*"

On the same day Barras wrote to Bonaparte—

That the republic would be saved by the majority of the public, of the armies, and all republicans.

On the 22d Thermidor, Augereau wrote as follows:

I have succeeded in obtaining the suppression of the army of the Alps. I unfolded to Barras the system of the revolutionists, and I was immediately appointed commandant of the seventeenth military division. The dismissal of all the civil and military authorities is finally determined on. Reflect that the safety of the republic is in our hands, and that our purity and courage, directed by purity of opinion and conduct, can alone rescue France from the awful abyss into which the agents of the throne and the altar would plunge her.

Three days afterwards, he wrote thus:

The councils have spoken of a change of residence. For my part, I observe and act, and am continually hurrying from the Directory to Sotin, and from Sotin to the Directory. I encourage them, and do every thing to bring them to a determination. I know not what obliges them to temporize. We must not wait for the ensuing elections."

A letter, written by La Vallette on the 26th Thermidor, contains the following:

Carnot's speech has had a good effect. The patriots do not, however, believe him to be sincere. They accuse him of secret designs, and allege that his speech was concerted with the leaders of the faction. No reconciliation, therefore, has taken place, and irritation still exists.

I have seen Sièyes, who still continues ill. He is of opinion, that if a strong barrier be not raised up against the torrent of the royalists, the constitution will be destroyed, and with it France.

On the 29th, La Vallette wrote to the following effect:

I will tell you what Barras said to me, after dinner, the day before yesterday.

"I tore aside the veil at the Directory this morning. The negotiations of Italy were spoken of. Carnot alleged that Bonaparte's situation, when he signed the preliminaries, was not such as to oblige him to subscribe to any conditions which he could not subsequently abide by. I defended Bonaparte, and said to Carnot, 'You are a scoundrel! You are a scoundrel! You have sold the Republic, and you would sacrifice all who defend it. Infamous villain!' I then rose, and Carnot replied, with an embarrassed air, 'I despise your provocations; but one day or other I will reply to them.'"

A young man in Carnot's service says it would be very easy to

make an end of him, should he attempt the least stir against the projected movement. I have just seen Barras, who desires me to inform you that every thing is arranged, and that the decisive step will be taken very shortly. If the Council of Five Hundred should change its residence, the Directory will remain.

I have just now heard from the secretary of Barras, that a person named Viscowitz has given the Directory the six hundred thousand francs, to obtain more advantageous conditions for the villains. About half the sum has been paid, and the remainder will be speedily advanced. I cannot touch money without it being known; I am watched by the inspectors of the Five Hundred.

On the 29th Thermidor, Augereau complains of the uncertainty that prevails, and states his urgent want of money. He then adds—

The Elector of Hesse writes confidentially to his nephew, General Hesse, that the emperor will not conclude peace, because it does not appear to be agreeable to the Clichy party, which he supposes exercises the ascendancy over Paris, and the two councils.

On the 30th Thermidor, Carnot addressing the general-in-chief upon the subject of the pretended dangers of the republic, the panic terrors, &c., says—

Each faction has the nightmare; all are armed to fight with windmills. But people are beginning to see clearly. Fear has done the mischief, and fear will work the remedy. In the name of Heaven, conclude peace, on the very basis of the preliminaries. That will still be excellent; and without peace, the republic is still a problem. You have earned glory enough; be now the hero of humanity. He concludes with these words:—Believe me, my dear general, the most faithful and inviolable of your friends.

La Vallette writes on the 7th Fructidor—

The movement which you so positively announced, on the part of Barras, is adjourned. The obstacles which retard it are—1st. Disagreement respecting the means of execution — 2d. The fear of engaging in a contest, of which the success is not doubtful, but of which the consequences are alarming—3d. The embarrassment which would be caused by the Council of Ancients, who are determined to oppose no resistance, and by the Council of Five Hundred, who must be driven away, because they will not go quietly—4th. The apprehension of the Babœuf reaction—5th. The impossibility of preventing the elders from leaving Paris, and the necessity which the Directory feels of following them.

Augereau is much offended that you do not write to him. "I do not understand Bonaparte," he says, "for the last four months. He does himself great harm by his praises of Bernadotte and Serrurier. It was imprudent to send Bernadotte. He knows well that none but he and I can save the Republic, and that I alone can make him properly acquainted with what is going on. But he may do as he pleases: I will not write to him again."

Yesterday evening, at Barras's, they were talking of superseding Sherer, who was reproached with immorality, drunkenness, and incapacity in business. I mentioned Bernadotte. "He is not enough of a patriot," it was answered; "he has been tried in present circumstances."

I thought I ought to await your orders, relative to the money. Barras's secretary told me that they had enough for their operations.

On the very day on which Augereau said he would not again write to Bonaparte, he wrote as follows:

Twelve thousand men of the army of the Sambre and Meuse will be marched near the constitutional circle, and quartered, to be in readiness for duty, in case of necessity, and cutting off any communications which may take place with Calvados, where the emigrants, who have fled from Paris since my arrival, have taken refuge.

You will shortly learn the change of the war minister. The Directory thinks that change important.

Augereau writes again, on the 11th Fructidor—

The spirit of the Directory continues unchanged, that is to say, the project is still in train; and that its execution will save the republic, in spite of the obstacles which arise to delay both plans and planners.

Send me some money.

Bonaparte thus replied to La Vallette's letter of the 7th Fructidor, in which mention is made of Augereau:

Augereau is rather warm: but he is attached to the cause of the people, to the army, and, I believe, to me.

Tell Carnot that I place no faith in the reports which are circulated about him. Give him the assurance of my perfect concurrence in all the sentiments he has expressed. Tell him, *as an opinion of your own*, that on the first opportunity I shall withdraw from public life, and if that opportunity does not speedily occur, I shall offer my resignation. *Observe well what effect this may produce on him.*

La Vallette writes, of the 14th Fructidor—

The movement so often talked of is now about to take place. To-morrow night, or the night after, the Directory will order the arrest of fifteen or twenty deputies. It is presumed that there will be no resistance.

He next speaks of the nomination of La Reveillère to the presidency of the Directory—the speech of Marbot—the paper written by Bailleul—the rejection of the resolution respecting the fugitives of the Lower Rhine, and the appointment of Cherin to the command of the guards of the Directory, and the rank of general of a division.

Carnot says (continues he) that the safety of the republic depends on peace, whatever may be its conditions.

On the 18th Fructidor, Barras and La Vallette wrote to an-

nounce that the crisis was past. Barras adds, by way of post-script—

Peace, peace! but an honourable and lasting peace! not the infamous proposition of Carnot, transmitted by the aide-de-camp La Vallette.

Augereau thus expressed himself on the 18th Fructidor:

At length, general, my mission is accomplished, and the promises of the army of Italy are fulfilled. The fear of being anticipated has caused measures to be hurried.

At midnight I despatched orders to all the troops to march towards the points specified. Before day, all the bridges and principal places were planted with cannon. At daybreak, the halls of the councils were surrounded, the guards of the councils were amicably mingled with our troops, and the members, of whom I send you a list, were arrested, and conveyed to the Temple. The greater number have escaped, and are being pursued. Carnot has disappeared.*

Paris is tranquil, and every one is astounded at an event which promised to be awful, but which has passed over like a fête.

The stout patriots of the faubourgs proclaim the safety of the republic, and the black collars are put down. It now remains for the wise energy of the Directory and the patriots of the two councils to do the rest. The place of sitting is changed, and the first operations promise well. This event is a great step towards peace; which it is your task finally to secure to us.

Do not forget the bill of exchange for twenty-five thousand francs. It is urgent.

On the 18th and 22d Fructidor, La Vallette wrote to announce the change, and the dismissal of General Clarke. He informed Bonaparte that Barras was very distrustful on the subject of the money.

A letter from Talleyrand to Bonaparte, dated the 22d Fructidor, after detailing the events of the 18th, thus concludes:

You will read in the proclamations, that a conspiracy, entirely in the interests of royalty, had been long preparing against the constitution. Latterly, it was not disguised, but was visible to the most indifferent observer. The name of patriot had become an insult;—all republican institutions were degraded;—the most inveterate enemies of France were received in her bosom, and treated with respect. Hypocritical fanaticism had suddenly transported us to the sixteenth century. Division was in the Directory. Men were sitting in the Legislative Body who had been elected according to the instructions of the pretender, and whose motions were all dictated by royalism. The Directory, being fully assured of these circumstances, ordered the conspirators to be seized. To confound at once the hopes and the calumnies of those who have so long desired and still meditate the

* It is worthy of remark, that in 1814, Louis XVIII. sent letters of nobility to those members of the two councils, who were, as it was termed, *fructidorized*.

ruin of the constitution, death would be the punishment of any one who would restore royalty or the constitution of 93.

Next day La Vallette wrote thus:

It is very important that you should have some one constantly here who is devoted to you. Here is a cabal against you: it is composed of violent men, who reproach you with having suffered the patriots of Piedmont to be sacrificed, and with not having received those of the south with suitable attention. Augereau takes an active part in all this. I ought not to conceal from you that Visconti uses the most unrestrained language respecting you.

I have seen Barras: he made no mention of you.

On the preceding day, Barras had written to Bonaparte as follows:

The infamous journalists will now have their turn. The resolution of the Five Hundred will be adopted. To-morrow we shall have two colleagues: they are François de Neufchateau and Merlin. Conclude peace, but let it be honourable. Let the Rhine be the boundary: let Mantua belong to the Cisalpine republic, and take Venice from the house of Austria. Such are the wishes of the present Directory, and these wishes are in accordance with the interests of the republic, as well as with the glory of the general and the immortal army he commands.

In another letter, dated two days after, he says—

Your silence is very strange, my dear general. The outlaws set off yesterday. No one can behave better than Augereau. He enjoys the confidence of both parties, and he deserves it. The Bourbons depart to-morrow for Spain.

On the same day Augereau writes—

My aide-de-camp, Verine, will acquaint you with the events of the 18th. He is also to deliver to you some despatches from the Directory, where much uneasiness is felt at not hearing from you. No less uneasiness is experienced on seeing in Paris one of your aides-de-camp,* whose conduct excites the dissatisfaction and distrust of the patriots, towards whom he has behaved very ill.

The news of General Clarke's recal will have reached you by this time, and I suspect has surprised you. Amongst the thousand and one motives which have determined the government to take this step, may be reckoned his correspondence with Carnot, which has been communicated to me, and in which he treated the generals of the army of Italy as brigands.

Moreau has sent the Directory a letter which throws a new light on Pichegru's treason. Such baseness is hardly to he conceived.

The government perseveres in maintaining the salutary measures which it has adopted. I hope it will be in vain for the remnant

* La Vallette.

of the factions to renew their plots. The patriots will continue united.

Fresh troops having been summoned to Paris, and my presence at their head being considered indispensable by the government, I shall not have the satisfaction of seeing you so soon as I hoped. This has determined me to send for my horses and carriages, which I left at Milan.

Bernadotte wrote to Bonaparte on the 24th Fructidor, as follows:

The arrested deputies are removed to Rochefort, where they will be embarked for the island of Madagascar. Paris is tranquil. The people at first heard of the arrest of the deputies with indifference. A feeling of curiosity soon drew them into the streets; enthusiasm followed, and cries of *Vive la République*, which had not been heard for a long time, now resounded in every street. The neighbouring departments have expressed their discontent. That of Allier has, it is said, protested; but it will cut a fine figure. Eight thousand men are marching to the environs of Paris. Part is already within the precincts, under the orders of General Lemoine. The government has it at present in its power to elevate public spirit; but every body feels that it is necessary the Directory should be surrounded by tried and energetic republicans.—Unfortunately, a host of men, without talent and resources, already suppose that what has taken place has been done only in order to advance their interests. Time is necessary to set all to rights. The armies have regained consistency. The soldiers of the interior are esteemed, or, at least, feared. The emigrants fly, and the non-juring priests conceal themselves.

Nothing could have happened more fortunately to consolidate the republic. But if the crisis be not taken advantage of, we shall be compelled to make a fresh movement after the approaching elections. The Legislative Body has granted a great degree of power to the Directory. Some persons think that it would be better to adjourn for a definite period, leaving to the Directory the duty of maintaining the constitution in the interim: there is a difference of opinion on this point. Nevertheless, the Directory and the Legislative Body act in harmony. There however remains, without doubt, a party in the two councils which dislikes the republic, and will do every thing possible to destroy it, as soon as the first feeling of terror is past. The government knows that party, and will probably take measures to avoid the danger, and thereby secure the patriots against a new prosecution.

On the 25th Fructidor, La Vallette wrote as follows:

I have had a long conversation with the representative Lacuée. He stated this: "The Council of Five Hundred will adjourn. It does not desire to be the senate of Tiberius. As to Bonaparte, let him not hope ever to enjoy here the reward of his labours. He is feared by the authorities, envied by military men, and misunderstood by a people too worthless to appreciate him. Calumny has prepared its poison, and he will be its victim. I wish him well; I wish him

not to depart from the high destiny to which his great genius and fortune decidedly invite him."*

Bonaparte wrote as follows, to the Directory, on the 26th Fructidor:

Herewith you will receive a proclamation to the army, relative to the events of the 18th. I have despatched the 48th demi-brigade, commanded by General Bon, to Lyons, together with fifty cavalry; also General Lannes, with the 20th light infantry and the 8th regiment of the line, to Marseilles. I have issued the enclosed proclamation in the southern departments. I am about to prepare a proclamation for the inhabitants of Lyons, as soon as I obtain some information of what may have passed there.

If I find there is the least disturbance, I will march there with the utmost rapidity. Believe that there are here a hundred thousand men, who are alone sufficient to make the measures you have taken to place liberty on a solid basis, be respected. What avails it that we gain victories, if we are not respected in our country. In speaking of Paris, one may parody what Cassius said of Rome: "Of what use to call her Queen on the banks of the Seine, when she is the slave of Pitt's gold?"

On the 30th Fructidor, Augereau wrote to Bonaparte in the following terms:

Public opinion, which acquires fresh power daily, promises, through the prudence of Frenchmen, a happy future, and banishes the fear of retrograding, although royalism has not lost all hope. I have not heard from you for a long time. You made me hope that I should have heard in a few days, and that the first courier would bring me an order for money. I look anxiously for both these things, for I am obliged to have recourse to many persons, and to make great efforts to pay my way. Be satisfied, citizen-general, that, at all hazards, I will surmount every obstacle opposed to the object in view, namely, to consolidate the republic, and cause it to be respected in the interior by constitutional means. Let me hear from you; keep your promises, and I undertake to do all that is necessary.

After the 18th Fructidor, Augereau wished to have his reward for his share in the victory, and for the service which he had rendered. He wished to be a Director. He got, however, only the length of being a candidate; honour enough for one who had merely been an instrument on that day.

On the 30th Fructidor, Talleyrand wrote a second letter to Bonaparte, as follows:

* Many persons have attributed the superior view which Bonaparte took of the events of the 18th Fructidor to his correspondence with La Vallette. I do not wish to detract from the merit of M. La Vallette. No person can, in this respect, entertain a higher opinion of him than myself. But this *ante Fructidorian* correspondence just set forth, proves that Bonaparte, although out of France, had a correct view of an event which he encouraged by his proclamations, and caused to be supported by his favourite generals. Faithful accounts, conversations reported with spirit and accuracy, careful scrutinies of facts—are not advice. Bonaparte did not like advice.

DRAWN BY T. DE THULSTRUP.

THE COUNCIL OF WAR — BONAPARTE AND AUGEREAU DIFFER.

We intend to publish some papers, from which it will appear evident that the courts of Vienna and London had a perfect understanding with the faction which has just been overthrown here. It will be seen how much the stratagems of these courts and the movements in the interior correspond. The members of Clichy and the emperor's cabinet seek the common and manifest object of re-establishing a king in France, and making a disgraceful peace, by which Italy would be restored to her ancient masters.

This correspondence, the autographs of which I have preserved, appears to me of great interest, as it contains most important and novel facts relative to the 18th Fructidor: I have therefore considered it my duty to publish the whole of it.

CHAPTER X.

1797.

Bonaparte's joy at the result of the 18th Fructidor—His letters to Augereau and François de Neufchateau—His correspondence with the Directory and proposed resignation—Explanation of the Directory—Bottot—Indication of the Egyptian expedition—Release of MM. de la Fayette, de Latour-Maubourg, and Bureau de Puzy, from Olmutz—General Clarke—Letter from Madame Bacciocchi to Bonaparte—Autograph letter of the Emperor Francis to Bonaparte—Arrival of Count Cobentzel—Autograph note of Bonaparte on the conditions of peace.

Bonaparte was intoxicated with joy when he heard of the happy issue of the 18th Fructidor. Its result was the dissolution of the Legislative Body and the fall of the *Clichian* party, which for some months had disturbed his tranquillity. The Clichians had objected to Joseph Bonaparte's right to sit, as deputy for Liamone, in the Council of Five Hundred.* His brother's victory removed the difficulty; but the general-in-chief soon perceived that the ascendant party abused its power, and again compromised the safety of the republic, by recommencing the revolutionary government. The directors were alarmed at his discontent and offended by his censure. They conceived the singular idea of opposing to Bonaparte, Augereau, of whose blind zeal they had received many proofs. The Directory appointed Augereau commander of the army of Germany. Augereau, whose extreme vanity was notorious, believed himself in a situation to compete with Bonaparte. What he built his arrogance on was, that, with a numerous troop, he had

* He was ambassador to Rome, and not a deputy at this time. When he became a member of the council, after his return from Rome, he experienced no opposition.—*Joseph Bonaparte's Notes on Bourrienne.*

arrested some unarmed representatives, and torn the epaulettes from the shoulders of the commandant of the guard of the councils. The Directory and he filled the head-quarters at Passeriano with spies and intriguers.

Bonaparte, who was informed of every thing that was going on, laughed at the Directory, and tendered his resignation, in order that he might be supplicated to continue in command.

The following post-Thermidorian letters will prove that the general's judgment on this point was correct.

On the 2d Vendémiaire, year VI. (23d of September, 1797), he wrote to Augereau, after having announced the arrival of his aide-de-camp, as follows:

The whole army applauds the wisdom and vigour which you have displayed upon this important occasion, and participates in the success of the country with the enthusiasm and energy which characterize our soldiers. It is only to be hoped, however, that the government will not be playing at seesaw, and thus throw itself into the opposite party. Wisdom and moderate views alone can establish the happiness of the country on a sure foundation. As for myself, this is the most ardent wish of my heart.

Bonaparte wrote, on the same day, to François de Neufchateau, as follows:

The fate of Europe henceforth depends on the union, the wisdom, and the power of the government. There is a part of the nation which it is necessary to conquer by good government. We have conquered Europe—we have carried the glory of the French name higher than it ever was before. It is for you, first magistrates of the republic, to extinguish all factions, and to be as much respected at home as you are abroad. A decree of the Executive Directory overthrows thrones: take care, then, at least, that timid writers or ambitious fanatics, concealed under masks of every description, do not plunge us into the revolutionary torrent.

The sentiments regarding peace which animated the majority of the Directory before the 18th Fructidor, acquired additional strength from the success of that day. The Directory wrote to Bonaparte the 2d Vendémiaire, year VI. (23d of September, 1797), as follows:

It is no longer necessary to keep terms with Austria. Her perfidy, her connexion with the internal conspirators, are manifest. The truce was merely a pretext for her to gain the time necessary to repair her losses, and await the internal movements which the 18th Fructidor has prevented. In the whole Austrian army, from the general down to the private, the report was circulated, that when that period arrived, the three directors who were designated as triumvirs would be assassinated, and royalty proclaimed. Every soldier flattered himself with the idea of soon visiting Paris with the emigrants. Condé, the chief of the latter, was already in France in secret, and, by the assistance of his friends, had nearly arrived at Lyons.

On the 4th Vendémiaire, Bonaparte wrote a second letter to the Directory, which passed on the road that written by the Directory to him on the 2d. Bonaparte's letter was in the following terms:

The day before yesterday, an officer arrived at the army from Paris. He asserted that he left Paris on the 25th, when anxiety prevailed there as to the feelings with which I viewed the events of the 18th. He was the bearer of a sort of circular from General Augereau to all the generals of division; and he brought a letter of credit from the minister of war to the commissary-general, authorizing him to draw as much money as he might require for his journey.

It is evident from these circumstances, that the government is acting towards me in somewhat the same way in which Pichegru was dealt with after Vendémiaire (year IV.)

I beg of you to receive my resignation, and appoint another to my place. No power on earth shall make me continue in the service after this shocking mark of ingratitude on the part of the government, which I was very far from expecting. My health, which is considerably impaired, imperiously demands repose and tranquillity.

The state of my mind, likewise, requires me to mingle again in the mass of citizens. Great power has for a long time been confided to my hands. I have employed it on all occasions for the advantage of my country; *so much the worse for those who put no faith in virtue, and may have suspected mine.* My recompence is in my own conscience, and in the opinion of posterity.

Now that the country is tranquil and free from the dangers which have menaced it, I can, without inconvenience, quit the post in which I have been placed.

Be sure that if there were a moment of danger, I would be found in the foremost rank of the defenders of liberty and the constitution of the year III.

The Directory replied without delay on the 12th Vendémiaire, and endeavoured to repel Bonaparte's reproaches of mistrust and ingratitude. In that letter the Directory said—

As to the grounds of your uneasiness at the story of a young man —a story perhaps made for him—can any thing he may have said have greater weight with you than the constant and direct communications from the government?

As to General Augereau's letter, as the royalist representatives had written to the generals of the army of Italy, and as this was known at Paris, the general, perhaps, thought it his duty to apply the antidote to the poison. This is not capable of any sinister interpretation against you. It is the same with the letter of the minister of war. Doubtless, it referred only to funds for the expenses of his journey. Beware, lest the royalist conspirators, at the moment when, perhaps, they poisoned Hoche, may not have endeavoured to fill your mind with disgust and suspicion, which might deprive your country of the exertion of your genius.

The Directory, judging from the account which Bottot gave of his mission, that he had not succeeded in entirely removing

the suspicions of Bonaparte, wrote the following letter on the 30th Vendémiaire:

The Directory has been troubled about the impression made on you by the letter, of which an aide-de-camp of the paymaster-general was the bearer. The composition of this letter has very much astonished the government, which never appointed nor recognised such an agent: it is at least an error of office. But it should not alter the opinion you ought otherwise to entertain of the manner in which the Directory thinks of and esteems you. It appears that the 18th Fructidor was misrepresented in the letters which were sent to the army of Italy. You did well to intercept them, and it may be right to transmit the most remarkable to the minister of police.*

In your observations on the too strong tendency of opinion towards military government, the Directory recognises an equally enlightened and ardent friend of the republic.

Nothing is wiser than the maxim—*cedant arma togæ*, for the maintenance of republics. To show so much anxiety on so important a point is not one of the least glorious features in the life of a general placed at the head of a triumphant army.

Bottot, on his part, wrote on the 5th Brumaire to Bonaparte, to satisfy him, and to describe the interest with which he had been received on his return from Italy. He said he had found the Directory full of admiration of the general, and affectionately attached to him. The following is an extract from his letter:

Perhaps the government commits many faults; perhaps it does not always take so correct a view of affairs as you do; but with what *republican docility* did it not receive your observation!

Soon after the events of the 18th Fructidor, Bonaparte addressed to the sailors of Admiral Brueys squadron a proclamation, the language of which proved that he entertained the idea of his favourite project, the expedition to Egypt.

TO THE SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRON OF ADMIRAL BRUEYS.

Comrades,

I hasten to make known to you the proclamation issued by the Executive Directory. You will perceive by it the danger from which we have just escaped.

A few traitors and emigrants had taken possession of the national tribunal.

The chief magistrates of the republic, the representatives, faithful to their country, republicans, soldiers, rallied round the tree of liberty. All have united their efforts—all have invoked the destiny of the republic. The partisans of tyranny are dismayed and secured.

Comrades, we have subdued and given peace to the continent. We must now unite our efforts with yours, in order to conquer the freedom of the seas, and revenge ourselves upon those proud islanders for the wrongs we have suffered at their hands. What sailor of the Mediterranean can have forgotten them?

* What an ignoble task to propose to the conqueror of Italy!

Do you not remember that terrible night, which will for ever be disastrous in the remembrance of the French people? Toulon abandoned to the English, its arsenal, with several of our frigates, in flames. So many injuries, and so many crimes, were the work of but a few hours! Yet there are bigots and traitors no less audacious than base, who seek to restore those who sold us to England, and closed every sea against us. *No*—this shall never be, never, while a single soldier of our three armies shall exist, and while you too, brave seamen, shall retain a due sense of the honour of your country, and of the high destinies which ere long shall render it illustrious.

Without you, we should not be able to extend the glory of the French name beyond a corner of Europe; with your aid, we shall range the seas, and carry the standard of the republic to the most distant countries.

His sentiments towards England, and the efforts he made against the power of that country, would leave posterity in doubt (were not the fact incontestably proved) of his having voluntarily and spontaneously sought an asylum among a people whom he disdainfully styled a nation of shopkeepers, who hate us, whom he thoroughly hated, and against whose commerce, manufactures, institutions, and even existence, he had constantly waged war.

In consequence of the complaints transmitted to the Court of Vienna, relative to the bad treatment of General de la Fayette and his two fellow-captives detained as prisoners in Olmütz, the Marquis de Chasteler was directed by the Emperor of Austria to make a report on the state of their prison and the manner in which they were treated. He was, besides, charged with a particular proposition, on which each of the prisoners was to make a declaration before obtaining his liberty.

The marquis drew up a report, under the title of "Minutes of an Examination respecting the Treatment of MM. de la Fayette, Latour-Maubourg, and Bureau de Puzy, prisoners in the fortress of Olmütz; likewise of Madame de la Fayette and her daughters, whom his majesty the Emperor had permitted to visit their husband and father, and of their servants."

The Marquis de Chasteler, after conferring with each of the prisoners in private, brought them together on the 26th of July, 1797, and, in the presence of Captain Mac-Eligot, drew up his account of the investigation.

With respect to lodging, the report stated that the prisoners, with Madame de la Fayette and her daughters, were confined in apartments behind the barracks. The apartments were on the ground floor. The principal inconvenience attending these apartments was, that a common-sewer passed under them, which, added to the vicinity of the water-closets, occasioned an unpleasant smell in changes of weather.

M. de la Fayette occupied a vaulted chamber, twenty-four feet long, fifty broad, and twelve high, containing a stove, a bed,

a table, chairs, and a chest of drawers. MM. de Latour-Maubourg and Bureau de Puzy had each a chamber similarly furnished. Madame de la Fayette and her daughters were lodged in a single room. The two young ladies had only one bed between them; but they had made repeated applications, especially when one of them was indisposed, for separate beds. As to food, the marquis stated that in the morning the prisoners were served with coffee or chocolate; at dinner, soup, a bouilli, a ragout of greens, some roasted meat, salad, dessert, and a bottle of red Hungary wine; for supper, a salad, some roasted meat, and a pint of wine. The food was sufficient as to quantity, but often of inferior quality.

The servant of M. de Maubourg was allowed to attend his master three hours a day. M. Bureau de Puzy's had been prevented from attending him for six weeks. Ever since M. de la Fayette's attempt to escape, he and his family had been waited on by soldiers. and were allowed no communication with their servants. In case of sickness, the surgeon belonging to the fortress attended the prisoners.

The Marquis de la Fayette's declaration was in the following terms:

The commission with which M. de Chasteler is charged, appears to me to resolve itself into three considerations:

1. His majesty wishes to ascertain our situation at Olmütz: I do not mean to prefer any complaint to him. Many details may be found in the letters of my wife, transmitted to and returned by the Austrian government; and if his imperial majesty deems it not sufficient to look over again the instructions conveyed in his name, I will voluntarily give to M. de Chasteler whatever information he may require.

2. His majesty the emperor and king wishes to be assured that, immediately on my liberation, I will depart for America. This is an intention I have often manifested: but as, under the present circumstances, my reply would seem to recognise the right of imposing this condition upon me, I do not conceive I ought to satisfy such a demand.

3. His majesty the emperor and king has done me the honour to signify, that the principles I profess being incompatible with the security of the Austrian government, he does not wish I should continue in his dominions, without his special permission. There are some duties from which I cannot withdraw myself. Some of these I owe to the United States, and, above all, to France; and I cannot, in any degree, surrender the right which my country possesses over my person.

With these sole reservations, I can assure M. de Chasteler that my fixed determination is, not to set my foot in any territory subject to his majesty the King of Bohemia and Hungary.

(Signed) LAFAYETTE.

M. de Latour-Maubourg, in his reply, stated that, without recognising in the Austrian government any right over his person—without submitting to what was arrogated over Frenchmen, disarmed, and strangers to the provinces which recognised

the dominion of Austria, he considered it his duty to declare that he had received no bad treatment, in word or deed, from the person now charged with his custody. He must, however, say that, with the exception of the present captain (Mac-Eligot) charged with the state prisoners, the greater part of the officers who preceded him behaved with a degree of grossness and indifference, of which the natural effect was, that the prisoners were left destitute of every thing.

Being unacquainted with the code of the Austrian state prisons, M. Latour-Maubourg could not say whether the treatment he had received was in conformity to such a code or not. But all that had transpired respecting the horrible system of the Bastile, all he had read during his captivity in Prussia of the atrocities said to be committed in the French prisons, during the barbarous reign of Marat and Robespierre, and his treatment in Prussia itself, though very severe, still had not prepared him for suffering, under the dominion of a prince whose humanity and virtues he had heard celebrated, a usage so harsh that he could not have believed its existence possible, had he not derived the conviction from a long and woful experience. He now renewed the resolution he had often formed for himself, never to set a foot in the dominions of his imperial majesty. Nevertheless, as circumstances might prevent him from furthering his intention of going to the United States, and to remove every pretext for again incarcerating him on account of his performing the duty of a good citizen, he made this engagement under the exception of the case, not very probable, that his country, which he was about to quit, and which would always be dear to him, or the country which he was to adopt, should impose upon him the duty of infringing it.

M. Bureau de Puzy replied in much the same way, in substance and spirit, as the other two prisoners. He closed his declaration, by saying that he would, with joy, engage never to enter, or to ask permission to enter, the Austrian dominions; but that he must except, from any such engagement, the case of military service on the supposition of a war between Austria and any country which might give him an asylum.

The Directory had sent General Clarke to treat for peace, as second plenipotentiary. Bonaparte has often told me, he had no doubt that General Clarke was charged with a secret mission to act as a spy upon him, and even to arrest him if an opportunity offered for so doing without danger. That he had a suspicion of this kind is certain; but I must own that I was never by any means able to discover its grounds; for in all my intercourse since with Clarke, he never put a single question to me, nor did I ever hear a word drop from his mouth, which savoured of such a character. If the fact be that he was a spy, he certainly played his part well. In all the parts of his correspondence

which were intercepted, there never was found the least confirmation of this suspicion. Be this as it may, Bonaparte could not endure him; he did not make him acquainted with what was going on, and his influence rendered this mission a mere nullity. The general-in-chief concentrated all the business of the negotiation in his own closet; and, as to what was going on, Clarke continued a mere cipher until the 18th Fructidor, when he was recalled. Bonaparte made but little count of Clarke's talents. It is but justice, however, to say that he bore him no grudge for the conduct of which he suspected he was guilty in Italy. *Because I have the power to punish him,* said he, *I pardon him.*

He even had the generosity to make interest for a second-rate official situation for him. These amiable traits were not uncommon with Bonaparte.

Bonaparte had to encounter so many disagreeable contrarieties, both in the negotiators for peace, and the events at Paris, that he often displayed a good deal of irritation and disgust. This state of mind was increased by the recollection of the vexation his sister's marriage had caused him, and which was unfortunately revived by a letter he received from her at this juncture. His excitement was such, that he threw it down with an expression of anger. It has been erroneously reported, in several publications, that Bacciocchi espoused Marie-Anne-Eliza Bonaparte on the 5th of May, 1797. The brother of the bride was at the time negotiating the preliminaries of peace with Austria.

In fact, the preliminaries were signed in the month of April, and it was for the definitive peace we were negotiating in May. But the reader will find, by the subjoined letter, that Christine applied to her brother to stand godfather to her third child. Three children in three months would be rather quick work in the family way.

Ajaccio, 14th Thermidor, year V. (August 1, 1797).

GENERAL,

Suffer me to write to you, and call you by the name of brother. My first child was born at a time when you were much incensed against us. I trust she may soon caress you, and so make you forget the pain my marriage has occasioned you. My second child was still-born. Obliged to quit Paris by your order, I miscarried in Germany. In a month's time I hope to present you with a nephew. A favourable time, and other circumstances, incline me to hope my next will be a boy; and I promise you I will make a soldier of him: but I wish him to bear your name, and that you should be his godfather. I trust you will not refuse your sister's request.

Will you send, for this purpose, your power of attorney to Bacciocchi, or to whomsoever you think fit? Myself will be godmother. I shall expect with impatience your assent. Because we are poor, let not that cause you to despise us; for, after all, you are our brother—mine are the only children that call you uncle, and we all love you

more than we do the favours of fortune. Perhaps I may one day succeed in convincing you of the love I bear you.

Your affectionate sister,

CHRISTINE BONAPARTE.*

P. S. Do not fail to remember me to your wife, whom I strongly desire to be acquainted with. They told me, at Paris, I was very like her. If you recollect my features you can judge. C. B.

This letter is in the handwriting of Lucien Bonaparte.†

General Bonaparte had been near a month at Passeriano, when he received the following autograph letter from the Emperor of Austria:

TO GENERAL BONAPARTE, GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.

General Bonaparte—When I thought I had given my plenipotentiaries full powers to terminate the important negotiation with which they were charged, I learn, with as much pain as surprise, that, in consequence of swerving continually from the stipulations of the preliminaries, the restoration of tranquillity, with the tidings of which I desire to gladden the hearts of my subjects, and which the half of Europe devoutly prays for, becomes, day after day, more uncertain.

Faithful to the performance of my engagements, I am ready to execute what was agreed to at Leoben, and require from you but the reciprocal performance of so sacred a duty. This is what has already been declared in my name, and what I do not now hesitate myself to declare. If the execution of some of the preliminary articles be now impossible, in consequence of the events which have since occurred, and in which I had no part, it may be necessary to substitute others in their stead, equally adapted to the interests, and equally conformable to the dignity of the two nations. To such alone will I put my hand. A frank and sincere explanation, dictated by the same feelings which govern me, is the only way to lead to so salutary a result. In order to accelerate this result as far as in me lies, and to put an end at once to the state of uncertainty we remain in, and which is already too great, I have determined to despatch to the place of the present negotiations, Count de Cobentzel, a man who possesses my most unlimited confidence, and who is instructed as to my intentions, and furnished with my most ample powers. I have authorized him to receive and accept every proposition tending to the reconciliation of the two parties which may be in conformity with the principles of equity and reciprocal fitness, and to conclude accordingly.

After this fresh assurance of the spirit of conciliation which animates me, I doubt not you will perceive that peace lies in your own hands,

* Madame Bacciocchi went by the name of Marianne at St. Cyr, of Christine while on her travels, and of Eliza under the consulate.

† Joseph Bonaparte in his Notes says, "It is false that Madame Bonaparte ever called herself Christine; it is false that she ever wrote the letter of which M. de Bourrienne here gives a copy." It will be observed, that Bourrienne says it was written by her brother Lucien.—*Editor.*

and that on your determination will depend the happiness or misery of millions of men. If I mistake as to the means I think best adapted to terminate the calamities which for a long time have desolated Europe, I shall, at least, have the consolation of reflecting that I have done all that depended on me. With the consequences which may result, I can never be reproached.

I have been particularly determined to the course I now take by the opinion I entertain of your upright character, and by the personal esteem I have conceived towards you, of which I am very happy, General Bonaparte, to give you here an assurance.

(Signed) FRANCIS.

Vienna, 20th September, 1797,

In fact, it was only on the arrival of the Count de Cobentzel that the negotiations were seriously set on foot. Bonaparte had all along clearly perceived that Gallo and Meerweldt were not furnished with adequate powers. He saw, also, clearly enough, that if the month of September were to be trifled away in unsatisfactory negotiations, as the month which preceded it had been, it would be difficult, in October, to strike a blow at the house of Austria on the side of Carinthia. The Austrian cabinet perceived with satisfaction the approach of the bad weather, and insisted more strongly on its ultimatum, which was the Adige, with Venice.

Before the 18th Fructidor, the Emperor of Austria hoped that the movement which was preparing in Paris would operate badly for France, and favourably to the European cause. The Austrian plenipotentiaries, in consequence, elevated the tone of their pretensions, and sent notes, and an ultimatum, which gave the proceedings more an air of mockery than of serious negotiation, and which excited, alternately, anger and contempt. Bonaparte's ideas, which I have, under his hand, were as follow:

1. The emperor to have Italy as far as the Adige.
2. The King of Sardinia, as far as the Adda.
3. The Genoese republic to have the boundary of Tortona, as far as the Po (Tortona to be demolished), as also the imperial fiefs. (Coni to be ceded to France, or to be demolished.)
4. The Grand Duke of Tuscany to be restored.
5. The Duke of Parma to be restored.*

* The reader can easily compare these ideas of Bonaparte's with the treaty he afterwards concluded.

CHAPTER XI.

1797.

Influence of the 18th Fructidor on the negotiations—Bonaparte's suspicion of Bottot—His complaints respecting the non-erasure of Bourrienne—Bourrienne's conversation with the Marquis of Gallo—Bottot writes from Paris to Bonaparte on the part of the Directory—Agents of the Directory employed to watch Bonaparte—Influence of the weather on the conclusion of peace—Remarkable observation of Bonaparte—Conclusion of the treaty—The Directory dissatisfied with the terms of the peace—Bonaparte's predilection for representative government—Opinion on Bonaparte.

After the 18th Fructidor, Bonaparte was more powerful, Austria less haughty and confident. Venice was the only point of real difficulty. Austria wanted the line of the Adige, with Venice, in exchange for Mentz, and the boundary of the Rhine, until that river enters Holland. The Directory wished to have the latter boundary, and to add Mantua to the Italian republic, without giving up all the line of the Adige and Venice. The difficulties were felt to be so irreconcilable, that within about a month of the conclusion of peace, the Directory wrote to General Bonaparte, that a resumption of hostilities was preferable to the state of uncertainty which was agitating and ruining France. The Directory, therefore, declared that both the armies of the Rhine should take the field. It appears from the Fructidorian correspondence, which has been already given, that the majority of the Directory then looked upon a peace, such as Bonaparte afterwards made, as *infamous*. But Bonaparte, from the moment the Venetian insurrection broke out, perceived that Venice might be usefully disposed of in the pacification. Bonaparte, who was convinced that, in order to bring matters to an issue, Venice and the territory beyond the Adige must fall beneath the Austrian yoke, wrote to the Directory, that he could not commence operations, advantageously, before the end of March, 1798; but that if the objections to giving Venice to the Emperor of Austria were persisted in, hostilities would certainly be resumed in the month of October, for the emperor would not renounce Venice. In that case it would be necessary to be ready on the Rhine, for an advance in Germany, as the army of Italy, if it could make head against the Archduke Charles, was not sufficiently strong for any operations on

a grand scale. At this period the conclusion of peace was certainly very doubtful; it was even seriously considered in what form the rupture should be notified.

Towards the end of September, Bottot, Barras's secretary, arrived at Passeriano. He was despatched by the Directory. Bonaparte immediately suspected he was a new spy, come on a secret mission, to watch him. He was therefore received and treated with coolness; but Bonaparte never had, as Sir Walter Scott asserts, the idea of ordering him to be shot. That writer is also in error, when he says, that Bottot was sent to Passeriano to reproach Bonaparte for failing to fulfil his promise of sending money to the Directory.

Bonaparte soon gave Bottot an opportunity of judging of the kind of spirit which prevailed at head-quarters. He began again to propose his resignation, which he had already several times called upon the Directory to accept. He accused the government, at table, in Bottot's presence, of horrible ingratitude. He recounted all his subjects of complaint, in loud and impassioned language, without any restraint, and before twenty or thirty persons.

Indignant at finding that his reiterated demands for the erasure of my name from the list of emigrants had been slighted, and that, in spite of his representations, conveyed to Paris by General Bernadotte, Louis Bonaparte, and others, I was still included in that fatal list, he apostrophized M. Bottot, at dinner one day, before forty individuals, among whom were the diplomatists, Gallo, Cobentzel, and Meerweldt. The conversation turned upon the Directory: "Yes, truly," cried Bonaparte, in a loud voice, "I have good reason to complain; and, to pass from great to little things, look, I pray you, at Bourrienne's case. He possesses my most unbounded confidence. He alone is intrusted, under my orders, with all the details of the negotiation. This you well know; and yet your Directory will not strike him off the list. In a word, it is not only an inconceivable, but an extremely stupid piece of business; for he has all my secrets; he knows my ultimatum, and could by a single word realize a handsome fortune, and laugh at your infatuation. Ask M. de Gallo if this be not true."

Bottot wished to offer some excuse; but the general murmur reduced him to silence.

The Marquis de Gallo had conversed with me but three days before, in the park of Passeriano, on the subject of my position with regard to France—of the determination expressed by the Directory not to erase my name—and of the risk I thereby ran. "We have no desire," continued he, "to renew the war: we wish sincerely for peace; but it must be an honourable one. The republic of Venice presents a large territory for partition, which would be sufficient for both parties. The cessions at present proposed, are not, however, satisfactory. We want to know

Bonaparte's ultimatum; and I am authorized to offer an estate in Bohemia, tilled and mansioned, with a revenue of ninety thousand florins."

I quickly interrupted M. de Gallo, and assured him that both my conscience and my duty obliged me to reject his proposal; and so put at once an end to the conversation.

I took care to let the general-in-chief know this story, and he was not surprised at my reply. His conviction, however, was strong, from all that M. de Gallo had said, and more particularly from the offer he had made, that Austria was resolved to avoid war, and was anxious for peace.

After I had retired to rest, M. Bottot came to my bedroom and asked me with a feigned surprise, whether it were true that my name was still on the list of emigrants? On my replying in the affirmative, he requested me to draw up a note on the subject. This I declined doing; but I told him that twenty notes of the kind he required already existed: that I would take no further steps; and that I would henceforth await the decision in a state of perfect inaction.

General Bonaparte thought it quite inexplicable that the directors should express dissatisfaction at the view he took of the events of the 18th Fructidor, as, without his aid, they would doubtless have been overcome. He wrote a despatch, in which he repeated that his health and his spirits were affected—that he had need of some years' repose—that he could no longer endure the fatigue of riding; but that the prosperity and liberty of his country would always command his warmest interests. In all this there was not a single word of truth. The Directory thought as much, and declined to accept his resignation in the most flattering terms.

Bottot proposed to him, on the part of the Directory, to revolutionize Italy. The general inquired whether the *whole* of Italy would be included in the plan. The revolutionary commission had, however, been intrusted to Bottot in so indefinite a way, that he could only hesitate, and give a vague reply. Bonaparte wished for more precise orders. In the interval, peace was concluded, and the idea of that perilous and extravagant undertaking was no longer agitated.

Bottot, soon after his return to Paris, wrote a letter to General Bonaparte, in which he complained that the last moments he had passed at Passeriano had deeply afflicted his heart. He said that cruel suspicions had followed him even to the gates of the Directory. These cruel suspicions had, however, been dissipated by the sentiments of admiration and affection which he had found the Directory entertained for the person of Bonaparte.

These assurances, which were precisely what Bonaparte had expected, did not avail to lessen the contempt he entertained for the heads of the government, nor to change his conviction of their envy and mistrust of himself. To their alleged affection

he made no return. Bottot assured the hero of Italy of the docility of the Directory, and touched upon the reproaches Bonaparte had thrown out against them, and upon his demands which had not been granted. He said—

"The three armies, of the North, of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, are to form only one, the army of Germany.—Augereau? But you yourself sent him. The fault committed by the Directory is owing to yourself! Bernadotte? —he is gone to join you. Cacault?—he is recalled. Twelve thousand men for your army?—they are on their march. The treaty with Sardinia?—it is ratified. Bourrienne?—he is erased. The revolution of Italy?—it is adjourned. Advise the Directory, then: I repeat it, they have need of information, and it is to you they look for it."

The assertion regarding me was false. For six months, Bonaparte demanded my erasure, without being able to obtain it. I was not struck off the list until the 11th of November, 1797.

Just before the close of the negotiation, Bonaparte, disgusted at the opposition and difficulties with which he was surrounded, reiterated again and again the offer of his resignation, and his wish to have a successor appointed. What augmented his uneasiness was, an idea he entertained that the Directory had penetrated his secret, and attributed his powerful concurrence on the 18th Fructidor to the true cause—his personal views of ambition. In spite of the hypocritical assurances of gratitude made to him in writing, and though the directors knew that his services were indispensable, spies were employed to watch his movements, and to endeavour by means of the persons about him to discover his views. Some of the general's friends wrote to him from Paris, and for my part I never ceased repeating to him, that the peace, the power of making which he had in his own hands, would render him far more popular than the renewal of hostilities, undertaken with all the chances of success and reverse. The signing of the peace, according to his own ideas, and in opposition to those of the Directory, the way in which he just halted at Rastadt, and avoided returning to the congress, and, finally, his resolution to expatriate himself with an army in order to attempt new enterprises, sprung more than is generally believed from the ruling idea that he was distrusted, and that his ruin was meditated. He often recalled to mind what La Vallette had written to him, about his conversation with Lacuée; and all he saw and heard confirmed the impression he had received on this subject.

The early appearance of bad weather precipitated his determination. On the 13th of October, at daybreak, on opening my window, I perceived the mountains covered with snow. The previous night had been superb, and the autumn till then promised to be fine and late. I proceeded, as I always did, at seven o'clock in the morning, to the general's chamber. I woke

him, and told him what I had seen. He feigned at first to disbelieve me, then leaped from his bed, ran to the window, and, convinced of the sudden change, he calmly said, "What! before the middle of October! What a country is this! Well, we must make peace!" While he hastily put on his clothes, I read the journals to him, as was my daily custom. He paid but little attention to them. Shutting himself up with me in his closet, he reviewed with the greatest care all the returns from the different corps of his army. "Here are," said he, "nearly eighty thousand effective men. I feed, I pay them: but I can bring but sixty thousand into the field on the day of battle. I shall gain it, but afterwards my force will be reduced twenty thousand men—by killed, wounded, and prisoners. Then how oppose the Austrian forces that will march to the protection of Vienna? It would be a month before the armies of the Rhine could support me, if they should be able; and in a fortnight all the roads and passages will be covered deep with snow. It is settled—I will make peace. Venice shall pay for the expense of the war, and the boundary of the Rhine: let the Directory and the lawyers say what they like."

He wrote to the Directory in the following words: "The summits of the hills are covered with snow; I cannot, on account of the stipulations agreed to for the recommencement of hostilities, begin before five-and-twenty days, and by that time we shall be overwhelmed with snow."

Fourteen years after, another early winter, in a severe climate, was destined to have a fatal influence on his fortunes. Had he but then exercised equal foresight!

It is well known that, by the treaty of Campo-Formio, the two belligerent powers made peace at the expense of the republic of Venice, which had nothing to do with the quarrel in the first instance, and which only interfered at a late period, probably against her own inclination, and impelled by the force of inevitable circumstances. But what has been the result of this great political spoliation? A portion of the Venetian territory was adjudged to the Cisalpine republic: it is now in the possession of Austria. Another considerable portion, and the capital itself, fell to the lot of Austria in compensation for the Belgic provinces and Lombardy. Austria has now retaken Lombardy, and the additions then made to it, and Belgium is in the possession of the house of Orange. France obtained Corfu and some of the Ionian isles: these now belong to England. Romulus never thought he was founding Rome for Goths and priests. Alexander did not foresee that his Egyptian city would belong to the Turks; nor did Constantine strip Rome for the benefit of Mahomet II. Why then fight for a few paltry villages?

Thus have we been gloriously conquering for Austria and England. An ancient state is overturned without noise, and its

provinces, after being divided among different bordering states, are now all under the dominion of Austria. We do not possess a foot of ground in all the fine countries we conquered, and which served as compensations for the immense acquisitions of the house of Hapsburgh, in Italy. Thus that house was aggrandized by a war which was to itself most disastrous. But Austria has often found other means of extending her dominion than military triumphs, as is recorded in the celebrated distich of Mathias Corvinus:

> Bella gerunt alii, tu felix Austria nube:
> Nam quæ Mars aliis, dat tibi regna Venus.*

The Directory was far from being satisfied with the treaty of Campo-Formio, and with difficulty resisted the temptation of not ratifying it. A fortnight before the signature, the Directors wrote to General Bonaparte that they would not consent to give to the emperor Venice, Frioul, Padua, and the *terra firma* with the boundary of the Adige. "That," said they, "would not be to make peace, but to adjourn the war. We shall be regarded as the beaten party, independently of the disgrace of abandoning Venice, which Bonaparte himself thought so worthy of freedom. France ought not, and never will wish, to see Italy delivered up to Austria. The Directory would prefer the chances of a war to changing a single word of its ultimatum, which is already too favourable to Austria." But all this was said in vain. Bonaparte made no scruple of disregarding his instructions. It has been said that the Emperor of Austria made an offer of a very considerable sum of money, and even of a principality, to obtain favourable terms. I was never able to find the slightest ground for this report, which refers to a time when the smallest circumstance could not escape my notice. The character of Bonaparte stood too high for him to sacrifice his glory as a conqueror and peacemaker for even the greatest private advantage. This was so thoroughly known, and he was so profoundly esteemed by the Austrian plenipotentiaries, that I will venture to say none of them would have been capable of making the slightest overture to him of so debasing a proposition. Besides, it would have induced him to put an end to all intercourse with the plenipotentiaries. Perhaps what I have just stated of M. de Gallo will throw some light upon this odious accusation. But let us dismiss this story with the rest, and among them that of the porcelain tray, which was said to have been smashed and thrown at the head of M. de Cobentzel. I certainly know nothing of any such scene: our manners at Passeriano were not quite so bad!

* Glad Austria wins by Hymen's silken chain,
What other states by doubtful battle gain,
And while fierce Mars enriches meaner lands,
Receives possession from fair Venus' hands.

The presents customary on such occasions were given, but the Emperor of Austria took that opportunity to present to General Bonaparte six magnificent white horses.

Bonaparte returned to Milan by Gratz, Laybach, Trieste, Mestre, Verona, and Mantua.

At this period Bonaparte was still swayed by the impulse of the age. He thought of nothing but representative governments. Often has he said to me, "I should like the era of representative governments to be dated from my time." His conduct in Italy, and his proclamations, ought to give, and, in fact, do give, weight to this account of his opinion. But there is no doubt that this idea was more connected with lofty views of ambition, than a sincere desire for the benefit of the human race; for, at a later period, he adopted this phrase:—*I should like to be the head of the most ancient of the dynasties of Europe.* What a difference between Bonaparte, the author of the *Souper de Beaucaire,* the subduer of royalism at Toulon, the author of the remonstrance to Albitte and Salicetti, the fortunate conqueror of the 13th Vendémiaire, the instigator and supporter of the revolution of Fructidor, and the founder of the republics of Italy, the fruits of his immortal victories, and Bonaparte, first consul in 1800; consul for life in 1802; and, above all, Napoleon, Emperor of the French, in 1804, and King of Italy, in 1805! *

After having, in the countries he conquered, tried to force a premature ripeness of the age, when to do so was imprudent and untimely, he, some years after, wished to make opinion retro-

* And what a difference, also, between France of 1793 and France of 1800! Bonaparte followed the movement given by the nation. He would have been a Washington in the United States of America. The object of his life was to deserve well of posterity. He did not seek to gratify any personal passion, or to promote the interest of any political faction. He wished to act in accordance with the opinion of the great body of the people; to foresee events, and to turn them to advantage as they occurred, without creating any, as Bourrienne pretends. Napoleon was blessed with great good sense, and with simple and precise ideas which seldom misled him. After the days of terror and reaction every thing tended in France to the concentration of the executive power. He sincerely desired peace; but such was not the wish of the English and the oligarchic classes which now govern the cabinets of Europe; for they saw the greatness of France, and the decline of their own political importance, in the prosperity with which peace could not fail to environ the French people and the first consul. The war continued. The result was, a succession of fresh victories obtained by the first consul, which placed crowns at his disposal and augmented his glory and personal importance. He was thus elevated so highly above all other persons, that France thought it right to consolidate her existing prosperity by rendering the first magistracy hereditary. But the enemies of this new state of France, aided by the premature frosts of Russia, by internal treasons, and unfavoured by fortune, hoped to reduce France and Europe to the state in which they were before the Revolution. My opinion is, that had Napoleon lived he would have been as liberal as the opinion of the instructed classes of European society now is. It was only by conforming to that opinion that he could expect the approbation of posterity, for which he was always ready to make any sacrifice.—*Note on the above passage in the text by J. Bonaparte.* (*Editor.*)

grade when that was impossible. Abjuring liberty for glory, he thought it necessary to prefer his own celebrity to the good of mankind. Perhaps his simulated love for representative government was put forward as a means of more easily subduing nations, by holding out to expectation what was flattering to popular feeling, without any intention of realizing the promise. Already anticipating his wars in Germany, anticipations which constantly engaged his thoughts, we find him writing from Cairo to the Directory, " that he should think it the happiest day of his life, when he should hear of the formation of the first republic in Germany."

But by precipitating nations towards an epoch, at which they could only arrive in succession, he gave to the partisans of things as they existed in past times, motives and means for compelling the people of every country to retrograde. The man who, at the period of which I am speaking, would have no more kings, and proscribed them in all his proclamations, wished afterwards to be the senior of all sovereigns, the eldest head of the European dynasties; and this dream, like that of extemporaneous representative governments, caused torrents of blood to flow. What folly to wish to jump, all at once, and without transition, to a future which does not belong to us, or to wish to return to a period which no longer exists! What evils have resulted from the adoption of these two principles!

CHAPTER XII.

1797.

Effect of the 18th Fructidor on the peace—The standard of the army of Italy—Honours rendered to the memory of General Hoche and of Virgil, at Mantua—Remarkable letter—In passing through Switzerland Bonaparte visits the field of Morat—Arrival at Rastadt—Letter from the Directory calling Bonaparte to Paris—Intrigues against Josephine—Grand ceremony on the reception of Bonaparte by the Directory—Speeches—The theatres—Modesty of Bonaparte—An assassination—Bonaparte's opinion of the Parisians—His election to the National Institute—Letter to Camus—Projects—Reflections.

The day of the 18th Fructidor, had, without any doubt, powerfully contributed to the conclusion of peace at Campo-Formio. On the one hand, the Directory, hitherto not very pacifically inclined, after having struck what is called a *coup d'état*, at length saw the necessity of obtaining absolution from the discontented, by giving peace to France. On the other

SKETCH BY ERIC PAPE. AFTER THE PORTRAIT BY FRANÇOIS BOUCHOT IN THE VERSAILLES MUSEUM.

BARTHÉLEMY-CATHERINE JOUBERT.

DRAWN BY T. DE THULSTRUP.

THE ENTRY INTO MILAN.

hand, the cabinet of Vienna, observing the complete failure of all the royalist plots in the interior, thought it high time to conclude with the French republic a treaty which, notwithstanding all the defeats Austria had sustained, still left her a preponderating influence over Italy.

Besides, the campaign of Italy, so fertile in glorious achievements of arms, had not been productive of glory alone. Something of greater importance followed these conquests. Public affairs had assumed a somewhat unusual aspect, and a grand moral influence, the effect of victories and of peace, had begun to extend all over France. Republicanism was no longer so sanguinary and fierce as it had been some years before. Bonaparte, negotiating with princes and their ministers on a footing of equality, but still with all that superiority to which victory and his genius entitled him, gradually taught foreign courts to be familiar with republican France, and the republic to cease regarding all states governed by kings as of necessity enemies.

In these circumstances, the general-in-chief's departure, and his expected visit to Paris, excited general attention. The feeble Directory was prepared to submit to the presence of the conqueror of Italy in the capital.

It was for the purpose of acting as head of the French legation, at the congress of Rastadt, that Bonaparte quitted Milan on the 17th of November. But before his departure he sent to the Directory one of those monuments, the inscriptions of which may generally be considered as fabulous, but which, in this case, were nothing but the truth. This monument was the "flag of the Army of Italy," and to General Joubert was assigned the honourable duty of presenting it to the members of the executive government.

On one side of the flag were the words, "To the Army of Italy, the grateful country." The other contained an enumeration of the battles fought, and places taken, and presented, in the following inscriptions, a simple, but striking abridgment of the history of the Italian campaign.

150,000 PRISONERS; 170 STANDARDS; 550 PIECES OF BATTERING CANNON; 600 PIECES OF FIELD ARTILLERY; FIVE BRIDGE EQUIPAGES; NINE 64-GUN SHIPS; TWELVE 32-GUN FRIGATES; 12 CORVETTES; 18 GALLEYS; ARMISTICE WITH THE KING OF SARDINIA; CONVENTION WITH GENOA; ARMISTICE WITH THE DUKE OF PARMA; ARMISTICE WITH THE KING OF NAPLES; ARMISTICE WITH THE POPE; PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN; CONVENTION OF MONTEBELLO WITH THE REPUBLIC OF GENOA; TREATY OF PEACE WITH THE EMPEROR AT CAMPO-FORMIO.

LIBERTY GIVEN TO THE PEOPLE OF BOLOGNA, FERRARA, MODENA, MASSA-CARRARA, LA ROMAGNO, LOMBARDY, BRESCIA, BERGAMI, MANTUA, CREMA, PART OF THE VERONESE, CHIAVENA, BORMIO, THE VALTELINA, THE GENOESE, THE IMPERIAL FIEFS, THE PEOPLE

OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF CORÇYRA, OF THE ÆGEAN SEA, AND OF ITHACA.

SENT TO PARIS ALL THE MASTER-PIECES OF MICHAEL ANGELO, OF GUERCINO, OF TITIAN, OF PAUL VERONESE, OF CORREGIO, OF ALBANO, OF CARRACCI, OF RAPHAEL, AND OF LEONARDO DA VINCI.

Thus were recapitulated on a flag, destined to decorate the Hall of the Public Sittings of the Directory, the military deeds of the campaign in Italy, its political results, and the conquest of the monuments of art.

Most of the Italian cities looked upon their conqueror as a liberator—such was the magic of the word *liberty*, which resounded from the Alps to the Apennines. In his way to Mantua the general took up his residence in the palace of the ancient dukes. Bonaparte promised the authorities of Mantua that their department should be one of the most extensive; impressed on them the necessity of promptly organizing a local militia, and of putting in execution the plans of Bari, the mathematician, for the navigation of the Mincio from Mantua to Peschiera.

He stopped two days at Mantua, and the morrow of his arrival was devoted to the celebration of a military funeral solemnity, in honour of General Hoche, who had just died. His next object was to hasten the execution of the monument which was erecting to the memory of Virgil. Thus, in one day, he paid honour to France and Italy, to modern and to ancient glory, to the laurels of war and to the laurels of poetry.

A person who saw Bonaparte, on this occasion, for the first time, thus described him in a letter he wrote to Paris:—"With lively interest and extreme attention I have observed this extraordinary man, who has performed such great deeds, and about whom there is something which seems to indicate that his career is not yet terminated. I found him very like his portraits—little, thin, pale, with an air of fatigue, but not of ill-health, as has been reported of him. He appears to me to listen with more abstraction than interest, and that he was more occupied with what he was thinking of than with what was said to him. There is great intelligence in his countenance, along with which may be marked an air of habitual meditation, which reveals nothing of what is passing within. In that thinking head, in that bold mind, it is impossible not to believe that some daring designs are engendering *which will have their influence on the destinies of Europe.*"

From the last phrase, in particular, of this letter, one might suspect that it was written after Bonaparte had made his name feared throughout Europe; but it really appeared in a journal in the month of December, 1797, a little before his arrival in Paris.

There exists a sort of analogy between celebrated men and celebrated places: it was not, therefore, an uninteresting spec-

ENGRAVED BY R. G. TIETZE. AFTER THE ORIGINAL PORTRAIT IN POSSESSION OF THE MARQUIS DES ROYS.

LOUIS-LAZARE HOCHE.

tacle to see Bonaparte surveying the field of Morat, where, in 1476, Charles the Rash, Duke of Burgundy, daring like himself, fell, with his powerful army, under the effects of Helvetian valour. Bonaparte slept during the night at Moudon, where, as in every place through which he passed, the greatest honours were paid him. In the morning, his carriage being broken, we continued our journey on foot, accompanied only by some officers, and an escort of dragoons of the country. Bonaparte stopped near Bones-Chapel, and desired to be shown the spot where the battle of Morat was fought. A plain in front of the chapel was pointed out to him. An officer who had served in France was present, and explained to him how the Swiss, descending from the neighbouring mountains, were enabled, under cover of a wood, to turn the Burgundian army, and put it to the rout. "What was the force of that army?" asked Bonaparte.—"Sixty thousand men."—Sixty thousand men!" he exclaimed: "they might have completely covered these mountains!"—"The French fight better now," said Lannes, who was one of the officers of his suite.—"At that time," observed Bonaparte, interrupting him, "the Burgundians were not Frenchmen."

Bonaparte's journey through Switzerland was not without utility; and his presence served to calm more than one inquietude. He proceeded on his journey to Rastadt by Aix in Savoy, Berne, and Bâle. On arriving at Berne, during night, we passed through a double file of well lighted equipages, filled with beautiful women, all of whom raised the cry of "Long live Bonaparte!—long live the Pacificator!" To have a proper idea of this genuine enthusiasm, it is necessary to have seen it.

The elevated situation in society to which his great victories and the peace had contributed to raise him, rendered insupportable the style of the second person singular, and the familiar manner in which his old schoolfellows of Brienne would sometimes address him. I thought this very natural.

M. de Cominges, one of those who went with him to the military school at Paris, and who had emigrated, was at Bâle. Having learned our arrival, he presented himself without ceremony, with great indecorum, and with a complete disregard of the respect due to a man who had rendered himself so illustrious. General Bonaparte, offended at this behaviour, refused to see him again, and expressed himself to me with much warmth, on the occasion of this visit. All my efforts to remove his displeasure were unavailing: this impression always continued, and he never did for M. de Cominges what his means, and the old ties of boyhood, might well have warranted.

On arriving at Rastadt, Bonaparte found a letter from the Directory, calling him to Paris. He eagerly obeyed this invitation, which drew him from a place where he could act only an insignificant part, and which he had determined to leave

soon, never again to return. Some time after his arrival in Paris, he required, on the ground that his presence was necessary for the execution of different orders, and the general despatch of business, that authority should be given to a part of his household, which he had left at Rastadt, to return.

How could it ever be said that the Directory "kept General Bonaparte away from the great interests which were under discussion at Rastadt?" Quite the contrary! The Directors would have been delighted to see him return there, as they would then have been relieved from his presence in Paris; but nothing was so disagreeable to Bonaparte, as long, and seemingly interminable, negotiations. Such tedious work did not suit his character, and he had been sufficiently disgusted with similar proceedings at Campo-Formio.

On our arrival at Rastadt, I soon found that General Bonaparte was determined to stay there only a short time. I therefore expressed to him my decided desire to continue in Germany. I was then ignorant that my erasure from the emigrant list had been ordered on the 11th of November, as the decree did not reach the commissary of the Executive Directory, at Auxerre, until the 17th of November, the day of our departure from Milan.

The silly pretext of difficulties by which my erasure, notwithstanding the reiterated solicitations of the victorious general, was so long delayed, made me apprehensive of a renewal, under a weak and jealous pentarchy, of the horrible scenes of 1796. Bonaparte said to me, in a tone of indignation, "Come, pass the Rhine: they will not dare to seize you while near me. I answer for your safety." On reaching Paris, I found that my erasure had taken place. It was at this period only that General Bonaparte's applications in my favour were tardily crowned with success. Sotin, the minister of general police, notified the fact to Bonaparte; but his letter gave a reason for my erasure, very different from that stated in the decree. The minister said that the government did not wish to leave among the names of traitors to their country, the name of a citizen who approached the person of the conqueror of Italy; while the decree stated, as the motive for removing my name from the list, that I never had emigrated.

At St. Helena, it seems, Bonaparte said, that he did not return from Italy with more than three hundred thousand francs; but I assert that he had at that time in his possession something more than three millions. How could he, with three hundred thousand francs, have been able to provide for the extensive repairs, the embellishment, and the furnishing of his house, in Rue Chantereine? How could he have supported the establishment he did, with only fifteen thousand francs of income, and the emoluments of his rank? The excursion which he made along the coast, of which I have yet to speak, of

THE PAINTING BY FRANÇOIS GÉRARD, IN THE MUSEUM OF VERSAILLES. ENGRAVED BY FRA

EUGÉNIE-HORTENSE, QUEEN OF HOLLAND, AND HER SON.

HENRY WOLF. FROM THE PAINTING BY FRANÇOIS GERARD, IN THE MUSEUM O

GÉRARD'S PORTRAIT OF JOSEPHINE AS EMPRESS.

itself cost near twelve thousand francs in gold, which he transferred to me to defray the expense of the journey, and I am not sure that this sum was ever repaid him. Besides, what did it signify, for any object he might have in disguising his fortune, whether he brought three millions or three hundred thousand francs with him from Italy? No one will accuse him of squandering. He was a rigid economist. He was always irritated at the discovery of fraud, and pursued those guilty of it with all the vigour of his character. He wished to be independent, which he well knew that no one could be without fortune. He has often said to me, "I am no Capuchin, not I." But after having been allowed only three hundred thousand francs on his arrival from the rich Italy, where fortune never abandoned him, it has been printed that he had twenty millions (some have even doubled the amount) on his return from Egypt, which is a very poor country, where money is scarce, and where reverses followed close upon his victories. All these reports are false. What he brought from Italy has just been stated, and it will be seen when we come to Egypt, what treasure he carried away from the country of the Pharaohs.

Bonaparte's brothers, desirous of obtaining complete dominion over his mind, strenuously endeavoured to lessen the influence which Josephine possessed from the love of her husband. They tried to excite his jealousy, and took advantage of her stay at Milan after our departure, which had been authorized by Bonaparte himself. My intimacy with both the husband and the wife, fortunately afforded me an opportunity of averting or lessening a good deal of mischief. If Josephine still lived, she would allow me this merit. I never took part against her but once, and that unwillingly. It was on the subject of the marriage of her daughter Hortense. Josephine had never as yet spoken to me on the subject. Bonaparte wished to give his daughter-in-law to Duroc, and his brothers were eager to promote the marriage, because they wished to separate Josephine from Hortense, for whom Bonaparte felt the tenderest affection. Josephine, on the other hand, wished Hortense to marry Louis Bonaparte. Her motives, as may easily be divined, were to gain support in a family where she experienced nothing but enmity, and she carried her point.*

* "Previous to her marriage with Louis, Hortense cherished an attachment for Duroc, who was at that time a handsome man about thirty, and a great favourite of Bonaparte. However, the indifference with which Duroc regarded the marriage of Louis Bonaparte sufficiently proves that the regard with which he had inspired Hortense was not very ardently returned. It is certain that Duroc might have become the husband of Mademoiselle de Beauharnais, had he been willing to accede to the conditions on which the first consul offered him his stepdaughter's hand. But Duroc looked forward to something better, and his ordinary prudence forsook him at a moment when he might easily have beheld a perspective calculated to gratify even a more towering ambition than his. He declined the proposed marriage; and the union of Hortense and

On his arrival from Rastadt, the most magnificent preparations were made at the Luxembourg for the reception of Bonaparte. The grand court of the palace was elegantly ornamented; and at its further end, close to the palace, a large amphitheatre was erected, for the accommodation of official persons. Curiosity, as on all like occasions, attracted multitudes, and the court was filled. Opposite to the principal vestibule stood the altar of the country, surrounded by the statues of Liberty, Equality, and Peace. When Bonaparte entered, every head was uncovered. The windows were full of young and beautiful females. But, notwithstanding this great preparation, an icy coldness characterized the ceremony. Every one seemed to be present only for the purpose of beholding a sight, and curiosity was the prevailing expression, rather than joy or gratitude. It is but right to say, however, that an unfortunate event contributed to the general indifference. The right wing of the palace was not occupied, but great preparations had been making there; and an officer had been directed to prevent any one from ascending. One of the clerks of the Directory, however, contrived to get upon the scaffolding, but had scarcely placed his foot on the first plank, when it tilted up, and the imprudent man fell the whole height into the court. This accident created a general stupor. Ladies fainted, and the windows were nearly deserted.

However, the Directors displayed all the republican splendour of which they were so prodigal on similar occasions. Speeches were far from being scarce. Talleyrand, who was then minister for foreign affairs, on introducing Bonaparte to the Directory, made a long oration, in the course of which he hinted that the personal greatness of the general ought not to excite uneasiness, even in a rising republic, and introduced the following passage:

When I reflect on all that he has done, to render that greatness pardonable in him, on the antique taste for simplicity which distinguishes him, on his love for the abstract sciences, on his favourite authors, on that sublime Ossian, which seems to detach him from the earth; when I think on what is generally known, his profound contempt for splendour, luxury, and state, the despicable objects of ambition to common souls; when I consider all this, far from apprehending any thing from his ambition, I believe that we shall one day be obliged to solicit him to tear himself from the pleasures of studious

Louis, which Madame Bonaparte, to conciliate the favour of her brothers-in-law, had endeavoured to bring about, was immediately determined on."—*Memoires de Constant.*

In allusion to the alleged unfriendly feeling of Napoleon's brothers towards Josephine, the following observation occurs in Joseph Bonaparte's notes on Bourrienne:

"None of Napoleon's brothers," he says, "were near him at the time of his departure for Italy, except Louis, who cannot be suspected of having intrigued against Josephine, whose daughter he married. These calumnies are without foundation."—*Editor.*



THE PRINT IN THE CARNAVALET MUSEUM.

PAUL-JEAN-FRANÇOIS-NICOLAS, COMTE DE BARRAS.

retirement. All France will be free; but perhaps he never will; such is his destiny.

Talleyrand was listened to with impatience; so anxious was every one to hear Bonaparte. The conqueror of Italy then rose, and pronounced, with a modest air, but in a firm voice, the following discourse:

Citizen Directors—The French people, to gain their freedom, had to contend with kings. To obtain a constitution founded on reason, the prejudices of eighteen centuries were to be overcome. The constitution of the year III. and you have triumphed over all those obstacles. Religion, feudalism, and royalism, have successively governed Europe for twenty ages; but from the peace which you have just concluded, dates the era of representative governments. You had effected the organization of the Great Nation, the territory of which is only circumscribed because nature herself has fixed its limits. You have done more. The two most lovely portions of Europe, heretofore so celebrated for the sciences, the arts, and the great men cradled in them, behold with glad expectation the genius of liberty rising from the tombs of their ancestors. Such are the pedestals on which destiny is about to place two powerful nations.

I have the honour to lay before you the treaty signed at Campo-Formio, and ratified by his majesty the emperor. When the happiness of the French people shall be established on the best organic laws, the whole of Europe will then become free.

Barras, at that time President of the Directory, replied to the the general with so much prolixity as to weary every one. The only remarkable observations in his long discourse were contained in the first sentences.

Citizen-general (said he) nature, sparing of her prodigies, gives great men to the world only at long intervals; but she must have been anxious to mark the Aurora of liberty by one of those phenomena; and the sublime revolution of the French people, new in the history of nations, was, therefore, destined to present a new genius in the history of celebrated men. You, citizen-general, as first of all, stand forth without a parallel—and with the same arm with which you prostrated the enemies of the republic, you have removed the rivals which antiquity might have opposed to you.

As soon as Barras finished speaking, he threw himself into the arms of the general, who was not much pleased with such affected displays, and gave him what was then called the fraternal embrace. The other members of the Directory, following the example of the president, surrounded Bonaparte and pressed him in their arms; each acted, to the best of his ability, his part in the sentimental comedy.

Chénier composed for this occasion a hymn, which Mehul set to music. A few days after, an opera was produced, bearing the title of the "Fall of Carthage," which was meant as an

allusion to the anticipated exploits of the conqueror of Italy, recently appointed to the command of the army of England. The poets were all employed in praising him; and Lebrun, with but little of the Pindaric fire in his soul, composed the following distich, which certainly is not worth much:

> Héros, cher à la paix, aux arts, à la victoire—
> Il conquit en deux ans mille siècles de gloire.

The two councils were not disposed to be behind the Directory in the manifestation of joy. A few days after, they gave a banquet to the general in the gallery of the Louvre, which had recently been enriched by the masterpieces of painting conquered in Italy.

At this time Bonaparte displayed great modesty in all his transactions in Paris. The administrators of the department of the Seine having sent a deputation to him to inquire what hour and day he would allow them to wait on him, he carried himself his answer to the department, accompanied by General Berthier. It was also remarked, that the judge of the peace, of the arrondissement where the general lived, having called on him on the 6th of December, the evening of his arrival, he returned the visit next morning. These attentions, puerile as they may appear, were not without their effect on the minds of the Parisians.

In consequence of General Bonaparte's victories, the peace he had effected, and the brilliant reception of which he had been the object, the business of Vendémiaire was in some measure forgotten. Every one was eager to get a sight of the young hero, whose career had commenced with so much éclat. He lived very retiredly, yet went often to the theatre. He desired me, one day, to go and request the representation of two of the best pieces of the time, in which Elléviou, Mesdames St. Aubin, Phillis, and other distinguished performers played. His message was, that he only wished these two pieces on the same night, if that were possible. The manager told me that nothing that the conqueror of Italy wished for was *impossible*, for he had long ago erased that word from the dictionary. Bonaparte laughed heartily at the manager's answer. When we went to the theatre, he seated himself, as usual, in the back of the box, behind Madame Bonaparte, making me sit by her side. The pit and boxes, however, soon found out that he was in the house, and loudly called for him. Several times an earnest desire to see him was manifested, but all in vain, for he never showed himself.

Some days after, being at the Théâtre des Arts, at the second representation of "Horatius Cocles," although he was sitting at the back of a box in the second tier, the audience discovered that he was in the house. Immediately acclamations arose from all quarters; but he kept himself concealed as much as pos-

sible, and said to a person in the next box, "Had I known that the boxes were so exposed, I should not have come."

During Bonaparte's stay at Paris, a woman sent a messenger to warn him that his life would be attempted, and that poison was to be employed for that purpose. Bonaparte had the bearer of this information arrested, who went, accompanied by the judge of the peace, to the woman's house, where she was found extended on the floor, and bathed in her blood. The men, whose plot she had overheard, having discovered that she had revealed their secret, murdered her. The poor woman was dreadfully mangled: her throat was cut; and, not satisfied with that, the assassins had also hacked her body with sharp instruments.

On the night of the 10th of Nivose, the Rue Chantéreine, in which Bonaparte had a small house (No. 6), received, in pursuance of a decree of the department, the name of Rue de la Victoir. The cries of "Vive Bonaparte!" and the incense prodigally offered up to him, did not, however, seduce him from his retired habits. Lately the conqueror and ruler of Italy, and now under men for whom he had no respect, and who dreaded him as a formidable rival, he said to me, one day, "The people of Paris do not remember any thing. Were I to remain here long, doing nothing, I should be lost. In this great Babylon one reputation displaces another. Let me be seen but three times at the theatre, and I shall no longer excite attention; so I shall go there but seldom." When he went, he occupied a box shaded with curtains. The manager of the opera wished to get up a representation in honour of him; but he declined the offer. When I observed that it must be agreeable to him to see his fellow-citizens so eagerly running after him, he replied, "Bah! the people would crowd as fast to see me if I were going to the scaffold."

On the 28th December, Bonaparte was named a member of the Institute, in the class of the Sciences and Arts. He showed a deep sense of this honour, and wrote the following letter to Camus, the president of the class:

Citizen President,

The suffrage of the distinguished men who compose the Institute confers a high honour on me. I feel well assured that, before I can be their equal, I must long be their scholar. If there were any way more expressive than another of making known my esteem for you, I should be glad to employ it. True conquests—the only ones which leave no regret behind them—are those which are made over ignorance. The most honourable, as well as the most useful, occupation for nations is the contributing to the extension of human knowledge. The true power of the French republic might henceforth be made to consist in not allowing a single new idea to exist without making it part of its property.

Bonaparte.

The general now renewed, though unsuccessfully, the attempt he had made before the 18th Fructidor, to obtain a dispensation of the age necessary for becoming a Director. Perceiving that the time was not yet favourable for such a purpose, he said to me, on the 29th of January, 1798, " Bourrienne, I do not wish to remain here; there is nothing to do. They are unwilling to listen to any thing. I see that if I linger here, I shall soon lose myself. Every thing wears out here; my glory has already disappeared. This little Europe does not supply enough of it for me. I must seek it in the east; all great celebrity comes from that quarter. However, I wish first to make a tour along the coast, to ascertain by my own observation what may be attempted. I will take you, Lannes, and Sulkowsky, with me. If the success of a descent on England appear doubtful, as I suspect it will, the army of England shall become the army of the east, and I go to Egypt."

This and other conversations give a just idea of his character. He always considered war and conquest as the most noble and inexhaustible source of that glory, which was the constant object of his desire. He revolted at the idea of languishing in idleness at Paris, while fresh laurels were growing for him in distant climes. His imagination inscribed, in anticipation, his name on those gigantic monuments, which alone, perhaps, of all the creations of man, have the character of eternity. Already proclaimed the most illustrious of living generals, he sought to efface the rival names of antiquity by his own. If Cæsar fought fifty battles, he longed to fight a hundred: if Alexander left Macedon to penetrate to the Temple of Ammon, he wished to leave Paris to travel to the Cataracts of the Nile. While he was thus to run a race with fame, events would, in his opinion, so proceed in France, as to render his return necessary and opportune. His place would be ready for him, and he should not come to claim it as a forgotten or unknown man.

FROM THE PAINTING BY J. L. GÉRÔME.

BONAPARTE BEFORE THE SPHINX. ("L'ŒDIPE.")



H. BELLANGÉ. ENGRAVED BY J. W. EVANS.

BONAPARTE AT THE BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS.



[A French version of the Arabic appears here, of which the English, below, is a translation.]

FACSIMILE OF AN ARABIC PETITION PRESENTED TO BONAPARTE WHILE IN EGYPT, WITH THE INDORSEMENT, OVER HIS OWN SIGNATURE, REFERRING THE PAPER TO THE FRENCH AGENT OF THE PROVINCE OF GIZEH. FROM THE COLLECTION OF W. C. CRANE.

TRANSLATION:

To the General-in-chief Bonaparte, whom God preserve:

THE undersigned, Ali Ammao, Arab of the tribe Azzalé, living in the village of Abousio, province of Gizeh, very humbly has the honor to inform you that being at home retired for the night and abed with the door closed, there came into my house Hassein el Habiry, accompanied by many cavalry and some infantry. They broke down the door, and fired upon me with guns and other firearms. As they were stronger than I, they carried off various cattle, three buffaloes, a horse, cooking-utensils, jewelry, linen, and dresses belonging to the women. They having then retired with their capture, we ran after them with Salem Habiry, one of the foremost members of the Divan of Gizeh. From information given us we learned that all my property had been taken to the house of Hassein el Habiry. At once we went to Cairo to lay an information before Moustafa Aga, . . . patron of our village. He advised us to write a letter to Hassein Habiry, by which I ordered him to bring back and render account of the stolen effects. He will not surrender them, and has made a harsh reply. In consequence we pray your Highness to very kindly write a letter to the commander at Gizeh, calling together the assembly of the Divan in order that he shall make restitution of my property. As we are your faithful subjects we flatter ourselves that you are willing to render us justice. Moreover, we are very poor, and you will succor a numerous family. Hassein Habiry has carried on his depredations, by night and day, in many villages established for the safety of the peasants. I finish by desiring for you, with profound respect, a long life and all the prosperity a subject can be allowed to wish his superior.

[Signed] ALI AMMAO,
Arab of the tribe Azzalé, living in the village of Abousio.

[Indorsement.] Sent back to the French agent of the province of Gizeh to report upon.
The General-in-chief,
BONAPARTE.

JUNE 21, 1799.

CHAPTER XIII.

1798.

Bonaparte's departure from Paris—His return—The Egyptian expedition projected—M. de Talleyrand—General Desaix—Expedition against Malta—Money taken at Berne—Bonaparte's ideas respecting the East—Monge—Non-influence of the Directory—Marriages of Marmont and La Vallette—Bonaparte's plan of colonizing Egypt—His camp library—Orthographical blunders—Stock of wines—Bonaparte's arrival at Toulon—Madame Bonaparte's fall from a balcony—Execution of an old man—Simon.

Bonaparte left Paris for the north, on the 10th of February, 1798—but he received no order, though I have seen it every where so stated, to go there—"for the purpose of preparing the operations connected with the intended invasion of England." He occupied himself with no such business, for which a few days certainly would not have been sufficient. His journey to the coast was nothing but a rapid excursion, and its sole object was to enable him to form an opinion on the main point of the question. Neither did he remain absent several weeks, for the journey occupied only one. There were four of us in his carriage—himself, Lannes, Sulkowsky, and I. Moustache was our courier. Bonaparte was not a little surprised on reading, in the Moniteur of the 10th February, an article giving greater importance to his little excursion than it deserved. The following is the statement of the Moniteur:

> General Bonaparte has departed for Dunkirk, with some naval and engineer officers. They have gone to visit the coasts, and prepare the preliminary operations for the descent. It may be stated, that he will not return to Rastadt, and that the close of the session of the congress is approaching.

Now for the facts.—Bonaparte visited Estaples, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, Galais, Dunkirk, Furnes, Newport, Ostend, and the Isle of Walcheren. He collected, in the different ports, all the necessary information, with that intelligence and tact for which he was so eminently distinguished. He questioned the sailors, smugglers, and fishermen, and listened attentively to the answers he received.*

* Where did the Scottish historian learn that active preparations were made for the invasion? The business never went beyond official correspondence, in-

We returned to Paris by Antwerp, Brussels, Lille, and Saint Quentin. The object of our journey was accomplished when we reached the first of those towns. "Well, general," said I, "what think you of our journey? Are you satisfied? For my part, I confess I entertain no great hopes from any thing I have seen and heard." Bonaparte immediately answered, "It is too great a chance. I will not hazard it. I would not thus sport with the fate of dear France." On hearing this, I already fancied myself in Cairo.

On his return to Paris, Bonaparte lost no time in setting on foot the military and scientific preparations for the projected expedition to the banks of the Nile, respecting which such incorrect statements have appeared. It had long occupied his thoughts, as the following facts will prove:

In the month of August, 1797, he wrote—"that the time was not far distant when we should see that, to destroy the power of England effectually, it would be necessary to attack Egypt." In the same month he wrote to Talleyrand, who had just succeeded Charles de Lacroix, as minister for foreign affairs, "that it would be necessary to attack Egypt, which did not belong to the Grand Seigneur." Talleyrand replied, "that his ideas respecting Egypt were certainly grand, and that their utility could not fail to be fully appreciated." He concluded by saying, he would write to him *at length* on the subject.

History will speak as favourably of M. de Talleyrand, as his contemporaries have spoken ill of him. When a statesman, throughout a great, long, and difficult career, makes and preserves a number of faithful friends, and provokes but few enemies, it may justly be inferred that his character is honourable, and his talent profound, and that his political conduct has been wise and moderate. It is impossible to know M. de Talleyrand without admiring him. All who have that advantage, no doubt, judge him as I do.

In the month of November, of the same year, Bonaparte sent Poussielgue, under the pretence of inspecting the ports of the Levant, to give the finishing stroke to the meditated expedition against Malta.

General Desaix, whom Bonaparte had made the confident of all his plans, at their interview in Italy, after the preliminaries of Leoben, wrote to him from Affenbourg, on his return to Germany, that he regarded the fleet of Corfu with great interest. "If ever," said he, "it should be engaged in the grand

quiries, and conversations. There never were, although the contrary has often been stated, any serious arrangements made, either by Bonaparte or the Directory, for the invasion of England. Sir Walter Scott has perhaps exaggerated the danger, to justify the alarm which at that time really prevailed in England.

enterprises of which I have heard you speak, do not, I beseech you, forget me." Bonaparte was far from forgetting him.

The Directory, at first, disapproved of the expedition against Malta, which Bonaparte had proposed long before the treaty of Campo-Formio was signed. The expedition was decided to be impossible; for Malta had observed strict neutrality, and had, on several occasions, even saved our ships and seamen. Thus we had no pretext for going to war with her. It was said, too, that the legislative body would certainly not look with a favourable eye on such a measure. This opinion, which, however, did not last long, vexed Bonaparte. It was one of the disappointments which made him give a rough welcome to Bottot, Barras's agent, at the commencement of October, 1797.

In the course of an animated conversation, he said to Bottot, shrugging his shoulders, "Mon Dieu! Malta is to be sold!" Some time after, he himself was told, that "great importance was attached to the acquisition of Malta, and that he must not suffer it to escape." At the latter end of September, 1797, Talleyrand, then minister for foreign affairs, wrote to him that the Directory authorized him to give the necessary orders to Admiral Brueys for taking Malta. He sent Bonaparte some letters for the island, because Bonaparte had said it was necessary to prepare the public mind for the event.

Bonaparte exerted himself night and day in the execution of his projects. I never saw him so active. He made himself acquainted with the abilities of the respective generals, and the force of all the army corps. Orders and instructions succeeded each other with extraordinary rapidity. If he wanted an order of the Directory, he ran to the Luxembourg to get it signed by one of the directors. Merlin de Douai was generally the person who did him this service, for he was the most constant at his post. Lagarde, the secretary-general, did not countersign any document relative to this expedition, Bonaparte not wishing him to be informed of the business. He transmitted to Toulon the money taken at Berne, which the Directory had placed at his disposal. It amounted to something above three millions of francs. In those times of disorder and negligence, the finances were very badly managed. The revenues were anticipated and squandered away, so that the treasury never possessed so large a sum as that just mentioned.

It was determined that Bonaparte should undertake an expedition of an unusual character to the east. I must confess, that two things cheered me in this very painful interval; my friendship and admiration for the talents of the conqueror of Italy, and the pleasing hope of traversing those ancient regions, the historical and religious accounts of which had engaged the attention of my youth.

It was at Passeriano that, seeing the approaching termination of his labours in Europe, he first began to turn serious attention to the east. He delighted to converse about the celebrated

events of that part of the world, and the many famous empires it once possessed. He used to say, "Europe is a mole-hill. There have never been great empires and revolutions except in the east." He considered that part of the world as the cradle of all religions, of all metaphysical extravagances. This subject was no less interesting than inexhaustible—and he daily introduced it when conversing with the generals with whom he was intimate—with Monge, and with me.

Monge entirely concurred in the general-in-chief's opinions on this point; and his scientific ardour was increased by Bonaparte's enthusiasm. In short, all were unanimously of one opinion. The Directory had no share in renewing the project of this memorable expedition, the result of which did not correspond with the grand views in which it had been conceived. Neither had the Directory any positive control over Bonaparte's departure or return. It was merely the passive instrument of the general's wishes, which it converted into decrees, as the law required. He was no more ordered to undertake the conquest of Egypt than he was instructed as to the plan of its execution. Bonaparte organized the army of the east, raised money, and collected ships; and it was he who conceived the happy idea of joining to the expedition mén distinguished in science and art, and whose labours have made known, in its present and past state, a country, the very name of which is never pronounced without exciting grand recollections.

Bonaparte's orders flew like lightning from Toulon to Civitta Vecchia. With admirable precision, he appointed some forces to assemble before Malta, and others before Alexandria. He dictated all these orders to me in his cabinet.

In the position in which France stood with respect to Europe, after the treaty of Campo-Formio, the Directory, far from pressing or even facilitating this expedition, ought to have opposed it. A victory on the Adige would have been far better for France than one on the Nile. From all I saw, I am of opinion, that the wish to get rid of an ambitious young man, whose popularity excited envy, triumphed over the evident danger of removing, for an indefinite period, an excellent army, and the more probable loss of the French fleet. As to Bonaparte, he was well assured that nothing remained for him but to choose between that hazardous enterprise and his certain ruin. Egypt was, he thought, the right place to maintain his reputation, and to add fresh glory to his name.

On the 12th of April, 1798, he was appointed general-in-chief of the army of the east.

It was about this time that Marmont wes married to Mademoiselle Perregaux; and Bonaparte's aide-de-camp, La Vallette, to Mademoiselle Beauharnais.*

* Sir Walter Scott informs us, that Josephine, when she became empress, brought about the marriage between her neice and La Vallette. This is another fictitious incident of his historical romance.

DRAWN BY H. A. OGDEN.

BONAPARTE, GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY IN EGYPT.

Shortly before our departure, I asked Bonaparte how long he intended to remain in Egypt? He replied, "A few months, or six years: all depends on circumstances. I will colonise the country. I will bring them artists and artisans of every description; women, actors, &c. We are but nine-and-twenty now, and we shall then be five-and-thirty. That is not an old age. Those six years will enable me, if all goes well, to get to India. Give out that you are going to Brest. Say so even to your family." I obeyed, to prove my discretion and real attachment to him.

Bonaparte wished to form a camp library of duodecimo volumes, and he gave me a list of the books which I was to purchase. This list is in his own writing, and is as follows:

CAMP LIBRARY.

1st. Arts and Science. 2d. Geography and Travels. 3d. History. 4th. Poetry. 5th. Romance. 6th. Politics and Morals.

Arts and Science.—Fontenelle's Worlds, 1 vol. Letters to a German Princess, 2 vols. Courses of the Normal School, 6 vols. The Artillery Assistant, 1 vol. Treatise on Fortifications, 3 vols. Treatise on Fire Works, 1 vol.

Geography and Travels.—Barclay's Geography, 12 vols. Cook's Voyages, 3 vols. La Harpe's Travels, 24 vols.

History.—Plutarch, 12 vols. Turenne, 2 vols. Condé, 4 vols. Villars, 4 vols. Luxembourg, 2 vols. Duguesclin, 2 vols. Saxe, 3 vols. Memoirs of the Marshals of France, 20 vols. President Hainault, 4 vols. Chronology, 2 vols. Marlborough, 4 vols. Prince Eugene, 6 vols. Philosophical History of India, 12 vols. Germany, 2 vols. Charles XII., 1 vol. Essay on the Manners of Nations, 6 vols. Peter the Great, 1 vol. Polybius, 6 vols. Justin, 2 vols. Arrian, 3 vols. Tacitus, 2 vols. Titus Livy. Thucydides, 2 vols. Vertot, 4 vols. Donina, 8 vols. Frederick II., 8 vols.

Poetry.—Ossian, 1 vol. Tasso, 6 vols. Ariosto, 6 vols. Homer, 6 vols. Virgil, 4 vols. The Henriade, 1 vol. Telemachus, 2 vols. Les Jardins, 1 vol. The Chefs-d'Œuvre of the French Theatre, 20 vols. Select Poetry, 20 vols. La Fontaine's Poems.

Romance.—Voltaire, 4 vols. Héloise, 4 vols. Werter, 1 vol. Marmontel, 4 vols. English Novels, 40 vols. Le sage, 10 vols. Prévost, 10 vols.

Politics.—The Bible. The New Testament. The Koran.—The Vedan. Mythology. Montesquieu: the Esprit des Lois.

It will be observed, that he classed the books of the religious creeds of nations under the head of politics.

The autograph copy of the above list contains some of those orthographical blunders which Bonaparte so frequently committed. Whether these blunders are attributable to the limited course of instruction he received at Brienne, to his hasty writing, the rapid flow of his ideas, or the little importance he attached to that indispensable condition of polite education, I know not. Knowing so well, as he did, the authors and

generals whose names appear in the above list, it is curious that he should have written *Duecling* for Duguesclin, and *Ocean* for Ossian. The latter mistake would have puzzled me not a little, had I not known his predilection for the Caledonian bard.

Before his departure, Bonaparte laid in a considerable stock of Burgundy. It was supplied by a man named James, of Dijon. I may observe, that on this occasion we had an opportunity of ascertaining that good Burgundy, well racked off, and in casks hermetically sealed, does not lose its quality on a sea voyage. Several cases of this Burgundy twice crossed the desert of the isthmus of Suez, on camels' backs. We brought some of it back with us to Frejus, and it was as good as when we departed. James went with us to Egypt.

During the remainder of our stay in Paris, nothing occurred worthy of mention, with the exception of a conversation between Bonaparte and me some days before our departure for Toulon. He went with me to the Luxembourg, to get signatures to the official papers connected with his expedition. He was very silent. As we passed through the Rue de Sainte Anne, I asked him, with no other object than merely to break a long pause, whether he was still determined to quit France? He replied, "Yes: I have tried every thing. They do not want me (probably alluding to the office of Director). I ought to overthrow them, and make myself king; but it will not do yet. The nobles will never consent to it: I have tried my ground. The time is not yet come: I should be alone. But I will dazzle them again." I replied, "Well, we will go to Egypt;" and changed the conversation.

The squabble with Bernadotte at Vienna delayed our departure for a fortnight, and might have had the most disastrous influence on the fate of the squadron, as Nelson would most assuredly have waited between Malta and Sicily, if he had arrived there before us.*

It is untrue that he ever entertained the idea of abandoning the expedition, in consequence of Bernadotte's affair. The following letter to Brueys, dated the 28th of April, 1798, proves the contrary:

Some disturbances which have arisen at Vienna, render my presence in Paris necessary for a few days. This will not change any of the arrangements for the expedition. I have sent orders by this courier for the troops at Marseilles to embark and proceed to Toulon. On the evening of the 30th, I will send you a courier with orders for you to embark, and proceed with the squadron and convoy to Genoa, where I will join you.

* Sir Walter Scott, without any authority, states, that, at the moment of his departure, Bonaparte seemed disposed to abandon the command of an expedition so doubtful and hazardous, and that for this purpose he endeavoured to take advantage of what had occurred at Vienna. This must be ranked in the class of inventions, together with Barras's mysterious visit to communicate the change of destination, and also the ostracism and honourable exile which the Directory wished to impose on Bonaparte.

The delay which this fresh event has occasioned will, I imagine, have enabled you to complete every preparation.

We left Paris on the 3d of May, 1798. Ten days before General Bonaparte's departure for Egypt, a prisoner escaped from the Temple, who was destined to contribute most materially to his reverses. An escape, so unimportant in itself, afterwards caused the failure of the most gigantic projects, and daring conceptions. This escape was pregnant with future events; a false order of the minister of police prevented the revolution of the east.

We were at Toulon on the 8th. Bonaparte knew by the movements of the English that not a moment was to be lost; but adverse winds detained us ten days, which he occupied in attending to the most minute details connected with the fleet.

Bonaparte, whose attention was constantly occupied with his army, made a speech to the soldiers, which I wrote to his dictation, and which appeared in the public papers at the time. This address was followed by cries of "The immortal republic for ever!" and the singing of national hymns.

Those who knew Madame Bonaparte are aware that few women were more amiable and fascinating. Bonaparte was passionately fond of her, and to enjoy the pleasure of her society as long as possible, he brought her with him to Toulon. Nothing could be more affecting than their parting. On leaving Toulon, Josephine went to the waters of Plombières. I recollect that during her stay at Plombières she incurred great danger from a serious accident. Whilst she was one day sitting at the balcony of the hotel, with her suite, the balcony suddenly gave way, and all the persons in it fell into the street. Madame Bonaparte was much hurt, but no serious consequences ensued.*

Bonaparte had scarcely arrived at Toulon, when he heard that the law for the death of emigrants was enforced with frightful rigour; and that but recently an old man, upwards of eighty,

* "Madame Bonaparte had been but a short time at Plombières, when one morning, as she was sitting in her drawing-room engaged at needlework and conversing with some ladies, Madame de Cambis, who was in the balcony, called her to look at a beautiful little dog that was passing through the street. All the ladies who were in the room immediately rose, and, following Madame Bonaparte, rushed to the balcony, which instantly gave way, and fell with a tremendous crash. It fortunately happened that nobody was killed; but Madame de Cambis had her leg broken, and Madame Bonaparte was dreadfully hurt, though she escaped without broken bones. M. Charvet, who was in an adjoining room, being alarmed by the noise, ran out, and, on learning what had happened, he ordered a sheep to be immediately killed; and the skin of the animal being taken off, Madame Bonaparte was wrapped in it. She suffered from the effects of this accident for a considerable time. Her hands and arms were so severely bruised, that she was long unable to use them."—*Mémoires de Constant.* (*Editor.*)

had been shot. Indignant at this barbarity, he dictated to me, in a tone of anger, the following letter:

Head-quarters, Toulon, 27th Floréal, year IV.
(May 16, 1798.)

BONAPARTE, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE, TO THE MILITARY COMMISSIONERS OF THE NINTH DIVISION, ESTABLISHED BY THE LAW OF THE 19TH FRUCTIDOR.

I have learned, citizens, with deep regret, that an old man, between seventy and eighty years of age, and some unfortunate women, in a state of pregnancy, or surrounded with children of tender age, have been shot on the charge of emigration.

Have the soldiers of liberty become executioners? Can the mercy which they have exercised even in the fury of battle, be extinct in their hearts?

The law of the 19th Fructidor was a measure of public safety. Its object was to reach conspirators, not women and aged men.

I, therefore, exhort you, citizens, whenever the law brings to your your tribunals women or old men, to declare that in the field of battle you have respected the women and old men of your enemies.

The officer who signs a sentence against a person incapable of bearing arms is a coward.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

This letter saved the life of an unfortunate man, who came under the description of persons to whom Bonaparte referred. The tone of this note shows what an idea he already entertained of his power. He took upon him, doubtless from the noblest motives, to interpret and interdict the execution of a law, atrocious, it is true, but which even in those times of weakness, disorder, and anarchy, was still a law. In this instance, at least, the power of his name was nobly employed. This letter gave great satisfaction to the army destined for the expedition.

A man named Simon, who had followed his master in emigration, and dreaded the application of the law, heard that I wanted a servant. He came to me and acknowledged his situation. He suited me, and I hired him. He then told me he feared he should be arrested whilst going to the port to embark. Bonaparte, to whom I mentioned the circumstance, and who had just given a striking proof of his aversion to these acts of barbarity, said to me in a tone of kindness, "Give him my portfolio to carry, and let him remain with you." The words "Bonaparte, General-in-chief of the Army of the East," were inscribed in large gold letters on the green morocco. Whether it was the portfolio or his connexion with us that prevented Simon from being arrested, I know not; but he passed on without interruption. I reprimanded him for having smiled derisively at the ill humour of the persons appointed to arrest him. He served me faithfully, and was even sometimes useful to Bonaparte.

CHAPTER XIV.

1798.

Departure of the squadron—Arrival at Malta—Dolomieu—General Baraguay d'Hilliers—Attack on the western part of the island—Caffarelli's remark—Deliverance of the Turkish prisoners—Nelson's pursuit of the French fleet—A maxim of Bonaparte—Conversations on board—How Bonaparte passed his time—Propositions discussed—Morning music—Proclamation—Admiral Brueys—The English fleet avoided—Dangerous landing—Bonaparte and his fortune—Alexandria taken—Kleber wounded—Bonaparte's entrance into Alexandria.

The squadron sailed on the 19th of May. The Orient, which, owing to her heavy lading, drew too much water, touched the ground; but she was got off without much difficulty.

We arrived off Malta on the 10th of June. We had lost two days in waiting for some convoys which joined us at Malta.

The intrigues throughout Europe had not succeeded in causing the ports of that island to be opened to us immediately on our arrival. Bonaparte expressed much displeasure against the persons sent from Europe to arrange measures for that purpose. One of them, however, M. Dolomieu, had cause to repent his mission, which occasioned him to be badly treated by the Sicilians. M. Poussielgue had done all he could in the way of seduction, but he had not completely succeeded. There was some misunderstanding, and, in consequence, some shots were interchanged. Bonaparte was very much pleased with General Baraguay d'Hilliers's services in Italy. He could not but praise his military and political conduct at Venice, when, scarcely a year before, he had taken possession of that city by his orders. General Baraguay d'Hilliers joined us with his division, which had embarked in the convoy that sailed from Genoa. The general-in-chief ordered him to land and attack the western part of the island. He executed this order with equal prudence and ability, and highly to the satisfaction of the general-in-chief. As every person in the secret knew that all this was a mere form, these hostile demonstrations produced no unpleasant consequences. We wished to save the honour of the knights—that was all; for no one who has seen Malta can imagine that an island surrounded with such formidable and perfect fortifications, would have surrendered in two days to a fleet which was pursued by an enemy. The impregnable fortress of Malta is so secure against

a *coup de main*, that General Caffarelli, after examining its fortifications, said to the general-in-chief, in my presence, "Upon my word, general, it is lucky there is some one in the town to open the gates for us."

By comparing the observation of General Caffarelli with what has been previously stated respecting the project of the expedition to Egypt and Malta, an idea may be formed of the value of Bonaparte's assertion at St. Helena:—"The capture of Malta was not owing to private intrigues, but to the sagacity of the commander-in-chief. I took Malta when I was in Mantua!" It is not the less true, however, that I wrote, by his dictation, a mass of instructions for private intrigues. Napoleon also said to another noble companion of his exile at St. Helena, "Malta certainly possessed vast physical means of resistance; but no moral means. The knights did nothing dishonourable: nobody is obliged to do impossibilities." No; but they were sold; the capture of Malta was assured before we left Toulon.

The general-in-chief proceeded to that part of the port where the Turks made prisoners by the knights were kept. The disgusting galleys were emptied of their occupants. The same principles which, a few days after, formed the basis of Bonaparte's proclamation to the Egyptians, guided him in this act of reason and humanity.

He walked several times in the gardens of the grand-master. They were in beautiful order, and filled with magnificent orange-trees. We regaled ourselves with their fruit, which the great heat rendered most delicious.

On the 19th of June, after having settled the government and defence of the island, the general left Malta, which he little dreamed he had taken for the English, who have very badly requited the obligation. Many of the knights followed Bonaparte, and took civil and military appointments.

During the night of the 22d of June, the English squadron was almost close upon us. It passed at about six leagues from the French fleet. Nelson, who learned the capture of Malta at Messina, on the day we left the island, sailed direct for Alexandria, without proceeding into the north. He considered that city to be the place of our destination. By taking the shortest course, with every sail set, and unembarrassed by any convoy, he arrived before Alexandria on the 28th of June, three days before the French fleet, which, nevertheless, had sailed before him from the shores of Malta. The French squadron took the direction of Candia, which we perceived on the 25th of June, and afterwards stood to the south, favoured by the etesian winds, which regularly prevail at that season. The French fleet did not reach Alexandria till the 30th of June.*

* Bonaparte himself gives a very clear account of the manner in which the English squadron was evaded. It is as follows:

"Nelson was cruising between Corsica, Provence, and Spain, with the three sail detached by Lord Saint Vincent, when, in the night of the 19th of May, he



INTED BY HEINRICH FÜGER IN 1800 AT VIENNA. NOW IN THE BRITISH NATIONAL PORTRAIT GALLER

LORD NELSON.

FROM THE ORIGINAL PAINTING IN THE MUSEUM OF VERSAILLES, ARTIST UNKNOWN.

FRANÇOIS-PAUL BRUEYS D'AIGALLIERS.

Bonaparte having one day visited a school, said, on departing, to the scholars, to some of whom he had been putting questions, " My lads, every hour of lost time is a chance of

suffered from a gale, which damaged his ships, and dismasted that in which he sailed. He was obliged to be towed. It was his design to anchor in the Gulf of Oristagni, in Sardinia; he could not succeed in this, but made the roads of Saint Peter's Iles, where he repaired his damage.

" On the same night the French squadron sailed from Toulon ; it arrived before Malta on the 10th of June, after doubling Cape Corso and Cape Bonara. Nelson having been joined by Lord Saint-Vincent's ten ships, and appointed to the command of this squadron, was cruising off Toulon on the 1st of June. He did not then know that the French squadron had left that port. On the 15th he reconnoitred the roads of Tagliamone, on the coast of Tuscany, which he supposed to be the rendezvous of the French expedition. On the 20th he appeared before Naples, where he was informed by the government, that the French squadron had landed its troops at Malta, and that Garat, the ambassador of the republic, had stated, that the expedition was intended for Eyypt. On the 22d Nelson arrived off Messina. The intelligence of the capture of Malta by the French expedition was confirmed to him ; and he also learned that it was making for Candia. Upon this he passed the Faro of Messina, and proceeded to Alexandria, where he arrived on the 29th of June.

" The French squadron received the first intelligence of the presence of an English fleet in the Mediterranean, off Cape Bonara, from a ship that fell in with it; and on the 25th, whilst the squadron was reconnoitring the coast of Candia, it was joined by the frigate La Justice, which had been cruising off Naples, and which brought positive news of the presence of an English squadron in these latitudes. Napoleon then gave orders that, instead of steering directly for Alexandria, the squadron should manœuvre so as to make Cape Aza, in Africa, twenty-five leagues from Alexandria; and should not appear before Alexandria until further intelligence should be obtained.

" On the 29th, the coast of Africa and Cape Aza were described. Nelson was then just arrived before Alexandria; having gained no intelligence of the French squadron, he steered for Alexandretta, and thence made for Rhodes. He then scoured the Isles of the Archipelago, reconnoitred the entrance of the Adriatic, and on the 18th of July was obliged to anchor at Syracuse to take in water. Up to this time he had obtained no information respecting the course of the French squadron. He sailed from Syracuse, and on the 28th of July anchored off Cape Coron, at the extremity of the Morea. It was there that he was first informed that the French army had landed in Egypt a month before. He supposed that the French squadron must have already effected its return to Toulon; but he proceeded to Alexandria in order to be able to furnish his government with positive intelligence, and to leave the necessary forces before that place for the purpose of blockading it.

" When the French squadron left Toulon it was composed of thirteen sail of the line, six frigates, and a dozen brigs, sloops, and cutters. The English squadron consisted of thirteen sail, one of which carried 50 guns, and all the others 74. They had been fitted out very hastily, and were in bad condition. Nelson had no frigates. In the French squadron there were one ship of 120 guns, and three of 80. There was a fleet of several hundred sail under the convoy of this squadron, and particularly under the protection of two 64-gun ships, four Venetian-built frigates of 18 guns, and about twenty brigs and sloops. The French squadron, availing itself of its great number of light vessels, obtained intelligence from a great distance; so that the convoy had nothing to fear, and in case of falling in with the enemy, could easily take up the most advantageous position for remaining at a distance from the engagement. Every French ship had 500 old soldiers on board, with a company of land artillery amongst them. Twice a day, during the month they had been on board, the troops had been exercised in the manœuvres of the guns. In every ship of war

future misfortune." In these remarkable words he gave expression to the maxim which formed in a great measure the rule of his conduct; for, perhaps, no man ever understood better the value of time. It might, indeed, be said that his leisure was labour. Of this I often had proof, and particularly during our voyage. If the activity of his mind did not find sufficient employment in actual things, he supplied the want either by giving free scope to his imagination, or in listening to the conversation of the learned men attached to the expedition; for Bonaparte knew how to listen, and he was, perhaps, the only man, who never for a single moment yielded to lassitude.

On board the Orient he took pleasure in conversing frequently with Monge and Berthollet. The subjects on which they usually talked were chemistry, mathematics, and religion. General Caffarelli, whose conversation, supplied by knowledge, was at once energetic, witty, and lively, was one of those with whom he most willingly discoursed. Whatever friendship he might entertain for Berthollet, it was easy to perceive that he preferred Monge, and that he was led to that preference because Monge, endowed with an ardent imagination, without exactly possessing religious principles, had a kind of predisposition for religious ideas which harmonized with the notions of Bonaparte. On this subject, Berthollet sometimes rallied his inseparable friend Monge. Besides, Berthollet was, with his cold imagination, constantly devoted to analysis and abstractions, inclined towards materialism, an opinion with which the general was always much dissatisfied.

Bonaparte sometimes conversed with Admiral Brueys. His object was always to gain information respecting the different manœuvres, and nothing astonished the admiral more than the sagacity of his questions. I recollect that one day, Bonaparte having asked Brueys in what manner the hammocks were disposed of when clearing for action, he declared, after he had received an answer, that if the case should occur, he would order every one to throw his baggage overboard.

He passed a great part of his time in his cabin, lying on a bed, which, swinging on a kind of castors, alleviated the severity of the sea-sickness, from which he frequently suffered much when the ship rolled.

I was almost always with him in his cabin, where I read to him some of the favourite works, which he had selected for his camp library. He also frequently conversed, for hours together,

there were generals of experience, accustomed to stand fire, and to the chances of war.

"The supposition of an engagement with the English was the general subject of conversation. The captains of ships had orders, in that case, to consider it as a permanent and constant signal, to take part in the action, and to assist the ships near them. Nelson's squadron was one of the worst that England had ever fitted out of late years."—*Napoleon's Memoirs.* (*Editor.*)

with the captains of the vessels which he hailed. He never failed to ask whence they came? what was their destination? what ships they had met? what course they had sailed? His curiosity being thus satisfied, he allowed them to continue their voyage, after making them promise to say nothing of having seen the French squadron.

Whilst we were at sea, he seldom rose before ten o'clock in the morning. The Orient had the appearance of a populous town, from which women had been excluded; and this floating city was inhabited by two thousand individuals, amongst whom were a great number of distinguished men. Bonaparte every day invited several persons to dine with him, besides Brueys, Berthier, the colonels, and his ordinary household, who were always present at the table of the general-in-chief. When the weather was fine, he went up to the quarter-deck, which, from its extent, formed a grand promenade. I recollect, that when walking the quarter-deck with him, whilst we were in the sea of Sicily, I thought I could see the summits of the Alps, beautifully lighted by the rays of the setting sun. Bonaparte laughed much, and joked me about it. He called Admiral Brueys, who took his telescope, and soon confirmed my conjecture. The Alps! At the mention of that word, by the admiral, I think I can see Bonaparte still. He stood for a long time motionless; then, suddenly bursting from his trance, exclaimed, "No! I cannot behold the land of Italy without emotion! There is the east; and there I go; a perilous enterprise invites me. Those mountains command the plains where I so often had the good fortune to lead the French to victory. With them we will conquer again."

One of Bonaparte's greatest pleasures during the voyage was, after dinner, to fix upon three or four persons to support a proposition, and as many to oppose it. He had an object in view by this. These discussions afforded him an opportunity of studying the minds of those whom he had an interest in knowing well, in order that he might afterwards confide to each the functions for which he possessed the greatest aptitude. It will not appear singular to those who have been intimate with Bonaparte, that in these intellectual contests, he gave the preference to those who had supported an absurd proposition with ability over those who had maintained the cause of reason; and it was not superiority of mind which determined his judgment, for he really preferred the man who argued well in favour of an absurdity, to the man who argued equally well in support of a reasonable proposition. He always gave out the subjects which were to be discussed; and they most frequently turned upon questions of religion, the different kinds of government, and the art of war. One day he asked, whether the planets were inhabited; on another, what was the age of the world; then he proposed to consider the probability of the destruction of our

globe, either by water or fire; at another time, the truth or fallacy of presentiments, and the interpretation of dreams. I remember the circumstance which gave rise to the last proposition was an allusion to Joseph, of whom he happened to speak, as he did of almost every thing connected with the country to which we were bound, and which that able minister had governed.

No country came under Bonaparte's observation without recalling historical recollections to his mind. On passing the island of Candia, his imagination was excited, and he spoke with enthusiasm of ancient Crete and the Colossus, whose fabulous renown has surpassed all human glories. He spoke much of the fall of the empire of the east, which bore so little resemblance to what history has preserved of those fine countries, so often moistened with the blood of man. The ingenious fables of mythology likewise occurred to his mind, and imparted to his language something of a poetical, and, I may say, of an inspired character. The sight of the kingdom of Minos led him to reason on the laws best calculated for the government of nations; and the birthplace of Jupiter suggested to him the necessity of a religion for the mass of mankind. This animated conversation lasted until the favourable north winds, which drove the clouds into the valley of the Nile, caused us to lose sight of the island of Candia.

The musicians on board the Orient sometimes played *matinades;* but only between decks, for Bonaparte was not yet sufficiently fond of music to wish to have it in his cabin. It may be said, that his taste for this art increased in the due ratio of his power; and so it was with his taste for hunting, of which he gave no indication until after his elevation to the empire; as though he had wished to prove that he possessed within himself not only the genius of sovereignty for commanding men, but also the instinct for those aristocratical pleasures, the enjoyment of which is considered by mankind to be amongst the attributes of kings.

It is scarcely possible that some accidents should not occur during a long voyage, in a crowded vessel—that some persons should not fall overboard. Accidents of this kind frequently happened on board the Orient. On those occasions nothing was more remarkable than the great humanity of the man who has since been so prodigal of the blood of his fellow-creatures on the field of battle, and who was about to shed rivers of it even in Egypt, whither we were bound. When a man fell into the sea, the general-in-chief was in a state of agitation till he was saved. He instantly made the ship be laid-to, and exhibited the greatest uneasiness until the unfortunate individual was recovered. He ordered me to reward those who ventured their lives in this service. Amongst these, was a sailor who had incurred punishment for some fault. He not only exempted him

Scherfer p.

NAPOLEON INSCRIBES HIS NAME AT MOUNT SINAI.

Napoleon, having crossed the Red Sea at the shallows, was met on the opposite shore, by a deputation of Cenobites from Mount Sinai. These monks threw themselves at his feet, imploring his protection; and after having invoked the blessings of heaven on his head, they presented for his signature the ancient register of their privileges. Napoleon smiled at their request; he took the pen, and no doubt flattered by an homage so extraordinary, signed his name, already immortal, beside those of Ali, of Saladin, and of Ibrahim.

from the punishment, but also gave him some money. I recollect that one dark night we heard a noise like that occasioned by a man falling into the sea. Bonaparte instantly caused the ship to be laid-to, until the supposed victim was rescued from certain death. The men hastened from all sides, and at length they picked up—what?—the quarter of a bullock, which had fallen from the hook to which it was hung. What was Bonaparte's conduct? He ordered me to reward the sailors who had exerted themselves on this occasion even more generously than usual, saying, "It might have been a sailor, and these brave fellows have shown as much activity and courage as if it had."

After the lapse of thirty years, all these things are as fresh in my recollection as if they were passing at the present moment. In this manner Bonaparte employed his time on board the Orient, during the voyage, and it was also at this time, that he dictated to me the following proclamation:

Head-quarters, on board the Orient,
the 4th Messidor, year VI.

BONAPARTE, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE,
GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.

Soldiers,

You are about to undertake a conquest, the effects of which on civilization and commerce are incalculable. The blow you are about to give to England, will be the best aimed, and the most sensibly felt, she can receive, until the time arrive when you can give her her death-blow.

We must make some fatiguing marches; we must fight some battles; we shall succeed in all we undertake. The destinies are with us. The Mameluke Beys who favour exclusively English commerce, whose extortions oppress our merchants, and who tyrannize over the unfortunate inhabitants of the Nile, a few days after our arrival will no longer exist.

The people amongst whom we are going to live are Mahometans. The first article of their faith is this: "There is no God but God, and Mahomet is his Prophet." Do not contradict this. Behave to them as you have behaved to the Jews—to the Italians. Pay respect to their muftis, and their imans, as you did to the rabbis and the bishops. Extend to the ceremonies prescribed by the Koran, and to the mosques, the same toleration which you showed to the synagogues, to the religion of Moses, and of Jesus Christ.

The Roman Legions protected all religions. You will find here customs different from those of Europe. You must accommodate yourselves to them.

The people amongst whom we are to mix, differ from us in the treatment of women; but in all countries he who violates is a monster.

Pillage enriches only a small number of men; it dishonours us; it destroys our resources; it converts into enemies the people whom it is our interest to have for friends.

The first town we shall come to was built by Alexander. At every step we shall meet with grand recollections, worthy of exciting the emulation of Frenchmen.

BONAPARTE.

Here a reflection occurs to me relative to this proclamation, and some other documents, which I may hereafter introduce into my narrative. Some persons have taken objection to passages which seem contrary to the doctrines of Christianity. These people must be under the influence of the evil genius of interpretation. What was the object? To enter Egypt. But what would have been more absurd than to present ourselves with the cross in one hand, and the sword of persecution in the other, and uttering menaces against Islamism? Policy, common sense, required that we should treat with great respect the religion of the inhabitants. Not to have respected it, would have been an unpardonable fault. Conquerors have sometimes committed this error; but the time of religious revolutions is passed. Bonaparte's proclamations produced an excellent effect.

During the voyage, and particularly between Malta and Alexandria, I often conversed with the brave and unfortunate Admiral Brueys. The intelligence we heard from time to time, augmented his uneasiness. I had the good fortune to obtain the confidence of this worthy man. He complained bitterly of the imperfect manner in which the fleet had been prepared for sea; of the encumbered state of the ships of the line, and frigates, and especially of the Orient; of the great number of transports; of the bad outfit of all the ships, and the weakness of their crews. He assured me that it required no little courage to undertake the command of a fleet so badly equipped; and he often declared, that in the event of our falling in with the enemy, he could not answer for the consequences. The encumbered state of the vessels, the immense quantity of civil and military baggage, which each person had brought, and would wish to save, would render proper manœuvres impracticable. In case of an attack, added Brueys, even by an inferior squadron, the confusion and disorder amongst so great a number of persons, would produce an inevitable catastrophe. Finally, if the English had appeared with ten vessels only, the admiral could not have guaranteed a fortunate result. He considered victory to be a thing that was impossible, and even with a victory, what would have become of the expedition? "God send," he said, with a sigh, "that we may pass the English without meeting them!" He appeared to foresee what did afterwards happen to him, not in the open sea, but in a situation which he considered much more favourable to his defence.

On the morning of the 1st of July, the expedition arrived off the coast of Africa, and the column of Septimus Severus

pointed out to us the city of Alexandria. Our situation and frame of mind hardly permitted us to reflect that in the distant point we beheld the city of the Ptolemies and Cæsars, with its double port, its pharos, and the gigantic monuments of its ancient grandeur. Our imaginations did not rise to this pitch.

Admiral Brueys had sent on before the frigate Juno, to fetch M. Magallon, the French consul. It was near four o'clock when he arrived, and the sea was very rough. He informed the general-in-chief that Nelson had been off Alexandria on the 28th—that he immediately despatched a brig to obtain intelligence from the English agent. On the return of the brig, Nelson instantly stood away with his squadron towards the north-east. But for a delay which our convoy from Civitta Vecchia occasioned, we should have been on this coast at the same time as Nelson.

It appeared that Nelson supposed us to be already at Alexandria, when he arrived there. He had reason to suppose so, seeing that we left Malta on the 19th of June, whilst he did not sail from Messina till the 21st. Not finding us where he expected, and being persuaded we ought to have arrived there had Alexandria been the place of our destination, he sailed for Alexandretta, in Syria, whither he imagined we had gone to effect a landing. This error saved the expedition a second time.*

Bonaparte, on hearing the details which the French consul communicated, resolved to disembark immediately. Admiral Brueys represented the difficulties and dangers of a disembarkation—the violence of the surge—the distance from the coast†—a coast too, lined with reefs of rocks—the approaching night, and our perfect ignorance of the points suitable for landing. The Admiral, therefore, urged the necessity of wait-

* The following illustrative passage is from Southey's admirable Life of Nelson : " The first news of the enemy's armament was, that it had surprised Malta. Nelson formed a plan for attacking it while at anchor at Gozo ; but on the 22d of June, intelligence reached him that the French had left that island on the 16th, the day after their arrival. It was clear that their destination was eastward—he thought for Egypt—and for Egypt, therefore, he made all sail. Had the frigates been with him, he could scarcely have failed to gain information of the enemy : for want of them, he only spoke three vessels on the way ; two came from Alexandria, one from the Archipelago ; and neither of them had seen any thing of the French. He arrived off Alexandria on the 28th, and the enemy were not there, neither was there any account of them ; but the governor was endeavouring to put the city in a state of defence, having received advice from Leghorn, that the French expedition was intended against Egypt, after it had taken Malta. Nelson then shaped his course to the northward, for Caramania, and steered from thence along the southern side of Candia, carrying a press of sail, both night and day, with a contrary wind. It would have been his delight, he said, to have tried Bonaparte on a wind."

† It was near three leagues, and we did not anchor in the roads of Aboukir, as Sir Walter Scott supposes.

ing till next morning: that is to say, to delay the landing twelve hours. He observed that Nelson could not return from Syria for several days. Bonaparte listened to these representations with impatience and ill-humour. He replied peremptorily, "Admiral, we have no time to lose. Fortune gives me but three days; if I do not profit by them, we are lost." He relied much on fortune: this chimerical idea constantly influenced his resolutions.

Bonaparte having the command of the naval as well as the military force, the admiral was obliged to yield to his wishes.

I attest these facts, which passed in my presence, and no part of which could escape my observation. It is quite false that it was owing to the appearance of a sail which, it is pretended, was descried, but of which, for my part, I saw nothing, that Bonaparte exclaimed, "Fortune, have you abandoned me!—I ask only five days!" No such thing occurred.

Admiral Brueys took me aside, to communicate his apprehensions, which were principally on account of the general-in-chief, on whom he conceived the responsibility rested. On my refusal to revive his objections, on the ground that I was too well acquainted with Bonaparte's firmness, and that, besides, I concurred in his opinion, Brueys, with sorrow, gave the signal for a general landing. The getting of the troops into the boats was effected with much difficulty and danger.

It was one o'clock in the morning of the 2d of July when we landed on the soil of Egypt, at Marabou, three leagues to the west of Alexandria. We had to regret the loss of some lives; but we had every reason to expect that our losses would have been greater.

At three o'clock the same morning, the general-in-chief marched on Alexandria with the divisions of Kleber, Bon, and Morand. The Bedouin Arabs, who kept hovering about our right flank and our rear, picked up the stragglers.

Having arrived within gun-shot of Alexandria, we scaled the ramparts, and French valour soon triumphed over all obstacles.

The first blood I saw shed in war was General Kleber's. He was struck in the head by a ball, not in storming the walls, but whilst commanding the attack. He came to Pompey's Pillar, where many members of the staff were assembled, and where the general-in-chief was watching the attack. I then spoke to Kleber for the first time, and from that day our friendship commenced. I had the good fortune to contribute somewhat towards the assistance of which he stood in need, and which, as we were situated, could not be procured very easily.

It has been endeavoured to represent the capture of Alexandria, which surrendered after a few hours, as a brilliant exploit. The general-in-chief himself wrote that the city had been taken after a few discharges of cannon; the walls, badly fortified, were soon scaled. Alexandria was not delivered up to

BATAILLE DES TYPAMITES

BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS.

"On the 21st of July the army came within sight of the Pyramids, which, but for the regularity of the outline, might have been taken for a distant ridge of rocky mountains. While every eye was fixed on these hoary monuments of the past, they gained the brow of a gentle eminence, and saw at length spread out before them the vast army of the Beys, its right posted on an intrenched camp by the Nile, its centre and left composed of that brilliant cavalry with which they were by this time acquainted. Napoleon, riding forwards to reconnoitre, perceived (what escaped the observation of all his staff) that the guns on the intrenched camp were not provided with carriages; and instantly decided on his plan of attack. He prepared to throw his force on the left, where the guns could not be available. Mourad Bey, who commanded in chief, speedily penetrated his design; and the Mamelukes advanced gallantly to the encounter. "Soldiers," said Napoleon, "from the summit of yonder pyramid forty ages behold you;" and the battle began.

"The French formed into separate squares, and awaited the assault of the Mamelukes. These came on with impetuous speed, and wild cries, and practised every means to force their passage into the serried ranks of their new opponents. They rushed on the line of bayonets, backed their horses upon them, and at last, maddened by the firmness they could not shake, dashed their pistols and carbines into the faces of the men. They who had fallen wounded from their seats, would crawl along the sand, and hew at the legs of their enemies with their scymitars. Nothing could move the French: the bayonet and the continued roll of musketry by degrees thinned the host around them; and Buonaparte at last advanced. Such were the confusion and terror of the enemy when he came near the camp, that they abandoned their works, and flung themselves by hundreds into the Nile. The carnage was prodigious. Multitudes more were drowned. Mourad and a remnant of his Mamelukes retreated on Upper Egypt. Cairo surrendered, and Lower Egypt was entirely conquered." 1798—*History of Napoleon Buonaparte*, v. I, p. 134.

pillage, as has been asserted, and often repeated. This would have been a most impolitic mode of commencing the conquest of Egypt, which had no strong places requiring to be intimidated by a great example.

Bonaparte, with some others, entered the city by a narrow street, which scarcely allowed two persons to walk abreast; I was with him. We were stopped by some musket-shots fired from a low window by a man and a woman. They repeated their fire several times. The guides who preceded their general kept up a heavy fire on the window. The man and woman fell dead, and we passed on in safety, for the place had surrendered.

Bonaparte employed the six days during which he remained in Alexandria in establishing order in the city and province, with that activity and superior talent which I could never sufficiently admire, and in directing the march of the army across the province of Bohahireh. He sent Desaix with four thousand five hundred infantry and sixty cavalry to Beda, on the road to Damanhour. This general was the first to experience the privations and sufferings which the whole army had soon to endure. His great mind, his attachment to Bonaparte, seemed for a moment about to yield to the obstacles which presented themselves. On the 15th of July, he wrote from Bohahireh as follows: "I beseech you do not let us stop longer in this position. My men are discouraged and murmur. Make us advance or fall back, without delay. The villages consist merely of huts, absolutely without resources."

In these immense plains, scorched by the vertical rays of a burning sun, water, every where else so common, becomes an object of contest. The wells and springs, those secret treasures of the desert, are carefully concealed from the traveller; and frequently after our most oppressive marches, nothing could be found to allay the urgent cravings of thirst but a little brackish water of the most disgusting description.*

* Some idea of the misery endured by the French troops on this occasion may be gathered from the following description in Napoleon's Memoirs, dictated at St. Helena:

"As the Hebrews wandering in the wilderness complained, and angrily asked Moses for the onions and flesh-pots of Egypt, the French soldiers constantly regretted the luxuries of Italy. In vain were they assured that the country was the most fertile in the world, that it was even superior to Lombardy; how were they to be persuaded of this when they could get neither bread nor wine? We encamped on immense quantities of wheat, but there was neither mill nor oven in the country. The biscuit brought from Alexandria had long been exhausted; the soldiers were even reduced to bruise the wheat between two stones, and to make cakes, which they baked under the ashes. Many parched the wheat in a pan, after which they boiled it. This was the best way to use the grain; but, after all, it was not bread. The apprehensions of the soldiers increased daily; and rose to such a pitch, that a great number of them said there was no great city of Cairo; and that the place bearing that name was, like Damanhour, a vast assemblage of mere huts destitute of every thing that

could render life comfortable or agreeable. To such a melancholy state of mind had they brought themselves, that two dragoons threw themselves, completely clothed, into the Nile, where they were drowned. It is nevertheless true, that though there was neither bread nor wine, the resources which were procured with wheat, lentils, meat, and sometimes pigeons, furnished the army with food of some kind. But the evil was in the ferment of the mind. The officers complained more loudly than the soldiers, because the comparison was proportionately more disadvantageous to them. In Egypt they found neither the quarters, the good table, nor the luxury of Italy. The general-in-chief, wishing to set an example, used to bivouac in the midst of the army, and in the least commodious spots. No one had either tent or provisions; the dinner of Napoleon and his staff consisted of a dish of lentils. The soldiers passed the evenings in political conversations, arguments, and complaints. *For what purpose are we come here?* said some of them; *the Directory has transported us. Caffarelli*, said others, *is the agent that has been made use of to deceive the general-in-chief.* Many of them, having observed that wherever there were vestiges of antiquity, they were carefully searched, vented their spite in invective against the *savans*, or scientific men, who, they said, *had started the idea of the expedition in order to make these searches.* Jests were showered upon them, even in their presence. The men called an ass a *savant;* and said of Caffarelli Dufalga, alluding to his wooden leg, *He laughs at all these troubles; he has one foot in France."—Editor.*

CHAPTER XV.

1798.

Ancient and modern Egypt—Bonaparte's proclamation—The Mirage—Skirmishes with the Arabs—Mistake of General Desaix's division—Wretchedness of a rich sheik—Combat beneath the general's window—The flotilla on the Nile—Its distress and danger—The battle of Chebreisse—Defeat of the Mamelukes—Bonaparte's reception of me—Letter to Louis Bonaparte—Success of the French army—Proclamations of the general-in-chief—Letter to the pasha—Triumphal entrance into Cairo—Despatch of Kleber—Tragical death of the aide-de-camp Julien—Bonaparte's revenge—Civil and military organization of Cairo—Bonaparte's letter to his brother Joseph—Plan of colonization.

What a difference between the city of Alexandria described in history, and the wretched modern Alexandria! Where nine hundred thousand inhabitants were heretofore concentrated now scarcely six thousand can be numbered. We found this city, formerly so magnificent, without fortifications, and almost without monuments. We met with only some columns, gathered from among the ruins of the ancient city, and employed with bad taste in modern buildings. The quay of the old port is composed solely of fragments of granite and marble columns. We found only two ancient monuments standing and entire, namely, Pompey's Pillar and Cleopatra's Needle; but there is scarcely a trace of the times of the Cæsars, and none of Alexander's tomb. Before landing on the Egyptian territory, Bona-

"YOU ARE THE GREATEST MAN IN THE WORLD."

Buonaparte reached Alexandria on the evening of the 24th of July, 1799, when he found his army already posted in the neighbourhood of Aboukir, and prepared to anticipate the attack of the Turks on the morrow.

Surveying their entrenched camp from the heights above with Murat, he said, "Go how it may, the battle of to-morrow will decide the fate of the world:" "Of this army at least," answered Murat; "but the Turks have no cavalry, and, if ever infantry were charged to the teeth by horse, they shall be so by mine."*

On the 25th the attack was commenced by the French, when for a considerable time the Turks maintained the battle with success. Murat at length was enabled to charge their main body in flank, when the Turks became panic-struck, and the battle was changed into a massacre; and numerous Turks to escape the swords of the French precipitated themselves into the sea, where they were nearly all drowned. This eventful day crowned the labours of Buonaparte in Egypt with glory and honour; and after the victory, Kleber, in a transport of admiration pressed Napoleon in his arms, saying, "General! you are the greatest man in the world!"

* History of Napoleon Buonaparte, vol. i.

parte wrote a letter, on the 12th Messidor, to the Pasha of Egypt, in which he stated that he had been sent by the Directory of the republic to chastise the beys for the aggressions they had committed upon French commerce. He concluded by telling the pasha that he had not come to do any act contrary to the Koran, and by inviting him to join in invoking maledictions on the impious race of the beys.

On arriving at Alexandria, the general-in-chief issued a proclamation to the people of Egypt, which, besides adverting to the insults and extortions experienced by French merchants from the beys, contained the following passages:

People of Egypt—You will be told that I come to destroy your religion—do not believe it. Be assured that I come to restore your rights, to punish the usurpers, and that I respect, more than the Mamelukes, God, his prophet, and the Alcoran. Tell them that all men are equal in the eye of God: wisdom, talents, and virtue make the only difference.

Cadis, sheiks, imans, scorbajis, tell the people that we are friends of the true Mussulmans. Have not we destroyed the pope, who says that war ought to be made upon Mussulmans? Have we not destroyed the knights of Malta, because those bigots believed that God required them to raise their swords against the Mussulmans?

On the 7th of July, the general left Alexandria for Damanhour. In the vast plains of Bohahireh, the mirage every moment presented to the eye wide sheets of water, while, as we advanced, we found nothing but barren ground, full of deep cracks. Villages, which, at a distance, appear to be surrounded with water, are, on a nearer approach, discovered to be situated on heights, mostly artificial, by which they are raised above the inundations of the Nile. This illusion continually recurs; and it is the more treacherous, inasmuch as it presents to the eye the perfect representation of water, at the time when the want of that article is most felt. This mirage is so considerable in the plain of Pelusium, that shortly after sunrise no object is recognizable. The same phenomenon has been observed in other countries. Quintus Curtius says, that in the deserts of Sogdiana, a fog, rising from the earth, obscures the light, and the surrounding country seems like a vast sea. The cause of this singular illusion is now fully explained; and, from the observations of the learned Monge, it appears that the mirage will be found in almost every country situated between the tropics, where the local circumstances are similar.

The Arabs harassed the army without intermission. The few wells met with in the desert were either filled up, or the water was rendered unfit for use. The intolerable thirst with which the troops were tormented, even on this first march, was but ill allayed by dirty and unwholesome water. The army crossed the desert with the rapidity of lightning, scarcely tasting a drop of water. The sufferings of the troops were frequently expressed by discouraging murmurs.

On the first night a mistake occurred, which might have proved fatal. We were advancing in the dark, under feeble escort, almost sleeping on our horses, when suddenly we were assailed by two successive discharges of musketry. We rallied and reconnoitred, and, to our great satisfaction, discovered that the only mischief was a slight wound, received by one of our guides. Our assailants were the division of General Desaix, who, forming the advanced guard of the army, mistook us for a party of the enemy, and fired upon us. It was speedily ascertained that the little advanced guard of the head-quarters had not heard the *qui vive* of Desaix's advanced posts.

On reaching Damanhour, our head-quarters were established at the residence of a sheik. The house had been new whitened, and looked well enough outside; but the interior was inconceivably wretched. Every domestic utensil was broken, and the only seats were a few dirty, tattered mats. Bonaparte knew that the sheik was rich; and having somewhat won his confidence, he asked him, through the medium of the interpreter, why, being in easy circumstances, he thus deprived himself of all comfort. "Some years ago," replied the sheik, "I repaired and furnished my house. When this became known at Cairo, a demand was made upon me for money, because, it was said, my expenses proved me to be rich. I refused to pay the money, and, in consequence, I was ill-treated, and at length forced to pay it. From that time I have allowed myself only the bare necessaries of life, and I shall buy no furniture for my house." The old man was lame, in consequence of the treatment he had suffered. Woe to him, who in this country is suspected of having a competency—a hundred spies are always ready to denounce him. The appearance of poverty is the only security against the rapine of power and the cupidity of barbarism

A little troop of Arabs, on horseback, assailed our head-quarters. Bonaparte, who was at the window of the sheik's house, indignant at this insolence, turned to one of his aides-de-camp, who happened to be on duty, and said, "Croissier, take a few guides, and drive those fellows away!" In an instant, Croissier was in the plain, with fifteen guides. A little skirmish ensued, and we looked on from the window. In the movement and in the attack of Croissier and his party, there was a sort of hesitation which the general-in-chief could not comprehend. "Forward, I say! Charge!" he exclaimed from the window, as if he could have been heard. Our horsemen seemed to fall back as the Arabs returned to the attack; and after a little contest, maintained with tolerable spirit, the Arabs retired without loss, and without being molested in their retreat. Bonaparte could no longer repress his rage; and when Croissier returned, he experienced such a harsh reception, that the poor fellow withdrew, deeply mortified and distressed. Bonaparte desired me to follow him, and say something to console him: but all was in vain. "I cannot survive this" he said. "I will sacrifice my life on the

Delorme del.

CEUX QUE JE COMMANDE SONT MES ENFANS

"ALL THOSE I COMMAND ARE MY CHILDREN."

We may easily form an idea of the condition of the Egyptians, subject to the oppression of the Mamelukes on the one hand, and the rapacity of the Arabs on the other, when the French entered their territory under Napoleon, announcing themselves as avengers and liberators, as we find by the following occurrence, which has furnished the subject of M. Delorme's composition:—

"One day when Buonaparte was surrounded by the grand Sheiks, some one told him that the Arabs of the tribe of Osnadis had entered with an armed band into a village, driven off the herds, and killed an unfortunate fellah, who endeavoured to make some resistance. Full of indignation, he ordered 200 dromedaries and 300 horsemen to take the field in pursuit of the guilty party. The Sheiks, surprised at the animated tone in which this command was given, looked at each other, for to them the life of a poor fellah was of no consequence. One of them observed to him that he had better not embroil himself with the Arabs, a people always dangerous, and who could retaliate more than the evil he could inflict on them. "Wherefore," added the Sheik Elmodi, "all this stir? Because they have killed a fellah! Was he then thy cousin?" "More than that!" cried Napoleon with energy, "all those whom I command are my children!" And his gesture, more weighty than his words, sufficiently indicated that he took under his protection the unfortunate who came to plead for vengeance or justice. "*Taib!*" cried the astonished Sheik, "thou speakest like a prophet."—1798.

first occasion that offers itself. I will not live dishonoured." The word *coward* had escaped the general's lips. Poor Croissier died at Saint Jean d'Acre, as will hereafter be seen.

On the 10th of July, our head-quarters were established at Rahmahanieh, where they remained during the 11th and 12th. At this place commences the canal, which was cut by Alexander, to convey water to his new city, and to facilitate commercial intercourse between Europe and the east.

The flotilla, commanded by the brave chief of division, Perrée, had just arrived from Rosetta. Perrée was on board the shebeck called the *Cerf*. Bonaparte had great confidence in him. He had commanded, under the general's orders, the naval forces in the Adriatic in 1797.

Bonaparte placed on board the *Cerf* and the other vessels of the flotilla, those individuals who, not being military, could not be serviceable in engagements, and whose horses served to mount a few of the troops.

On the night of the 13th of July, the general-in-chief directed his march towards the south, along the left bank of the Nile. The flotilla sailed up the river, parallel with the left wing of the army. But the force of the wind, which at this season blows regularly from the Mediterranean into the valley of the Nile, carried the flotilla far in advance of the army, and frustrated the plan of their mutually defending and supporting each other. The flotilla, thus unprotected, fell in with seven Turkish gun-boats coming from Cairo, and was exposed simultaneously to their fire, and to that of the Mamelukes, Fellahs, and Arabs, who lined both banks of the river. They had small guns mounted on camels.

Perrée cast anchor, and an engagement commenced at nine o'clock on the 14th of July, and continued till half-past twelve.

At the same time, the general-in-chief met and attacked a corps of about four thousand Mamelukes. His object, as he afterwards said, was to turn the corps by the left of the village of Chebreisse, and to drive it upon the Nile.

About eleven in the morning, Perrée told me that the Turks were doing us more harm than we were doing them; that our ammunition would soon be exhausted; that the army was far inland, and that if it did not make a move to the left, there would be no hope for us.

Several vessels had already been boarded and taken by the Turks, who massacred the crews before our eyes, and with barbarous ferocity showed us the heads of the slaughtered men. Perrée, at considerable risk, despatched several persons to inform the general-in-chief of the desperate situation of the flotilla. The cannonade which Bonaparte had heard since the morning, and the explosion of a Turkish gun-boat, which was blown up by the artillery of the shebeck, led him to fear that our situation was really perilous. He therefore made a movement to the left. in the direction of the Nile and Chebreisse,

beat the Mamelukes, and forced them to retire on Cairo. At sight of the French troops, the commander of the Turkish flotilla weighed anchor, and sailed up the Nile. The two banks of the river were evacuated, and the flotilla escaped the destruction which a short time before had appeared inevitable. Some writers have alleged that the Turkish flotilla was destroyed in this engagement. The truth is, the Turks did us considerable injury, while on their part they suffered but little. We had twenty men killed and several wounded. Upwards of fifteen hundred guns were fired during the action.

General Berthier, in his narrative of the Egyptian expedition, enumerates the individuals who, though not in the military service, assisted Perrée in this unequal and dangerous engagement. He mentions Monge, Berthollet, Andréossy, Junot, the paymaster, and Bourrienne, secretary to the general-in-chief. It has also been stated that Sucy, the commissary-general, was seriously wounded while bravely defending a gun-boat laden with provisions; but this is incorrect.

We had no communication with the army until the 23d of July. On the 22d we came in sight of the pyramids, and were informed that we were only about ten leagues from Gizeh, where they are situated. The cannonade which we heard, and which augmented in proportion as the north wind diminished, announced a serious engagement; and that same day we saw the banks of the Nile strewed with heaps of bodies, which the waves were every moment washing into the sea. This horrible spectacle, the silence of the surrounding villages, which had hitherto been armed against us, and the cessation of the firing from the banks of the river, led us to infer, with tolerable certainty, that a battle fatal to the Mamelukes had been fought. The misery we suffered on our passage from Rahmahanieh to Gizeh is indescribable. We lived for eleven days on melons and water, besides being momentarily exposed to the musketry of the Arabs and the Fellahs. We luckily escaped with but a few killed and wounded. The swell of the Nile was only beginning. The shallowness of the river, near Cairo, obliged us to leave the shebeck and get on board a dejerm. We reached Gizeh at three in the afternoon of the 23d of July.

When I saluted the general-in-chief, whom I had not seen for twelve days, he thus addressed me: "So, you are here, are you? Do you know that you have all of you been the cause of my not following up the battle of Chebreisse? It was to save you, Monge, Berthollet, and the others on board the flotilla, that I hurried the movement of my left upon the Nile, before my right had turned Chebreisse. But for that, not a single Mameluke would have escaped."

"I thank you for my own part," replied I; "but in conscience could you have abandoned us, after taking away our horses, and making us go on board the shebeck, whether we

BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS.

[Plate II.]

The subject of the accompanying engraving is derived from the account given of the Battle of the Pyramids, at the moment when Napoleon, pointing to those remains of antiquity, and addressing his soldiers, exclaimed, "*Soldats! du haut de ces pyramides, quarante siècles vous contemplent.*" The results of this battle are well known. They were very profitable to the soldiery; "the name of Buonaparte, now spread panic through the East; and the Sultan Kebir (or King of Fire, as he was called from the deadly effects of the musketry in this engagement) was considered as the destined scourge of God, whom it was hopeless to resist."



.. GÉRÔME. ENGRAVED BY PETER AITKEN. PUBLICATION AUTHORIZED.

BONAPARTE AT CAIRO.

would or not?" He laughed, and then told me how sorry he was for the wound of Sucy, and the death of many useful men, whose places could not possibly be filled up.

He made me write a letter to his brother Louis, informing him that he had gained a complete victory over the Mamelukes at Embabeh, opposite Boulac, and that the enemy's loss was, two thousand men killed and wounded, forty pieces of cannon, and a great number of horses.

The occupation of Cairo was the immediate consequence of the victory of Embabeh. Bonaparte established his head-quarters in the house of Elfey Bey, in the great square of Ezbekyeh.

The march of the French army to Cairo was attended by an uninterrupted succession of combats and victories. We had won the battles of Rahmahanieh, Chebreisse, and the Pyramids. The Mamelukes were defeated, and their chief, Murad Bey, was obliged to fly into Upper Egypt. Bonaparte found no obstacle to oppose his entrance into the capital of Egypt, after a campaign of only twenty days.

No conqueror, perhaps, ever enjoyed a victory so much as Bonaparte, and yet no one was ever less inclined to abuse his triumphs.

After the battle of the Pyramids, he despatched the following letter and proclamation from his head-quarters at Gizeh:

Head-quarters, at Gizeh, 4th Thermidor, year VI. of the French Republic.

THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, BONAPARTE, TO THE SHEIKS AND NOTABLES OF CAIRO.

You will see by the annexed proclamation, the sentiments which animate me.

Yesterday, the Mamelukes were for the most part killed or wounded, and I am in pursuit of the few who escaped.

Send here the boats which are on your bank of the river, and send also a deputation to acquaint me with your submission. Provide bread, meat, straw, and barley for my troops. Be under no alarm, and rest assured that no one is more anxious to contribute to your happiness than I.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

Head-quarters, Gizeh, 4th Thermidor, year VI. of the French Republic.

THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, BONAPARTE, TO THE PEOPLE OF CAIRO.

People of Cairo—I am satisfied with your conduct. You did well not to take part against me. I am come to destroy the race of the Mamelukes, to protect commerce and the natives of the country. Let all who are alarmed, banish their fears; let those who have fled, return to their homes; and let prayers take place as usual. Fear nothing for your families, your houses, or your property;

and least of all, for the religion of the prophet, which I respect. As it is urgent that persons should be appointed to perform the duties of the police, so as to maintain the tranquillity of the city, a divan consisting of seven persons will meet at the Mosque of the Worm. There will always be two with the commandant of the fortress, and four to maintain the public peace, and to superintend the police.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

Next day, before he marched off to make his triumphal entry into Cairo, at the head of his army, the general-in-chief wrote to the pasha as follows:

Head-quarters, Gizeh, 5th Thermidor, year VI. of the French Republic.

THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, BONAPARTE, TO THE PASHA OF CAIRO.

The intention of the French Republic in occupying Egypt, was to extirpate the Mamelukes, who were at once rebels to the Porte, and the declared enemies of the French government.

Now that France is mistress of Egypt by the signal victory her army has gained, her intention is, to secure to the pasha of the grand seignior his revenues and his existence.

I beg you to assure the Porte, that she shall sustain no sort of loss, and that I will secure to her the continuance of the tribute which has hitherto been paid to her.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

We entered Cairo on the 24th of July,* and four days after Bonaparte sent off his aide-de-camp, Julien, with despatches to General Kleber, who was detained at Alexandria by his wound. In these despatches, which were dated from head-quarters at Cairo, 9th Thermidor, year VI. Bonaparte said—

We have found in Cairo, citizen-general, a very good mint. We must have all the ingots which we left at Alexandria, as we want to give them in exchange for some specie with which the merchants here have supplied us. I therefore beg you will assemble all the

* The wives of the Mamelukes staid in their houses at Cairo, whilst their husbands were carrying on the war against the French; and Napoleon sent Eugène, his son-in-law, to compliment the wife of Murad Bey, who had under her command about fifty slaves, belonging to that Mameluke chief and his kiashefs. It was a sort of convent of religious females, of which she was the abbess. She received Eugène on her grand divan, in the harem, to which he was admitted by special exception, and as the envoy of Sultan Kabir (a name given by the Arabs to Napoleon. The word *Kabir* signifies *great*). All the women wished to see the young and handsome Frenchman, and the slaves found it very difficult to restrain their impatience. The wife of Murad Bey was a woman of fifty, with the beauty and grace suitable to that age. She had coffee and sherbet served up, according to custom, in very rich plate, and in a sumptuous style. She took from her finger a ring, worth a thousand louis, which she presented to the young officer. She then addressed several requests to the general-in-chief, who preserved her villages for her, and always protected her.—*Memoirs of Napoleon.* (*Editor.*)

BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS. FROM A CONTEMPORARY LITHOGRAPH BY AN UNKNOWN ARTIST.

FROM THE LITHOGRAPH BY RAFFET, LENT BY MR. CHARLES LEDYARD NORTON.

NAPOLEON IN EGYPT — A MARCH IN THE DESERT.

REVOLT OF CAIRO.

While the French were masters of Cairo, a conspiracy was formed against them, which exploded on the 21st of October, 1798. The populace, at the instigation of the Sheiks, had sworn by Mahomet to exterminate the French. At the commencement of the insurrection, General Dupuy was mortally wounded, and several others were killed; when the drums were heard beating to arms, the Turks repaired to the Grand Mosque, where they assembled to the number of about 8,000. Here they were required to surrender, but refused, and seemed determined to defend themselves to the last, when Napoleon commanded bombs to be thrown from the citadel; this spread dismay and terror amongst the besieged, which was greatly increased by the French bursting open the doors. In a few moments the carnage became dreadful. The fanaticism of the revolters prevented their perceiving the impossibility of successful resistance to the French, who had been infuriated by observing Brigadier-General Sulkowski slain by the multitude. Girodet has produced a very animated picture of the scene. The most remarkable group is that where a man completely naked supports a young Turk, richly habited, who is about to receive his death-wound. Near to him is a negro, equally naked, aiming to ward off the fatal blow, and holding the head of a young Frenchman. On the left is an Hussar of a very extraordinary stature, whose weapon seems to bear death to the unfortunate Turk.

merchants with whom the said ingots were left, and get them back again. I will give in return corn and rice, of which we have an immense quantity.

We are as ill off for money, as we are well off for provisions. This obliges us to part with as little gold and silver as we can, but to make our payments in provisions.

The unfortunate Julien, a promising young officer, ran ashore with his dejerm on the Lybian bank of the Nile, and was murdered, together with fifteen soldiers who formed his escort. When, about a month after, it was discovered where he had perished, the general-in-chief published the following decree:

It having been ascertained that the inhabitants of the village of Alkam have assassinated the aide-de-camp Julien, and fifteen French soldiers who accompanied him, it is ordered that the village shall be burnt; and that General Lannes shall set off, with five hundred men and an aviso, to execute this order. If he succeed in arresting the sheiks, he is to bring them as hostages to Cairo. He is to consign Alkam to pillage, and not to leave a house standing; and he is to make known by a proclamation, circulated in the neighbouring villages, that Alkam is burnt as a punishment for the murder of Frenchmen who were navigating the Nile.

Alkam was accordingly destroyed. The only remaining trace of the unfortunate Julien and his companions, was a waistcoat-button, found in a deserted hut, in the neighbourhood of Alkam. All the inhabitants of the village had fled in anticipation of the vengeance with which they were visited. The button had belonged to one of the men who formed Julien's escort. It was marked with the number of the corps.

The general-in-chief immediately directed his attention to the civil and military organization of the country. Only those who saw him in the vigour of his youth can form an idea of his extraordinary intelligence and activity. Nothing escaped his observation. Egypt had long been the object of his study; and in a few weeks he was as well acquainted with the country, as if he had lived in it ten years. He issued orders for observing the strictest discipline, and these orders were punctually obeyed.

The mosques, the civil and religious institutions, the harems, the women, the customs of the country—all were scrupulously respected. A few days after they entered Cairo, the French were freely admitted into the shops, and were seen sociably smoking their pipes with the inhabitants, assisting them in their occupations, and playing with their children.

The day after his arrival in Cairo, Bonaparte addressed to his brother Joseph the following letter, which was intercepted and printed. Its authenticity has been doubted; but I saw Napoleon write it, and he read it to me before he sent it off.

Cairo, 7th Thermidor.

You will see in the public papers the bulletins of the battles and victories of Egypt, which were sufficiently contested to add another wreath to the laurels of the army. Egypt is richer than any country in the world in corn, rice, vegetables, and cattle. But the people are in a state of utter barbarism. We cannot procure money, even to pay the troops. I shall probably be in France in two months.

Engage a country-house, to be ready for me on my arrival, either near Paris, or in Burgundy, where I should like to pass the winter.

BONAPARTE.

This announcement of his departure to his brother is corroborated by a note which he despatched some days after, enumerating the supplies and individuals which he wished to have sent to Egypt. His note proves, more convincingly than any arguments, that Bonaparte earnestly wished to preserve his conquest, and to make it a French colony. It must be borne in mind, that the note here alluded to, as well as the letter above quoted, were written long before the destruction of the fleet.

Bonaparte's autograph note, after enumerating the troops and warlike stores he wished to be sent, concluded with the following list:

1st. A company of actors; 2d. A company of dancers: 3d. Some dealers in toys, at least three or four; 4th. A hundred women; 5th. The wives of all the men employed in the corps; 6th. Twenty surgeons, thirty apothecaries, and ten physicians; 7th. Some founders; 8th. Some distillers, and dealers in liquor; 9th. Fifty gardeners, with their families, and the seeds of every kind of vegetable; 10th. Each party to bring with them two hundred thousand quarts of brandy; 11th. Thirty thousand ells of blue and scarlet cloth; 12th. A supply of soap and oil.

CHAPTER XVI.

1798.

Establishment of a divan in each Egyptian province—Desaix in Upper Egypt—Ibrahim Bey beaten by Bonaparte at Salehyeh—Sulkowsky wounded—Disaster at Aboukir—Dissatisfaction and murmurs of the army—Dejection of the General-in-chief—His plan respecting Egypt—Meditated descent upon England—Bonaparte's censure of the Directory—Intercepted correspondence—Justification of Admiral Brueys—Bonaparte's letter to the Directory.

FROM the details I have already given respecting Bonaparte's plans for colonizing Egypt, it will be seen that his energy of mind urged him to adopt anticipatory measures for the ac-

THE BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.

complishment of objects which were never realized. During the short interval in which he sheathed his sword, he planned provisional governments for the towns and provinces occupied by the French troops, and he adroitly contrived to serve the interests of his army, without appearing to violate those of the country. After he had been four days at Cairo, during which time he employed himself in examining every thing, and consulting every individual from whom he could obtain useful information, he published the following order:

Head-quarters, Cairo, 9th Thermidor, year VI.

BONAPARTE, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE, AND GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, ORDERS,

Art. 1.—There shall be in each province of Egypt, a divan, composed of seven individuals, whose duty will be to superintend the interests of the province; to communicate to me any complaints that may be made; to prevent warfare among the different villages; to apprehend and punish criminals (for which purpose they may demand assistance from the French commandant); and to take every opportunity of enlightening the people.

Art. 2.—There shall be in each province an aga of the Janizaries, maintaining constant communication with the French commandant. He shall have with him a company of sixty armed natives, whom he may take wherever he pleases, for the maintenance of good order, subordination, and tranquillity.

Art. 3.—There shall be in each province an intendant, whose business will be to levy the miri, the feddam, and the other contributions which formerly belonged to the Mamelukes, but which now belong to the French republic. The intendants shall have as many agents as may be necessary.

Art. 4.—The said intendant shall have a French agent to correspond with the Finance Department, and to execute all the orders he may receive.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

While Bonaparte was thus actively taking measures for the organization of the country, General Desaix had marched into Upper Egypt in pursuit of Murad Bey. We learned that Ibrahim, who, next to Murad, was the most influential of the beys, had proceeded towards Syria, by the way of Balbeys and Salehyeh. The general-in-chief immediately determined to march, in person, against that formidable enemy, and he left Cairo about fifteen days after he had entered it. It is unnecessary to describe the well-known engagement in which Bonaparte drove Ibrahim back upon El Arysh; besides, I do not enter minutely into the details of battles, my chief object being to record events which I personally witnessed.

At the battle of Salehyeh, Bonaparte thought he had lost one of his aides-de-camp, Sulkowsky, to whom he was much attached, and one who had been with us during the whole of

the campaign of Italy. On the field of battle one object of regret cannot long engross the mind; yet, on his return to Cairo, Bonaparte frequently spoke to me of Sulkowsky in terms of unfeigned sorrow.

"I cannot," said he one day, "sufficiently admire the noble spirit and determined courage of poor Sulkowsky." He often said that Sulkowsky would have been a valuable aid to whoever might undertake the resuscitation of Poland. Fortunately that brave officer was not killed on that occasion, though seriously wounded. He was, however, killed shortly after.

The destruction of the French squadron, in the roads of Aboukir, occurred during the absence of the general-in-chief. This event happened on the 1st of August. The details are generally known; but there is one circumstance to which I cannot refrain from alluding, and which excited deep interest at the time. This was the heroic courage of the son of Casabianca, the captain of the Orient. Casabianca was among the wounded, and when the vessel was blown up, his son, a lad of ten years of age, preferred perishing along with him rather than saving himself, when one of the seamen had secured him the means of escape. I told the aide-de-camp, sent by General Kleber, who had the command of Alexandria, that the general-in-chief was near Salehyeh. He proceeded thither immediately, and Bonaparte hastened back to Cairo, a distance of about thirty-three leagues.

In spite of any assertions that may have been made to the contrary, the fact is, that as soon as the French troops set foot in Egypt, they were filled with dissatisfaction, and ardently longed to return home. The illusion of the expedition had disappeared, and only its reality remained. What bitter murmuring have I not heard from Murat, Lannes, Berthier, Bessières, and others! Their complaints were, indeed, often so unmeasured as almost to amount to sedition. This greatly vexed Bonaparte, and drew from him severe reproaches and violent language.* When the news arrived of the loss of the fleet, discontent increased. All who had acquired fortunes under Napoleon, now began to fear that they would never enjoy them. All turned their thoughts to Paris, and its amusements; and were utterly disheartened at the idea of being separated from their homes and their friends for a period, the termination of which it was impossible to foresee.

The catastrophe of Aboukir came like a thunderbolt upon the general-in-chief. In spite of all his energy and fortitude, he was deeply distressed by the disasters which now assailed him.

* Napoleon related at St. Helena, that in a fit of irritation he rushed among a group of dissatisfied generals, and said to one of them, who was remarkable for his stature, "You have held seditious language; but take care I do not perform my duty. Though you are five feet ten inches high, that shall not save you from being shot."

BATAILLE D'ARBOUIN

BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.

"The Turkish outposts were assaulted early on the morning of the 24th July, 1799, and driven in with great slaughter; but the French, when they advanced, came within the range of the batteries and also of the shipping that lay close by the shore, and were checked. Their retreat might have ended in a rout, but for the undisciplined eagerness with which the Turks engaged in the task of spoiling and maiming those that fell before them—thus giving to Murat the opportunity of charging their main body in flank with his cavalry, at the moment when the French infantry, profiting by their disordered and scattered condition, and rallying under the eye of Napoleon, forced a passage to the intrenchments. From that moment, the battle was a massacre. The Turks, attacked on all sides, were panic-struck; and the sea was covered with the turbans of men who flung themselves headlong into the waves, rather than await the fury of *Le Beau Sabreur,* or the steady rolling fire of the *Sultan Kebir*. Six thousand surrendered at discretion; twelve thousand perished on the field, or in the sea."

Hist. of Napoleon Buonaparte, vol. I. p. 155.

ENGRAVED BY PETER AITKEN. FROM THE PAINTING BY J. L. GÉRÔME. PUBLICATION AUTHORIZED

BONAPARTE IN EGYPT.

To the painful feelings excited by the complaints and dejection of his companions in arms, was now added the irreparable misfortune of the burning of our fleet. He measured the fatal consequences of this event at a single glance. We were now cut off from all communication with France, and all hope of returning thither, except by a degrading capitulation with an implacable and hated enemy. Bonaparte had lost all chance of preserving his conquest, and to him this was indeed a bitter reflection. And at what a time did this disaster befall him? At the very moment when he was about to apply for the aid of the mother country. Was it possible that these perplexing circumstances could fail in making a deep and melancholy impression on the mind of Bonaparte? In asserting the contrary, his would-be panegyrists are deceived if they suppose they are paying him a compliment.

From what General Bonaparte communicated to me previously to the 1st of August, his object was, having once secured the possession of Egypt, to return to Toulon with the fleet; then to send troops and provisions of every kind to Egypt; and next to combine with the fleet all the forces that could be supplied, not only by France, but by her allies, for the purpose of attacking England. It is certain that previously to his departure for Egypt he had laid before the Directory a note relative to his plans. He always regarded a descent upon England as possible, though in its result fatal, as long as we should be inferior in naval strength; but he hoped by various manœuvres to secure a superiority on one point.*

His intention was to return to France. Availing himself of the departure of the English fleet for the Mediterranean, the alarm excited by his Egyptian expedition, the panic that would be inspired by his sudden appearance at Boulogne, and his preparations against England, he hoped to oblige that power to withdraw her naval force from the Mediterranean, and to prevent her sending out troops to Egypt. This project was often in his head. He would have thought it sublime to date an order of the day from the ruins of Memphis, and three months later one from London. The loss of the fleet converted all these bold conceptions into mere romantic visions.

When alone with me he gave free vent to his emotion. I observed to him that the disaster was doubtless great, but that it would have been infinitely more irreparable had Nelson fallen in with us at Malta, or had waited for us four-and-twenty hours before Alexandria, or in the open sea. "Any one of these events," said I, "which were not only possible but probable, would have deprived us of every resource. We are blockaded here, but we have provisions and money. Let us then wait

* The reader will find in the notes in a subsequent part of this edition, many interesting particulars connected with Bonaparte's projected invasion of England.—*Editor.*

patiently to see what the Directory will do for us.—"The Directory!" exclaimed he, angrily, "the Directory is composed of a set of scoundrels! they envy and hate me, and would gladly let me perish here. Besides, you see how dissatisfied the whole army is: not a man is willing to stay."

The pleasing illusions which were cherished at the outset of the expedition, vanished long before our arrival in Cairo. Egypt was no longer the empire of the Ptolemies, covered with populous and wealthy cities; it now presented one unvaried scene of devastation and misery. Instead of being aided by the inhabitants, whom we had ruined, for the sake of delivering them from the yoke of the beys, we found all against us: Mamelukes, Arabs, and Fellahs. No Frenchman was secure of his life who happened to stray half a mile from any inhabited place, or the corps to which he belonged. The hostility which prevailed against us, and the discontent of the army, were clearly developed in the numerous letters which were written to France at the time, and intercepted.

I can confidently affirm, and my duties afforded me every opportunity of ascertaining the fact, that there was not a man in the army who did not deplore his absence from France, and long to quit a country which had been described as a terrestrial paradise, by men who had never seen any thing beyond their native city.

The gloomy reflections which at first assailed Bonaparte, were speedily banished; and he soon recovered the fortitude and presence of mind which had been for a moment shaken by the overwhelming news from Aboukir. He however sometimes repeated, in a tone which it would be difficult to describe, "Unfortunate Brueys, what have you done!"

I have remarked that in same chance observations which escaped Napoleon at St. Helena, he endeavoured to throw all the blame of the affair on Admiral Brueys.* Persons who are

* This remark of M. de Bourrienne's is not altogether just. Napoleon, at St. Helena, blamed Villeneuve rather than Brueys. The following is Napoleon's own account of the battle of Aboukir, or, as it is designated by us, the battle of the Nile:

"On the 31st of July, Nelson detached two of his ships, which reconnoitred the French line of moorings without molestation. On the 1st of August, the English squadron appeared towards three o'clock in the afternoon with all sails set. A fresh gale of the wind usual at that season was blowing. Admiral Brueys was at dinner; part of the crews were on shore; the decks were not cleared in a single ship. The admiral immediately made the signal to prepare for action. He despatched an officer to Alexandria to demand the seamen of the convoy; shortly afterwards he made a signal to prepare to get under sail; but the enemy's squadron came up so rapidly, that there was scarcely time to clear the decks, which was done with extreme negligence. Even on board the Orient (the admiral's own ship) some cabins, which had been constructed on the poop for the accommodation of the army officers during the passage, were not destroyed; they were left full of mattresses and buckets of paint and tar. The Guerrier and the Conquerant each cleared only one tier of guns for action; the

LORD NELSON

From an engraving by J. Skelton, after A. W. Devis (1805)

London, 1849.



Engraved by Sidney Hall.

Aboukir I.
Colloden
Mutine
Wind N.N.W.
Zealous
Guerrier
Conquerant
Audacious
Vanguard
Goliah
Spartiate
Minotaur
Theseus
Defence
Serieuse
Orion
Swiftsure
Leander
Franklin
Bellerophon
Orient
Majestic
Alexander
Tonnant
Peuple Souverain
Heureux
Mercure
Guillaume Tell
Artemise
Genereux
Diane
Timoleon
Justice
PLAN
of the
BATTLE
of
THE NILE,
Aug.t 1798
a Mile English.
French Toises
MAP
of the Bay
of ABOUKIR.
English Miles
French Leagues
Rosetta
Fort Julian
R. Nile
ROSETTA
Alexandrian Tower
Gheddieh
Aboukir I.
El Hamed
Aboukir Cape
Point of Lazaretto
BAY of ABOUKIR
Lake Madiah
Lake of Edko

determined to make Bonaparte an exception to human nature, have unjustly reproached the admiral for the loss of the fleet.

side towards the land was encumbered with all that had been cleared out from the opposite side, so that when the ships were turned those tiers could not fire. The English were so much astonished at this that they sent to reconnoitre the reason of this inconsistency; they saw the French flag wave without a gun being fired.

"The men who had been detached from the different crews had scarcely time enough to return on board. The admiral, judging that the enemy would not be within gun-shot before six o'clock, supposed that he would not attack until the following day, more particularly as he only observed eleven 74-gun ships; the two others had been detached on Alexandria, and did not rejoin Nelson until eight in the evening. Brueys did not think the admiral would attack him the same day, and with only eleven ships. It is imagined that he thought at first of getting under weigh, but that he deferred giving the order, until the sailors, whom he expected from Aboukir, should be embarked. The cannonade then commenced, and an English vessel struck on the isle, which gave Brueys fresh confidence. The sailors demanded at Alexandria did not arrive till towards eight o'clock, when the cannonade was already brisk between several ships. During the tumult and darkness, a great number of them remained on shore, and did not embark. The English admiral's plan was to attack ship after ship; every English ship anchoring astern, and placing herself athwart the head of a French ship; accident altered this disposition. The Culloden, intending to attack the Guerrier, and endeavouring to pass between the left of that ship and the isle, struck. Had the isle been supplied with a few pieces of cannon, this ship would have been taken. The Goliah, which followed her, manœuvring to anchor athwart the head of the Guerrier, was carried away by the wind and current, and did not anchor until she had passed and turned that ship. Perceiving then that the larboard tiers of the Conquerant did not fire, for the reasons explained above, she placed herself alongside of that vessel, and soon disabled her. The Zealous, the second English ship, followed the movement of the Goliah, and anchoring alongside the Guerrier, which could not return her fire, speedily dismasted her. The Orion, the third English ship, executed the same manœuvre, but was retarded in her movement by the attack of a French frigate, and anchored between the Franklin and the Peuple Souverain. The Vanguard, the English admiral's ship, cast anchor athwart the Spartiate, the third French ship. The Defence, the Bellerophon, the Majestic, and the Minotaur, followed the same movement, and engaged the centre of the French line as far as the Tonnant, the eighth ship. The French admiral and his two seconds formed a line of three ships, very superior to those of the English. The fire was terrible; the Bellerophon was disabled, dismasted, and compelled to strike. Several other English ships were obliged to sheer off; and if, at that moment, Admiral Villeneuve, who commanded the right wing of the French, had cut his cables and fallen on the English line, with the five ships under his command, the Heureux, Temelon, Mercure, Guillaume Tell, Genereux, and the Diane and Justice frigates, it would have been destroyed. The Culloden had struck on the Bequieres bank, and the Leander was engaged in endeavouring to bring her off. The Alexander and Swiftsure, two other English ships, seeing that our right did not stir, and that the centre of the English line was hard pressed, made towards it. The Alexander took the place of the Bellerophon, and the Swiftsure attacked the Franklin. The Leander, which until then had been engaged in righting the Culloden, perceiving the danger in which the centre stood, hastened to reinforce it. The victory was still far from being decided. The Guerrier and Conquerant no longer fired, but they were the worst ships in the squadron; and, on the side of the English, the Culloden and Bellerophon were disabled. The centre of the French line had, by the great superiority of its fire, occasioned the ships opposed to it much more damage than it had sustained. The English had only seventy-fours, and those of a small rate. It was to be presumed that the

I will enter into a few details relative to the affair of Aboukir, for it is gratifying to render justice to the memory of a man like Admiral Brueys.

Brueys, it is said, would not go to Corfu, in spite of the positive and reiterated orders he received. Bonaparte's letter to the Directory, and his words at St. Helena, have been tortured to show that Brueys expiated by his death the great fault of which he had been guilty. Much has been said about the report of Captain Barré; but the reply of the admiral ought also to be taken into account. Brueys, for good reasons, did not think that vessels of the size of those of the squadron could enter the ports of Alexandria. But it is said the orders to repair to Corfu were reiterated; though when, and by whom, is not mentioned. From the order of the 3d of July, to the time of his unfortunate death, Brueys did not receive a line from Bonaparte, who on his

fire being thus kept up all night, Admiral Villeneuve would at last get unde weigh in the morning, and the greatest success might yet be expected from the attack of five good ships, which, as yet, had neither fired nor sustained a single cannon-shot. But, at eleven o'clock, the Orient took fire, and blew up. This unforeseen accident decided the victory. The dreadful explosion of this ship suspended the action for a quarter of an hour. Our line, undismayed by this shocking spectacle, recommenced firing. The Franklin, Tonnant, Peuple Souverain, Spartiate, and Aquilon, maintained the action until three o'clock in the morning. From three to five o'clock the firing slackened on both sides. Between five and six it redoubled, and became terrible. What would it have been if the Orient had not blown up? In short, the battle was raging at noon, and was not over before two o'clock. It was not until then that Villeneuve seemed to awaken, and to perceive that the fleet had been fighting for twenty hours. He cut his cables, and stood out with the Guillaume Tell, his flag-ship, the Genereux, and the Diane and Justice frigates. The three other ships of his wing ran ashore without fighting. Thus, notwithstanding the terrible accident of the Orient, and the singular inactivity of Villeneuve, which prevented five ships from firing a single gun, the loss and confusion of the English were such, that twenty-four hours after the battle the French flag was still flying on board the Tonnant; and Nelson had no ship in a condition to attack her. Not only the Guillaume Tell and Genereux were not pursued by any English ship, but the enemy, in the disabled state they were in, were glad to see them make off. Admiral Brueys obstinately defended the honour of the French flag; although he had received several wounds he would not go down to the cockpit. He died on his quarter-deck giving his orders. Casabianca, Thermard, and Du Petit-Thouard, acquired glory on this unfortunate day. Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, according to Nelson and the English, might have decided the victory even after the explosion of the Orient. Even at midnight, had he got under weigh, and engaged in the action with the ships of his wing, he might have annihilated the English squadron. He remained a peaceful spectator of the battle. As Rear-Admiral Villeneuve was a brave and good seaman, one has to ask what was the cause of this singular conduct? He waited for orders! It is positively asserted that the Admiral made the signal for him to weigh anchor, but that the smoke prevented him from seeing it. But was there any need of an order to take part in the battle, and assist his comrades?

"The Orient blew up at eleven o'clock; from that time till three in the afternoon, that is to say for fifteen hours, the fight was continued. It was then Villeneuve who commanded; why did he do nothing? Villeneuve was of an irresolute character, destitute of energy."—*Napoleon's Memoirs.* (*Editor.*)

BONAPARTE IN EGYPT.

part did not receive all the admiral's despatches until the 26th of July, when he was at Cairo, and consequently too late to enable his answer to come to hand before the 1st of August. Brueys is also reproached with having persisted in awaiting the course of events at Aboukir. Can it be supposed that the admiral would have remained on the coast of Egypt against the express orders of the general-in-chief, who was his superior in command?

The friendship and confidence with which Admiral Brueys honoured me, his glorious death, and the fury with which he has been accused, impose upon me the obligation of defending him. In every publication I have read relative to the event, what is termed his great fault has been the subject of animadversion.

Who is the accuser? Bonaparte.—What is the act of accusation? The letter of the general-in-chief to the Directory, of the 20th of August, 1798. In his preceding letters he constantly praised the admiral's talent and judgment.

It will be seen that in the letter of the 20th of August, which was written fifty days after his entrance into Egypt, Bonaparte, anticipating what he afterwards said in his conversations at St. Helena, distorted facts, altered dates, affirmed what was at least doubtful, and accused the innocent, in the hope of averting reproach from himself.

Bonaparte had risked a badly-equipped squadron against the English fleet. He had the good fortune to land in Egypt, but the squadron was destroyed. It will be remembered what Admiral Brueys said to me on the passage; but, says Bonaparte, "If my orders had been attended to, the fleet would not have been lost."

Napoleon's anxious desire of being transmitted faultless to posterity, had heretofore been satisfied, and he was tormented by the idea of the impression which the event of Aboukir would produce on the public mind. But he might have justified himself without accusing any one. The loss of the fleet was evidently the result of the circumstances in which we were placed, and the misery to which we were exposed during the first month of the invasion, when our naval force was supplied with provisions day by day, and almost bit by bit.

Instead of the promised land which we had been taught to expect, we had to cope with every kind of privation, added to the most vexatious hostility on the part of the people.

The whole truth never appeared in Bonaparte's despatches, when it was in any way unfavourable to himself. He knew how to disguise, to alter, or to conceal it when necessary. He not unfrequently altered the despatches of others when they ran counter to his views, or were calculated to diminish the good opinion he wished the world should entertain of him. I drew up for him the following draught of a letter to be presented to the Directory:

Admiral Brueys could not enter with his squadron into the old port of Alexandria, which is impracticable for vessels of the size of his. Imperious circumstances obliged him to wait in the road of Aboukir for a favourable moment to proceed to Corfu. His moorings, however, were not effectual. The left of his line was forced, in spite of the two mortars placed on the bank, and each of his ships was exposed to the fire of several of the enemy's. The fleet has been destroyed. I send you an exact account of our loss in men and ships. This great disaster, which could only have been caused by a combination of unfortunate circumstances, will prove the necessity of immediately forwarding to us the reinforcements and other things required for the army.

This sketch of a letter contained neither justification nor blame. After having read it, Bonaparte smiled, and returned it to me, saying, "This is too vague, too soft: it is not pointed enough. We must enter into more details, and mention those who have distinguished themselves. Besides, you would make it appear that Brueys is blameless. This will not do. You do not know the men we have to deal with. I will tell you what to write."

He then dictated to me a despatch, the first part of which consisted of a long detail of his military operations against the beys. From that subject he broke off in the following manner:

I left at Salehyeh General Reynier's division and some officers of engineers, to construct a fortress; and on the 26th Thermidor I set out to return to Cairo. I was not two leagues from Salehyeh, when General Kleber's aide-de-camp arrived with the account of the attack which our squadron had suffered on the 14th Thermidor. Owing to the difficulty of communication, the aide-de-camp had been eleven days on the journey.

On the 18th Messidor, I set out from Alexandria. I wrote to Admiral Brueys, desiring him to enter the port of that city within four-and-twenty hours, and if his squadron could not get in, to land the artillery and every thing belonging to the army, and then proceed to Corfu.

The admiral did not think he could land the artillery, &c. in the situation in which he was, being anchored among some rocks before the port of Alexandria, and several vessels having already lost their anchors. He therefore anchored in the roads of Aboukir. I sent some officers of engineers and artillery, who assured the admiral that he could receive no assistance from land; and it was agreed, that, if the English should appear within the two or three days that he was obliged to remain at Aboukir, he must make up his mind to cut his cables, and that it was desirable to stay as short a time as possible at Aboukir.

I departed from Alexandria in the firm belief that, within three days, the squadron would enter the port of Alexandria, or sail for Corfu. From the 18th Messidor to the 6th Thermidor, I had no tidings either from Rosetta or Alexandria. A cloud of Arabs, thronging from all points of the desert, were continually within a short distance of the camp. On the 9th Thermidor, the report of our victories,

together with various arrangements that were made, opened our communications. I received several letters from the admiral, which, to my surprise, announced that he was still at Aboukir. I wrote immediately to desire that he would not delay another hour, either entering Alexandria or proceeding to Corfu.

The admiral informed me by a letter of the 2d Thermidor, that several English vessels had come to reconnoitre him, and that he was preparing to receive the enemy at Aboukir. This strange resolution filled me with alarm, and I feared the business was past all remedy; for the admiral's letter of the 2d Thermidor did not arrive until the 12th. I despatched Citizen Julien to Aboukir, with orders not to leave the place until he saw the squadron under sail; but as he set out on the 12th, he could not possibly have arrived in time.

On the 8th Thermidor, the admiral wrote to inform me that the English had withdrawn, which he attributed to the scarcity of provisions. I received the letter on the 12th.

On the 11th he wrote to me that he had just heard of the victory of the Pyramids, and the taking of Cairo, and that he had found a passage for entering the port of Alexandria.

On the evening of the 14th, the enemy attacked him. As soon as he perceived the English squadron, he despatched an officer to acquaint me with his arrangements. The officer perished on the road.

I am of opinion that Admiral Brueys did not wish to proceed to Corfu until he ascertained that he could not enter the port of Alexandria, and that the army, of which he had heard nothing for a considerable time, was beyond the necessity of retreating. If on this fatal occasion he committed errors, he has expiated them by a glorious death.

Fate, apparently, wishes to prove, that if she grants us the preponderance of power on land, she has given the empire of the seas to our rivals. But however great are our reverses, we must not say that Fortune has forsaken us. Far from it: she has assisted us in this operation beyond what she ever did before. When I arrived before Alexandria, and learned that the English had passed there in superior force some days previously, I immediately landed, though at the risk of being wrecked in the storm which then raged. I recollect that at the moment when we were making preparations for landing, we descried, at some distance to windward, a ship of war (La Justice) returning from Malta. "Fortune!" I exclaimed, "wilt thou forsake me? Grant me but five days!" I marched all night, and at daybreak attacked Alexandria with three thousand men, harassed with fatigue, without cannon, and almost without cartridges. In five days I was master of Rosetta and Damanhour; that is to say, completely established in Egypt.

In these five days, the squadron ought to have been secure against any attack on the part of the English, whatever might have been their numbers; but, on the contrary, it continued exposed to danger during the remainder of Messidor. It received from Rosetta, at the beginning of Thermidor, a supply of rice for two months. The English showed themselves in superior numbers for the space of six days.

On the 11th Messidor, Admiral Brueys received information of the entire possession of Egypt and our entrance into Cairo; and it was

not until Fortune saw that all her favours were unavailing, that she abandoned the fleet to its fate.

In the above letter, a great deal is said about Fortune and Fate. All this is very fine; but the best thing Fortune could have done for the general at that time, would have been to send him provisions.

The facts above stated, together with those related in my note, will, I trust, vindicate the memory of Admiral Brueys. A perusal of the official documents connected with the event, must convince every reflecting person that the general-in-chief did not really entertain any idea of despatching the squadron to Corfu before he was in possession of Cairo: and that he did not write to Brueys, on the 6th of July, the letter which he mentions. He was too provident to deprive himself immediately of so great a resource in case of a reverse of fortune. He acted like a man who could foresee events. He was not to blame for the loss of the fleet; but neither was Admiral Brueys. Before Bonaparte departed for Salehyeh, he frequently spoke to me of the possibility of his embarking again with the fleet.

CHAPTER XVII.

1798.

El Coraim—His execution—Misunderstanding and explanation between Bonaparte and Kleber—The Egyptian Institute—Festival of the Birth of Mahomet—Bonaparte's prudent respect for the Mahometan religion—His Turkish dress—Djezzar, the Pasha of Acre—Thoughts of a campaign in Germany—Want of news from France—Anniversary of the 1st Vendémiaire—Bonaparte and Madame Fourés—The Egyptian Fortune-teller, M. Berthollet and the sheik El Bekri—The air Marlbrook—Insurrection in Cairo—Death of General Dupuy—Death of Sulkowsky—The insurrection quelled—Nocturnal Executions—Destruction of a tribe of Arabs—Convoy of sick and wounded—Massacre of the French—Projected expedition to Syria—Letter to Tippoo Saib.

I HAVE already mentioned the name of Coraim: I will now relate a few particulars of his history, which may afford an idea of the character of most of the Egyptian chiefs, such as we found them on our arrival in the country.

General Kleber sent on board the Orient the Sherif of Alexandria, Sidy Mohammed el Coraim, who was arrested by order of Bonaparte on the charge of treason.

The following order was issued against him:

"The general-in-chief having proofs of the treason of Sidy Mohammed el Coraim, whom he had loaded with favours, orders—That Sidy Mohammed el Coraim shall pay a contribution of three hundred thousand francs; in default of which, five

days after the publication of the present order, he shall forfeit his head."

Coraim came from Aboukir to Cairo to defend himself against the accusation. On his arrival at Cairo, I desired Venture, our interpreter, to urge him to save his life by the payment of the fine; and to assure him that the general was determined to make an example. He was a fine handsome man, and his situation excited my interest. "You are rich," said I to him, through the medium of Venture, "therefore make the sacrifice." He smiled contemptuously, and replied, "If I am to die now, nothing can save me, and I should be giving away my piastres uselessly; and if I am not to die, why should I give them at all?" He was executed at Cairo, on the 6th of September, 1798, at noon, and his head was paraded through the streets of the city with the following placard: "Coraim, Sherif of Alexandria, condemned to death for having violated the oaths of fidelity he had taken to the French Republic, and for having maintained correspondence with the Mamelukes, to whom he was a spy. Thus shall be punished all traitors and perjurers!"

Coraim had taken his precautions so well, that nothing was found after his death. But this example facilitated the collection of the forced contributions, and intimidated some other rich chiefs, who were not such stanch fatalists as he.

The satirical way in which Kleber spoke of the Egyptian expedition, and the unreserved frankness of his correspondence, had produced a degree of coolness between him and the general-in-chief, who expressed his displeasure in language not more moderate than that which was attributed to Kleber. The latter being informed of this, wrote the following letter to the general-in-chief on the 22d of August, 1798:

You would be unjust, Citizen-general, to regard as a mark of weakness or discouragement the vehemence with which I have described my wants to you. It matters little to me where I live, or where I die, provided I live for the glory of France, and die as I have lived. Under any circumstances, therefore, you may rely on me as well as upon those whom you order to obey me. I have already told you that. The event of the 14th* has excited in the minds of the soldiers nothing but indignation and the desire of revenge. I am, in truth, much displeased with the navy, which I have seen under the most unfavourable point of view. The enormous quantity of baggage landed at Alexandria, and the style in which the naval officers have been seen in the streets of that city, prove that few of them have sustained serious loss. Besides the English have disinterestedly restored every thing to the prisoners, and have not suffered them to be deprived of an iota. It was not so with our military officers. No one has pleaded their cause; and being too proud to plead it themselves under such circumstances, they arrived here almost without clothing, and many of them, rather than surrender, preferred throwing themselves into the sea.

To this letter Bonaparte replied—

* The loss of the fleet (1st August, 1791).

Rely on the value I attach to your esteem and friendship; I fear a little misunderstanding has arisen between us. You would be unjust to doubt how much it vexes me. In Egypt, when clouds appear they pass away in six hours; on my part, should any arise, they shall be banished in three. The regard I cherish for you, is at least equal to that which you have sometimes evinced for me.

This lukewarm reciprocal assurance of esteem did not diminish the dislike they mutually entertained of each other.

The loss of the fleet convinced General Bonaparte of the necessity of speedily and effectively organizing Egypt, where every thing denoted that we should stay for a considerable time, except in the event of a forced evacuation, which the general was far from foreseeing or fearing. The distance of Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey now left him a little at rest. War, fortifications, taxation, government, the organization of the divans, trade, art, and science, all occupied his attention. Orders and instructions were immediately despatched, if not to repair the defeat, at least to avert the first danger that might ensue from it. On the 21st of August Bonaparte established at Cairo an institute of the arts and sciences, of which he subsequently appointed me a member in the room of M. de Sucy, who was obliged to return to France, in consequence of the wound he received on board the flotilla in the Nile.*

In founding this Institute, Bonaparte wished to afford an example of his ideas of civilization. The minutes of the sittings of that learned body, which have been printed, bear evidence of its utility, and of Napoleon's extended views. The objects of the Institute were the advancement and propagation of information in Egypt, and the study and publication of all facts relating to the natural history, trade, and antiquities of that ancient country.

On the 18th, Bonaparte was present at the ceremony of opening the dyke of the canal of Cairo, which receives the

* The Institute of Egypt was composed of members of the French Institute, and of the men of science and artists of the commission who did not belong to that body. They assembled and added to their number several officers of the artillery and staff, and others who had cultivated the sciences of literature.

The Institute was established in one of the palaces of the beys. The grand hall of the harem, by means of some alterations, became the place of their sittings, and the rest of the palace served for the habitation of the members. Before this building there was a very extensive garden, which adjoined the country, and near which the fort called De l'Institut was erected on a mount.

A great number of machines, and physical, chemical, and astronomical instruments, had been brought from France. They were distributed in the different rooms, which were also successively filled with all the curiosities of the country, whether of the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdom.

The garden of the palace became a botanical garden. A chemical laboratory was formed at head-quarters: Berthollet performed experiments there several times every week, at which Napoleon and a great number of officers attended. —*Memoirs of Napoleon. (Editor.)*

BONAPARTE, KLEBER, EUGENE DE BEAUHARNAIS, LASALLE, AND JUNOT AT THE TIVOLI GARDEN IN CAIRO

water of the Nile when it reaches the height fixed by the Mequyas.

Two days after came the anniversary festival of the birth of Mahomet. At this Napoleon was also present, in company with the sheik El Bekri,* who at his request gave him two young Mamelukes, Ibrahim and Roustan.

It has been alleged, that Bonaparte, when in Egypt, took part in the religious ceremonies and worship of the Mussulmans; but it cannot be said that he *celebrated* the festivals of the overflowing of the Nile, and the anniversary of the prophet. The Turks invited him to these, merely as a spectator; and the presence of their new master was gratifying to the people. But he never committed the folly of ordering any solemnity. He neither learned nor repeated any prayer of the Koran, as many persons have asserted; neither did he advocate fatalism, polygamy, or any other doctrine of the Koran. Bonaparte employed himself better than in discussing with the imans the theology of the children of Ismael. The ceremonies, at which policy induced him to be present, were to him, and to all who accompanied him, mere matters of curiosity. He never set foot in a mosque; and only on one occasion, which I shall hereafter mention, dressed himself in the Mahometan costume. He attended the festivals to which the green turbans invited him.† His re-

* The general-in-chief went to celebrate the feast of the prophet, at the house of the sheik El Bekri. The ceremony was begun by the recital of a kind of litany, containing the life of Mahomet from his birth to his death. About a hundred sheiks sitting in a circle, on carpets, with their legs crossed, recited all the verses, swinging their bodies violently backwards and forwards, and altogether.

A grand dinner was afterwards served up, at which the guests sat on carpets, with their legs across. There were twenty tables, and five or six people at each table. That of the general-in-chief and the sheik El Bekri was in the middle; a little slab of a precious kind of wood ornamented with mosaic work, was placed eighteen inches above the floor, and covered with a great number of dishes in succession. They were pilaws of rice, a particular kind of roast, entrées, and pastry, all very highly spiced. The sheiks picked every thing with their fingers. Accordingly water was brought to wash the hands three times during dinner. Gooseberry-water, lemonade, and other sorts of sherbets, were served to drink, and abundance of preserves and confectionary with the dessert. On the whole, the dinner was not disagreeable; it was only the manner of eating it that seemed strange to us.

In the evening the whole city was illuminated. After dinner the party went into the square of El Bekri, the illumination of which, in coloured glass, was very beautiful. An immense concourse of people attended. They were all placed in order, in ranks of from twenty to a hundred persons, who, standing close together, recited the prayers and litanies of the prophet with movements which kept increasing, until, at length, they seemed to be convulsive, and some of the most zealous fainted away.—*Memoirs of Napoleon.* (*Editor.*)

† From this Sir Walter Scott infers that he did not scruple to join the Mussulmans in the external ceremonies of their religion. He embellishes his romance with the ridiculous farce of the sepulchral chamber of the grand pyramid, and the speeches which were addressed to the general as well as to the muftis and imans; and he adds that Bonaparte was on the point of embracing Islamism. All that Sir Walter says on this subject is the height of absurdity, and does not

ligious tolerance was the natural consequence of his philosphic spirit.

Doubtless Bonaparte did, as he was bound to do, show respect for the religion of the country; and he found it necessary to act more like a Mussulman than a Catholic. A wise conqueror supports his triumphs by protecting, and even elevating the religion of the conquered people. Bonaparte's principle was, as he himself has often told me, to look upon religions as the work of men, but to respect them every where as a powerful engine of government. However, I will not go so far as to say that he would not have changed his religion, had the conquest of the east been the price of that change. All that he said about Mahomet, Islamism, and the Koran, to the great men of the country, he laughed at himself. He enjoyed the gratification of having all his fine sayings on the subject of religion translated into Arabic poetry, and repeated from mouth to mouth. This of course tended to conciliate the people.

The letter of the general-in-chief, in which he consigned the command to Kleber, contained the following passage:

"The Christians will always be our friends: but we must prevent them from being too insolent, lest the Turks should conceive against us the same fanatical hatred they cherish towards the Christians, in which case they would be irreconcilable."

On the 13th of March, 1799, he wrote to Menon—

"I thank you for the honours you have rendered to *our* prophet."

I confess that Bonaparte frequently conversed with the chiefs of the Mussulman religion, on the subject of his conversion; but only for the sake of amusement. The priests of the Koran, who would probably have been delighted to convert us, offered us the most ample concessions. But these conversations were merely started by way of entertainment, and never could have warranted a supposition of their leading to any serious result. If Bonaparte spoke as a Mussulman, it was merely in his character of a military and political chief, in a Mussulman country. To do so was essential to his success, to the safety of his army, and, consequently, to his glory. In every country he would have drawn up proclamations, and delivered addresses, on the same principle. In India, he would have been for Ali; at Thibet, for the Dalai-lama; and in China for Confucius.*

even deserve to be seriously refuted. Bonaparte never entered a mosque except from motives of curiosity, and he never for one moment afforded any ground for supposing that he *believed in the mission of Mahomet.*

* On the subject of his alleged conversion to Mahometanism, Bonaparte expressed himself at St. Helena as follows:

"I never followed any of the tenets of that religion. I never prayed in the mosques. I never abstained from wine, or was circumcised, neither did I ever profess it. I said merely that we were the friends of the Mussulmans, and that I respected Mahomet their prophet, which was true; I respect him now. I wanted to make the Imans cause prayers to be offered up in the mosques for me

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
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